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Innovation Agents
Mirit Eyal-Cohen*
Abstract
The standard narrative of entrepreneurship is one of
self-employed creative individuals working out of their garage or
independently
owned
start-up
companies.
Intrapreneurship— where employees are responsible for being alert
to new opportunities inside firms—is another model for developing
innovations. Relatively little is known, however, about the latter
process through which large, complex firms engage in
groundbreaking corporate entrepreneurship.
This Article’s focus is on these types of innovation agents. It
provides a thorough account of the positive and negative spillovers
of intrapreneurial firms while making the following key points:
First, intrapreneurial companies utilize their economies of scale,
scope, and age to deliver innovations to the masses. They transform
ideas, labor, and raw materials into tangible assets that can be
traded in the market. Second, in doing so they offer individual
entrepreneurs opportunities to capitalize their knowledge.
Sustaining entrepreneurs’ prospects for supra-competitive profits is
the main engine that motivates the latter to invest in discoveries in
the first place. Lastly, intrapreneurial firms also serve as
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greenhouses for entrepreneurship through the migration of their
own talented labor in the market.
While these spillovers have tremendous societal benefits, they
can also introduce harms. First, the race for the next breakthrough
might result in anticompetitive behavior by rivals who conspire
with employees-intrapreneurs to leave their firms and take with
them confidential information. Second, intrapreneurs often aspire
to undertake their own independent journey. In so doing, they leave
secure positions and high salaries while carrying valuable
knowledge and expertise. This, in return, often prompts
intrapreneurial firms to act opportunistically and lock-in or
lock-out intrapreneurs in restrictive and wasteful arrangements. As
a solution, this Article proposes ways law can balance the positive
and negative spillovers of intrapreneurship and ways the tax
system can help achieve such result.
Keywords:
Entrepreneurs,
Intrapreneurship,
Internal
Corporate Venturing, Innovation, Agents, Spillovers, Externalities,
Experience, Age, Scope, Economic Growth, Competition,
Non-Competes, Non-Disclosure, Anti-Poaching.
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I. Introduction
If you want to go quickly, go alone. If you want to go far, go
together.
—African Proverb

During one Northern California summer day, engineer
Anthony Levandowski decided to create a self-driving car
start-up.1 He subsequently contacted executives at Uber’s
self-driving car project to propose his new idea.2 Alas, Levandowski
was working at Google’s self-driving unit, Waymo, when he decided
to create his competing venture.3 He soon formed Ottomotto
(“Otto”) and resigned from Waymo without prior notice once Uber
executives expressed interest in buying his start-up.4 Uber
eventually bought Otto for approximately $680 million and hired
Levandowski to lead its self-driving car efforts. Subsequently,
other senior employees at Waymo began leaving to join
Levandowski at Otto.5 Waymo discovered a breach in confidential
1. See Waymo LLC v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. C 17-00939 WHA, 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 73843, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 2017) (“In summer of 2015, while
working for Waymo, Levandowski told coworker Pierre Yves Droz that it would
be nice to create a new self-driving car start-up.”).
2. See id. at *6–7 (describing emails between Uber executives that reference
Levandowski’s venture).
3. See id. at *6 (describing the actions Levandowski took when creating his
start-up).
4. See id. at *7–8, 47 nn.21–27 (detailing the underlying facts that led to
litigation).
5. Waymo’s former employees were Sameer Kshirsagar (a manager who,
among other things, negotiated with LiDAR hardware suppliers) and Radu
Raduta (then a manufacturing engineer in Waymo’s LiDAR department). Id. at
*8.
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information upon investigating the hasty departure of several of
its employees and filed a $1 billion lawsuit seeking an injunction
against Uber’s use of its LiDAR technology.6
The District Court for the Northern District of California sided
with Waymo and enjoined former Waymo employees from working
for Uber on the LiDAR technology project.7 Uber eventually
discharged these employees to validate non-use of Google’s trade
secrets.8 While Uber denied using Google’s proprietary information
in its self-driving technology, Uber apologized for its conduct and
settled the suit.9 It further promised not to use Waymo’s
technology to develop its driverless cars in the future.10 Uber CEO
Dara Khosrowshahi stated the following when addressing the
issue:
6. See Amanda Silvestri, Waymo, Uber Settle Stolen Trade Secrets Lawsuit
DAILY
NEWS
(Feb.
12,
2018),
for
$245
Million,
N.Y.
https://www.nydailynews.com/autos/news/waymo-uber-self-driving-tech-tradesecrets-lawsuit-settlement-article-1.3815484 (last visited Feb. 13, 2019)
(reporting that “[b]efore the fifth day of testimony was set to commence in a San
Francisco federal court, Uber agreed to pay $245 million worth of its own shares
to Waymo, meaning the Google-owned self-driving company will acquire a 0.34
percent stake in Uber’s $72 billion current valuation”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
7. See Waymo LLC, 2017 U.S. District LEXIS 73843, at *46 (granting
Waymo’s motion for provisional relief).
8. District Court Judge William Alsup ordered Uber to immediately remove
Anthony Levandowski from any role or responsibility pertaining to LiDAR, any
communication on the subject of LiDAR with any officer, director, employee,
agent, supplier, consultant, or customer and instruct the latter in writing of this
prohibition and report such breach to the court. Id. at *42.
9. See Statement by Dara Khosrowshahi, CEO of Uber, Uber and Waymo
Reach
Settlement,
UBER
NEWSROOM
(Feb.
9,
2018),
https://www.uber.com/newsroom/uber--waymo--settlement/ (last visited Feb. 13,
2019) [hereinafter Khosrowshahi Statement] (“As we change the way we operate
and put integrity at the core of every decision we make, we look forward to the
great race to build the future. We believe that race should be fair—and one whose
ultimate winners are people, cities and our environment.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
10. LiDAR stands for “Light Detection and Ranging,” a remote sensing
technology that uses light in the form of a pulsed laser to measure distances. See
Michelle Birdsall, Google and ITE: The Road Ahead for Self-Driving Cars, 84
INST. TRANSP. ENGIN. 36, 37 (2014) (exemplifying the usage of LiDAR technology
in Google’s self-driving project).

INNOVATION AGENTS

167

I want to express regret for the actions that have caused me to
write this letter. To our friends at Alphabet: we are partners,
you are an important investor in Uber, and we share a deep
belief in the power of technology to change people’s lives for the
better. Of course, we are also competitors.11

While this may seem like an ordinary trade secrets case, its
circumstances evince a newly emerging practice in innovative
conglomerates. Uber was not the first, nor will it be the last, to
utilize human capital to its benefit.12 As more companies realize
the importance of technological advancements, their investments
in research and development vastly increase.13 The higher the
stakes become, the more conflicts between competitors trickle
down to their employees.14
Similarly, a technology company, ZeniMax, has been working
on a joint venture with Oculus to create a virtual reality headset
called Oculus Rift.15 Along with other ZeniMax engineers headed
by John Carmack, Oculus and ZeniMax made improvements to the
11. See Khosrowshahi Statement, supra note 9 (noting that Google’s parent
company Alphabet sued Uber over stealing trade secrets from its subsidiary
company Waymo).
12. See ZeniMax Media, Inc. v. Oculus VR, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 3d 697, 698
(N.D. Tex. 2015) (describing a situation in which a creator entered into an
agreement with ZeniMax then went on to found his own company); E.I. DuPont
De Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., No. 3:09CV58, 2011 WL 1597528, at *1– 3
(E.D. Va. 2011) (detailing how a former employee of DuPont was hired by Kolon
and subsequently transmitted knowledge of DuPont products to his new
employer).
13. See, e.g., SOI Tax Stats–Corporation Research Credit, Figure B: Number
of Research Credit Claimants, by Size of Business Receipts for Tax Years
IRS,
https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-corporation1990– 2013,
research-credit (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (reporting that largest claimants of the
R&D tax credit in 2013 were firms with over $250 million in receipts) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
14. See Michael Elkon, 4 Steps to Avoid ‘Bet-The-Company’ Trade Secret
Litigation, LAW 360 (June 5, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/930610/4steps-to-avoid-bet-the-company-trade-secret-litigation (last visited Feb. 13, 2019)
(reporting that Uber CEO Travis Kalanick described Uber’s efforts to develop a
driverless car as critical to its very existence) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
15. See Lucas Matney, Zuckerberg Testifies in $2 Billion Lawsuit that Oculus
Did Not Steal Core VR Tech, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 17, 2017),
https://techcrunch.com/2017/01/17/zuckerberg-testifies-in-2-billion-lawsuit-thatoculus-did-not-steal-core-vr-tech/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (describing the basic
structure of the lawsuit) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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technological capabilities and design of the virtual reality
headset.16 Oculus showcased the Rift at technology exhibitions
where it was met with excitement.17 ZeniMax entered negotiations
with Oculus for an equity interest to compensate them for Oculus’s
reliance on ZeniMax technology and engineers but negotiations
eventually stalled.18 Shortly afterward, Carmack left his position
with ZeniMax and was hired as the Chief Technical Officer at
Oculus.19 About six months later, five other senior employees at
ZeniMax abruptly resigned and joined Oculus.20 The following
month, Facebook announced that it would purchase Oculus for $2
billion. ZeniMax sued and was awarded a $300 million verdict in
damages for infringement of various intellectual property rights.21
These latest sagas emphasize a problem that transcends
intellectual property litigation. Innovative knowledge is expensive
and transitory.22 Cutting-edge technology companies constantly
face substantial risks from former employees.23 Throughout their
16. See id. (detailing John Carmack’s employment history with both
companies).
17. See Complaint at 16, ZeniMax Media, Inc. v. Oculus VR, LLC, 166 F.
Supp. 3d 697 (N.D. Tex. 2014) (No. 3:14CV01849) (giving an overview of the facts
surrounding ZeniMax’s participation in the Electronic Entertainment Expo).
18. See id. at 92 (noting the defendants’ refusal “to enter into serious
negotiations”).
19. See id. at 95 (giving an overview of the facts surrounding Carmack’s
move to Oculus).
20. See id. at 97 (“On February 17, 2014, five additional senior employees of
ZeniMax, all of whom worked closely with Carmack at ID Software,
simultaneously resigned.”).
21. See ZeniMax Media Inc. v. Oculus VR Inc., 9 Tex. J.V.R.A. 12:6, 2017 WL
4820007 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 2017) (summarizing the verdict).
22. See Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Through the Lens of Innovation, 43 FLA. ST. L.
REV. 951, 981 (2016) (noting that discoveries in the innovation process are
transient due to knowledge spillover and non-rivalrous nature of knowledge
discoveries in the innovation process are transient).
23. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Ignacio Lopez de Arriortua, 948 F.
Supp. 656 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss in case where
Volkswagen hired executives from competitor car manufacturers and allegedly
received twenty boxes of stolen documents from General Motors and Opel);
Bloomberg News, Ex-Employee Pleads Guilty in Taking of Kodak Data, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 29, 1997, at D00002 (describing how an employee of thirty years
retired from Kodak, started a consulting company, hired sixty former Kodak
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employment, engineers and innovators are exposed to competitive
knowledge that if revealed, has the potential to damage, or even
force the company to shutter its doors. On the other hand, that
same innovative knowledge can be useful in promoting
independent entrepreneurship with interchanging technologies in
other industries and greatly promote innovation. For example,
while not a party to the Uber–Google litigation, Lior Ron, one of
Otto’s co-founders, was a former product lead for Google Maps and
former product lead for Motorola Mobility (which was later
acquired by Google).24 When asked why he left Google, Ron replied
that he “felt an obligation to bring this technology to society sooner
rather than later.”25 Ron continues to lead Otto, which developed
into a stand-alone company focused on upending the long-distance
trucking industry.26 He recently developed the app UberFreight
that helps vet and approve truck drivers. UberFreight provides
drivers with information on nearby available load jobs, calculates
distance for their destinations, and even pays them upfront for the
drive.27
There has been an increase in legal literature regarding who
owns human capital that contributes to innovation and growth
employees, and began to sell Kodak trade secrets).
24. See Mark Harris, The Man Who Built Google’s First Self-Driving Car is
Now
a
Trucker,
WIRED
(May
17,
2016
12:00
AM),
https://www.wired.com/2016/05/the-man-who-built-googles-first-self-driving-caris-now-a-trucker/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (using a Q&A format with Lior Ron
to report on the growth and development of Otto) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
25. Jack Stewart, $30K Retrofit Turns Dumb Semis into Self-Driving Robots,
WIRED (May 17, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/05/otto-retrofit-autonomousself-driving-trucks/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
26. See Katy Steinmetz, Why Self-Driving Trucks May Be the Next Big Thing
on the Road, TIME (Sept. 12, 2016), http://time.com/4475620/why-selfdriving-trucks-may-be-the-next-big--thing-on-the-road/ (last visited Feb. 13,
2019) (detailing the major breakthroughs Otto has made and the highlighting the
advantages of highway-autonomous trucks) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
27. See Darrell Etherington, Uber Freight Launches to Connect Truck
Drivers with Available Shipments, TECHCRUNCH (May 18, 2017),
https://techcrunch.com/2017/05/18/uber-freight-launches-to-connect-truckdrivers-with-available-shipments/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (presenting a promo
video for UberFreight and describing the services provided) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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occurring within an organization.28 Labor turnover is essentially
the process by which employees transmit the abilities and
knowledge aggregated throughout their employment to other
employers.29 While these employees possess knowledge in their
minds, they may not control the final innovative product developed
in the firm.30 Thus, scholars question whether tort law, intellectual
property law, labor law, or antitrust law should encourage greater
or lesser employee mobility in the knowledge-based economy.31
When discussing such questions, we should consider the interests
of several market players.
This Article endeavors to fill this gap by considering the
mobility of key engineers and managers in groundbreaking
conglomerates (“employees-intrapreneurs” or “intrapreneurs”)
from an agency perspective. It posits that different innovation
agents provide distinct kinds of social welfare. Each tells only part
of the story of the evolving role of discoveries. They respectively
generate unique spillovers, thereby requiring distinct approaches.
Unraveling the answers to the questions of who innovates and how
is imperative for policymakers aiming to promote and regulate
private sector innovation growth.32 While much has been written
28. See ORLY LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE: WHY WE SHOULD LEARN TO
LOVE LEAKS, RAIDS, AND FREE RIDING 13–16 (2013) (arguing that innovative
knowledge exists not only in company databases and computers, but also in the
minds of employees); Orly Lobel, The New Cognitive Property: Human Capital
Law and the Reach of Intellectual Property, 93 TEX. L. REV. 789, 790 (2015) (same);
Lily Kahng, Who Owns Human Capital?, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 607, 610 (2017)
(showing how tax law provides significant subsidies to business owners to
“propertize” labor into intellectual capital).
29. See Catherine L. Fisk, Trade Secrets, Restrictive Covenants
in Employment, and the Rise of Corporate Intellectual Property, 1800–1920, 52
HASTINGS L.J. 441, 446 (2001) (detailing the history of courts’ recognition of
knowledge as a form of property).
30. See Lobel, supra note 28, at 797–99 (describing an instance in which a
court required a terminated employee to disclose to his former employer his idea
even though the idea had only existed in the employee’s head).
31. See Henry Drummonds, Workplace Secrets, Loyalty, and Theft, 20 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 399, 400 (2016) (questioning whether the law of trade secrets,
non-competition agreements, employee duty of loyalty, and tortious interference
encourage employee mobility).
32. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, THE MICROTHEORY OF INNOVATIVE
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 27 (2010) (“The major breakthroughs have tended to come

INNOVATION AGENTS

171

about the entrepreneurial character,33 and the development and
difficulties of entrepreneurship,34 little has been accounted for its
counterpart—intrapreneurial firms.35
This Article contributes to the literature by extending the
theory of innovation to “intrapreneurship,” namely within large,
complex, groundbreaking organization.36 Also dubbed as
“corporate entrepreneurship” or “internal corporate venturing,”
intrapreneurship is the process whereby a group of employees in
an existing organization instigate renewal or innovation within
that organization.37 Lockheed Advanced Development Projects
(also known as “Skunk Works”)38 is an example of a group within
from small, new enterprises, while the invaluable incremental contributions that
multiply capacity and speed and increase reliability and user-friendliness have
been the domain of the larger firms.”).
33. For a general overview of psychological theories of entrepreneurial
attributes, see Edward P. Lazear, Balanced Skills and Entrepreneurship, 94 AM.
ECON. REV. 208, 208–11 (2004) (providing a general overview of psychological
theories of entrepreneurial attributes).
34. See Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, The Law as Stimulus: The Role of Law
in Fostering Innovative Entrepreneurship, 6 ISJLP 153, 170 (2010) (discussing
risks and rewards of entrepreneurs). See generally DAVID ROBINSON & MANJU
PURI, WHO ARE ENTREPRENEURS AND WHY DO THEY BEHAVE THAT WAY? (2006),
http://bus.msjc.edu/Portals/22/entreprenuers.pdf.
35. See Darian M. Ibrahim, Intrapreneurship, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1741,
1743 (2016) (“What receives less attention is innovation that takes place inside
our largest corporations, referred to as intrapreneurship.”); Tamara C. Belinfanti,
Contemplating the Gap-Filling Role of Social Intrapreneurship, 94 OR. L. REV. 67,
68 (2015) (“Although much has been written about social intrapreneurs in
managerial literature, legal literature has been silent.”).
36. Economists first coined the term “intrapreneurship” in the 1980s. See
generally Norman Macrae, Intrapreneurial Now, ECONOMIST, Apr. 1982, at 67, 68.
Up until the last decade, units that were divisions of large firms were excluded
from the definition of entrepreneurs because it was difficult to establish their
autonomy. See Joseph Bankman & Ronald J. Gilson, Why Start-Ups?, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 289, 289–90 (1999) (noting that “the prototypical start-up involves an
employee leaving her job with an idea”).
37. See R. Duane Ireland, Jeffrey G. Covin & Donald F. Kuratko,
Conceptualizing Corporate Entrepreneurship Strategy, 33 ENTREP. THEORY &
PRAC. 19, 20 (2009) (providing an overview of corporate entrepreneurship);
Pramodita Sharma & James J. Chrisman, Toward a Reconciliation of the
Definitional Issues in the Field of Corporate Entrepreneurship, 23 ENTREP.
THEORY & PRAC. 11, 12 (1999) (discussing corporate venturing).
MARTIN,
38. See
Skunk
Works
Origin
Story,
LOCKHEED
https://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/aeronautics/skunkworks/origin.html
(last
visited Feb. 13, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The
first Skunk Works project was in 1943 when the United States Army’s Air
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an organization given a high degree of autonomy to work on
cutting-edge projects.39 This group was responsible for major
innovative aircraft developments such as the Nighthawk,
Blackbird, Raptor and the F-35.40 Intrapreneurial behavior
involves continuous search for new opportunities, creation of
innovative knowledge, and regeneration of original products.41
While entrepreneurship denotes an independent process within
the entrepreneur’s external resources and environment,
intrapreneurship involves new combinations nested in the internal
resources of the firm.42 These conglomerates use their vast market
experience, exposure, and resources to develop and deliver new
discoveries.43
Tactical Service Command (ATSC) asked Lockheed Aircraft Corporation to create
a jet fighter quickly to deal with the German air force. Due to lack of room,
engineers started off work in a circus tent that emitted a strong odor because of
the intensive manufacturing work done inside. An engineer on the team was a
fan of the comic Li’l Abner, which has a running joke about a mysterious and very
bad smelling place deep in the forest called “Skunk Works.” He began referring
to the tent as Skunk Works, and it soon officially evolved into Lockheed’s “Skunk
Works” project. Id.
39. See id. (discussing how the Skunk Works “challeng[ed] the current
bureaucratic system that stifled innovation and hindered progress”).
40. See, e.g., Factbox: Lockheed’s Skunk Works Behind Many U.S. Military
Aircraft, REUTERS (Dec. 10, 2014, 7:12 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/uslockheed-skunkworks-factbox/factbox-lockheeds-skunk-works-behind-many-u-smilitary-aircraft-idUSKBN0JO17G20141210 (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (listing
Skunk Works’ innovations) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
41. See JOE J. AMBERG & SARA L. MCGAUGHEY, FOSTERING LOCAL
ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN A MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 2 (2017) (describing the
process of “corporate entrepreneurship” as a group of individuals in an existing
organization instigating innovation within the firm).
42. See Robert A. Burgelman, Corporate Entrepreneurship and Strategic
Management: Insights from a Process Study, 29 MGMT. SCI. 1349, 1354 (1983)
(distinguishing between “internal” and “external” entrepreneurship).
43. See D. Gordon Smith & Masako Ueda, Law & Entrepreneurship: Do
Courts Matter?, 1 ENTREPREN. BUS. L.J. 353, 356 (2006) (“Important issues in
entrepreneurship by new firms arise from lack of experience and resources, which
established firms usually possess.”). Up until the last decade, units that were
divisions of large firms were excluded from the definition of entrepreneurs
because it was difficult to establish their autonomy. See Arshad M. Khan & V.
Manopichetwattana, Innovative and Noninnovative Small Firms: Types and
Characteristics, 35 MGMT. SCI. 597, 600 (1989).
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After examining the innovation process from the perspective
of the intrapreneurial enterprise, this Article concludes that a
nation’s economic development depends on entrepreneurship
combined with the strength of intrapreneurship.44 It further
argues that the greatest externalities of intrapreneurial firms are
their hub for entrepreneurs’ exit and capitalization, their human
capital spilling over into the labor market, and their cultivation of
future individual-entrepreneurs. These spillovers, found in other
companies, are more pronounced in the intrapreneurial context.45
While these spillovers are beneficial to society and to the
innovation process, they can be detrimental to intrapreneurial
firms whose competitive advantage relies heavily on innovative
knowledge.46 As a result, these firms are more likely to develop
mechanisms that will cause lock-in and lock-out effects of human
capital.47 This Article recognizes these negative externalities that
warrant special attention. It provides policymakers a unique
viewpoint on today’s greenhouses of human capital.
Part I of this Article provides a taxonomy of innovation agency
and focuses on entrepreneurship and its significance to the
discovery process. Part II distinguishes between entrepreneurship
and intrapreneurship. It examines the innovation process in
intrapreneurial companies from both the organization and the
employee-intrapreneur’s perspective. Part III then analyzes the
positive spillovers of intrapreneurial firms such as training the
next generation of entrepreneurs and providing them exit
44. Id. at 97, 104; see also Zoltán J. Ács, “Entrepreneurial Capitalism” in
Capitalist Development: Toward a Synthesis of Capitalist Development and the
“Economy as a Whole,” in ZOLTÁN J. ÁCS, DAVID B. AUDRETSCH & ROBERT J. STROM,
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, GROWTH, AND PUBLIC POLICY 319 (2006) [Hereinafter
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, GROWTH, AND PUBLIC POLICY] (developing Schumpeter’s
theory describing the U.S. rediscovering the importance of innovation and
entrepreneurship).
45. See Leaps of Faith, ECONOMIST, (Feb. 18, 1999), https://www.economist.
com/special-report/1999/02/18/leaps-of-faith (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (“Most
successful innovations are born, bred, and brought to market entirely within
well-established organizations, mainly large companies. The people who do this
for a living are not so much entrepreneurs as intrapreneurs.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
46. See Belinfanti, supra note 35, at 109 (expressing concern that lock-in
procedures will cripple intrapreneurial innovation).
47. See id. (explaining that companies implement lock-in procedures to
secure control over employee inventions).
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opportunities. Thereafter, Part IV describes legal arrangements
that intrapreneurial firms undertake to lock-in employees in the
company or lock-out employees from competitors’ reach in the hope
of avoiding its dissemination. Part V suggests ways to amend the
current legal environment and maximize social welfare by
maintaining the positive and preventing the negative externalities
of intrapreneurial firms. Lastly, Part VI concludes by reflecting on
future research on the topic.
II. The Innovation Process
The term “innovation” often denotes novelty, originality, and
newness.48 Joseph Schumpeter, an influential scholar from the
Austrian school of economic thought, defined economic
development as a dynamic process of change.49 He claimed that the
circular flow of economic life evolves through a process of “creative
destruction”—that is, cycles of punctuated equilibria disrupted by
sudden leaps of endogenous innovation.50 In other words,
innovations destroy the basis of the old economy and pave the way
for a new economic order with higher levels of prosperity and
welfare.51 In 2007, the introduction of the smartphone by Apple
radicalized many industries.52 The iPhone allowed consumers to
48. See Sofia Ranchordás, Does Sharing Mean Caring? Regulating
Innovation in the Sharing Economy, 16 MINN J.L. SCI. & TECH. 413, 427 (2015)
(explaining that innovation is the ability to take new ideas and translate these
original ideas into outcomes using new processes, products, or services).
49. See Markus C. Becker, Thorbjorn Knudsen & Richard Swedberg,
Introduction, in JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE ENTREPRENEUR: CLASSIC TEXTS BY
JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER 1, 4 (Markus C. Becker, Thorbjørn Knudsen & Richard
Swedberg eds., 2011) (noting that Schumpeter’s most famous work on the theory
of entrepreneurship is his Theory of Economic Development (1911), which started
to draw attention soon after it was translated into English under Schumpeter’s
supervision and published in 1934).
50. As opposed to passive adaptive behavior. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER,
THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1911), reprinted in THE ENTREPRENEUR:
CLASSIC TEXTS BY JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, supra note 49, at 155–56 (explaining
how the economy changes over time).
51. See id. at 162 (explaining how “changes in the environment do not have
merely static influences. Rather, they trigger new things”).
52. See Paul Germeraad et. al., Shifts in Big Oil Patent Landscape:
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access the internet from wherever they were, using a navigation
system that was easier to operate than others in the market.53 The
iPhone directly impacted computer sales,54 as well as traditional
landline companies (effectively eliminating many people’s
landlines and telephone booths).55 It also radically transformed the
gaming industry with the advent of mobile games and
applications.56
Innovation agents such as Apple are responsible for not only
revealing new knowledge, but also successfully commercializing
and introducing it to the market. In order to transform inventions
into viable innovations with economic value, innovation agents
take the original idea or concept and create a prototype, define its
function, gather resources together, and monitor the progression
of the development process.57 Once the innovative product is out in
the marketplace it may create new market demands by
challenging previous popular practices and traditions.58
Innovation agents destroy the basis for the old economy while
paving the way to a new economic order of prosperity and welfare
by implementing innovations.59 This Part will outline the
Capturing Value from Intellectual Property for National Transformation, 52 LES
NOUVELLES 37, 38 (2017) (discussing how the iPhone “completely reset the
market’s vision of what a ‘mobile phone’ should be”).
53. See Tim Bajarin, How Apple’s iPhone Changed These 5 Major Industries,
TIME (June 26, 2017), http://time.com/4832599/iphone-anniversary-industrychange/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (discussing how the iPhone allowed consumers
to “have many more options to make the [internet] connection they need
regardless of location”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
54. See id. (noting that PC sales have declined by roughly 30% since the
iPhone).
55. See id. (explaining how the iPhone forced traditional communication
companies to completely change their business model).
56. See id. (“The iPhone expanded the market for mobile games as well as
created an entirely new category of touch-based gameplay . . . .”).
57. See Diana L. Day, Raising Radicals: Different Processes for Championing
Innovative Corporate Ventures, 5 ORG. SCI. 148, 149 (1994) (discussing the
character of intrapreneurs).
58. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: AN
INQUIRY INTO PROFITS, CAPITAL, CREDIT, INTEREST, AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE 66 (3d
ed. 1936) (describing economic development as the “opening of a new market, that
is a market into which the particular branch of manufacture of the country in
question has not previously entered, whether or not this market has existed
before”).
59. See id. at 149 (explaining that the “new state of affairs will soon replace
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taxonomy of innovation agents followed by a focus on private sector
entrepreneurship.
A. The Taxonomy of Innovation Agents
There are several types of innovation agents. Accelerators,
incubators, and financing hubs are instrumental in facilitating
innovation.60 These mediators provide mentorship and educational
components, access to substantial networking, information, and
capital.61 For example, Y Combinator is an accelerator that helped
launch Reddit, Uber, and Airbnb.62 Similar to other accelerators, Y
Combinator provides seed investment in start-ups in exchange for
a “promised right to purchase equity in the future.”63 Other than
capital, during three-month periods, in-house managing partners
provide guidance to start-ups and arrange weekly networking
events to introduce start-ups to alumni and future investors.64

the old accustomed value by a new one, which will finally become the customary
one”).
60. Accelerators and incubators are often used interchangeably, but they
are different in some respects. Incubators provide resources to the company for
longer periods of time (up to several years) with the goal being job creation and
economic development. Accelerators are commonly for-profit organizations that
act as incubators for shorter periods of time, but provide same services, and
receive equity from start-ups. See Dana Thompson, Accelerating the Growth of the
Next Generation of Innovators, 8 OHIO ST. ENTREP. BUS. L.J. 379, 391 n.2 (2013)
(describing the differences between incubators and accelerators).
61. See Day, supra note 57, at 155 (describing leadership opportunities in
corporate venturing).
62. See Kate Rockwood, Accelerated Liberties to Handle Its Funding Surge,
the ACLU Looks to Silicon Valley in Managing Funding Surge, ABA J. (June
2017),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/aclu_ycombinator_funding_accelera
tor (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (“Y Combinator is best known for launching
start-ups such as Airbnb, Reddit and Uber.”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
63. See Dana Brakman Reiser & Steven A. Dean, Financing the Benefit
Corporation, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 793, 816 (2017) (citation omitted).
64. See Rockwood, supra note 62, at n.91 (explaining that the ACLU
presented to potential donors during Y Combinator).
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Essential innovations are also generated by government
agencies and universities.65 These innovation agents are
instrumental in countering the “knowledge filter.”66 A knowledge
filter is defined as the tendency of certain innovation agents to
place high screeners and barriers to impede creativity.67
Innovation agents often decide not to pursue ideas that would
ultimately lead to valuable innovations.68 Some for-profit
innovation agents consider investing in basic research a “wasteful”
expenditure because it carries no guarantee of enhancing the
company’s earnings.69 For these reasons, other innovation conduits
such as universities and government agencies are essential for
cultivating discoveries that might otherwise be abandoned or lie
dormant.70 For example, many universities fulfill an important role
65. See BAUMOL, supra note 32, at 34 (“There are, however, two key players
in the innovation story that are not guided directly by market forces: universities
and government agencies.”).
66. See Zoltán J. Ács, David B. Audretsch & Robert J. Strom, Introduction:
Why Entrepreneurship Matters, in ENTREPRENEURSHIP, GROWTH, AND PUBLIC
POLICY, supra note 44, at 7 (explaining that the knowledge filter is “impeding the
spillover of knowledge for commercialization, innovation, and ultimately
economic growth”); DAVID B. AUDRETSCH, MAX KEILBACH & ERIK LEHMANM,
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 5 (2006) (discussing “the existence of
a knowledge filter that impedes the commercialization and spillover of
knowledge”).
67. See Ács, Audretsch & Strom, supra note 66, at 7 (listing various examples
of knowledge filters, such as the copy machine, fax machine, personal computer,
and flat screen).
68. See id. at 8 (“Many of the most visible and successful companies of today
were created by people who tenaciously stuck with ideas rejected by the
decision-making bureaucracy of large corporations and choose to pursue and
commercialize those ideas by becoming entrepreneurs.”); see also CLAYTON M.
CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW TECHNOLOGIES CAUSE
GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL 86 (1997) (contending that “established firms are also
captive to the financial structure and organizational culture inherent in the value
network in which they compete—a capacity that can block any rationale for timely
investment in the next wave of destructive technology”).
69. See BAUMOL, supra note 32, at 34 (“From the point of view of the
unthinking market mechanism, an outlay on basic research is apt to be a
‘wasteful’ expenditure because it makes no substantial promises of adding to the
firm’s profits.”).
70. See Clifton Leaf, The Law of Unintended Consequences, CNN MONEY
(Sept. 19, 2005), https://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/
2005/09/19/8272884/index.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (“For a century or
more, the white-hot core of American innovation has been basic science. And the
foundation of basic science has been the fluid exchange of ideas at the nation’s
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in developing drugs that treat rare diseases or uncommon
conditions.71 In 1990, three scientists at Emory University began
work on what would eventually become Emtriva, a drug used to
treat HIV during a time with relatively little market interest in
finding viable treatment for HIV or AIDS.72 The scientists, working
on a federal grant, had to wait until 2003 for their drug to be
approved by the FDA.73 By 2005, Emory had received $540 million
for their 20% share in the drug after it was combined with another
antiviral formula.74 This innovative and life-changing drug was
produced in spite of the required high degree of experimentation
and market uncertainty.75
By its very nature, basic research generates enormous
uncertainty. “[I]t is nearly impossible to predict whether basic
research will yield any financial benefit and, if it does, who will be
the ultimate beneficiary.”76 Yet, universities and government
agencies are innovation agents that are not guided directly by
market forces.77 In fact, 73% of schools that have tech-transfer
offices either lose money after paying salaries and operating
expenses or break even after the distribution of inventor’s shares.78
Only 11% of schools end up making a profit.79 And yet even
research universities.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
71. See id. (describing how universities contribute to medical research).
72. See id. (explaining that three Emory University scientists developed
Emtriva).
73. See id. (explaining how the researchers “received FDA approval only in
July 2003”).
74. See id. (describing how Emory developed and sold Emtriva).
75. See John E. Tyler III, Advancing University Innovation: More Must Be
Expected—More Must Be Done, 10 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 143, 182 (2009) (“Often,
university innovations are at a stage of development where there is a high degree
of technical and, especially, market uncertainty.” (citation omitted)).
76. BAUMOL, supra note 32, at 34.
77. See BAUMOL, supra note 32, at 34 (explaining how the “public-private
division of labor can be attributed to the private firm’s profit motive”).
78. See Dave Merrill, Blacki Migliozzi & Susan Decker, Billions at Stake in
University
Patent
Fights,
BLOOMBERG
(May
24,
2016),
https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2016-university-patents/ (last visited Feb.
13, 2019) (displaying a chart breaking down tech-transfer finances) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
79. See id. (displaying a chart breaking down tech-transfer finances).
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operating at a loss most of the time, these public-sector innovation
agents are responsible for the utmost revolutionary discoveries. In
2006, R&D Magazine found that fifty-five of the top eighty-eight
innovations were products of publicly funded agents such as U.S.
government laboratories or universities either working alone or in
conjunction with private firms.80 Private firms alone only made six
out of the eighty-eight innovative products.81 Nanotechnology has
benefitted the most from innovations at universities.82 In any given
field, universities account for roughly 1% of the patents.83
However, in the field of nanotechnology they account for 12% of the
patents and about 2/3 of the patents for the basic building blocks
of nanotechnology.84 One reason that might explain this
idiosyncrasy is that the nanotechnology industry involves
immense investments in capital and labor until commercial
application is more certain.85 Universities are not confined to
specific market applications and thus, are more likely to engage in
more basic building block type research than private markets.86
These university agents’ contributions tend to be rooted in
extended periods of fundamental study and discovery.87 Their lack
of profit motive distinguishes them significantly from private
sector agents.88 Universities and government agencies fill a void
80. See Fred Block, Swimming Against the Curent: The Rise of a Hidden
Developmental State in the United States, 36 POL. & SOC’Y 169, 187 (2008)
(describing expanding finance and support opportunities for the private sector to
commercialize new technologies in the U.S. alongside political efforts to make
these efforts invisible to mainstream public debate).
81. Id.
82. See Mark A. Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, 58 STAN. L. REV. 601,
615 (2015) (“The third significant fact unique to nanotechnology patents is that
they are held in surprisingly large proportion by universities.”).
83. See id. (reviewing the development of the nanotechnology industry).
84. See Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 614–15 (2008) (reviewing the types of innovation
patented in universities).
85. See Lemley, supra note 82, at 616 (discussing why universities patent
nanotechnology more than other technology).
86. See id. (explaining that most of the “basic research labs are located in
universities”).
87. See BAUMOL, supra note 32, at 34 (“This public-private division of labor
can be attributed to the private firm’s profit motive.”).
88. See Birch Bayh & Joseph P. Allen, School Power: The Case for Keeping
Innovation in the Hands of Universities, ATLANTIC (Apr. 11, 2012),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/04/school-power-the-case-for-
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and ensure that basic research is undertaken regardless of its
duration or ambiguity.89 The case from Emory mentioned above is
a prime example. In the field of medicine, universities have been
crucial in researching new drugs that can take more than a decade
and anywhere from $4–$11 billion to create.90 Long-term growth
and applied innovation depend greatly on advancements made in
basic research.91 Thus, it is imperative to maintain such non-profit
innovation agencies. However, this Article’s focus is on the
innovation process in the private sector. Next, it will spotlight
entrepreneurial and intrapreneurial agents and their role in
delivering innovations to the masses.
B. Entrepreneurs
1. Defining Entrepreneurship
The term “entrepreneur” was coined by economist Richard
Cantillon.92 He defined the entrepreneur as an “agent who buys
means of production at certain prices in order to combine them into
a product that he is going to sell at prices that are uncertain at the
moment at which he commits himself to his costs.”93 French
keeping-innovation-in-the-hands-of-universities/255751/ (last visited Feb. 13,
2019) (explaining that universities conduct research even when profits are rare,
whereas the “private sector abandoned basic research for this reason”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
89. See id. (explaining that although “breakthrough technologies are most
likely to occur [in basic research], these discoveries are far removed from being
commercial products”).
90. See id. (“Developing new drugs can take more than a decade, sometimes
costing $4 billion to $11 billion per drug by some estimates.”).
91. See id. (explaining that it “takes years for university inventions to reach
the market”).
92. See RICHARD CANTILLON, ESSAI SUR LA NATURE DU COMMERCE EN GENERAL
388 (Henry Higgs ed. & trans., Frank Cass & Co. Ltd. 1959) (1755) (explaining
that Cantillon coined the term entrepreneur “to designate that most important
economic function of the man who collects in his hands the productive forces of
capital—labour and natural agents”).
93. Joseph A. Schumpeter, Economic Theory and Entrepreneurial History,
reprinted in ESSAYS ON ENTREPRENEURS, INNOVATIONS, BUSINESS CYCLES, AND THE
EVOLUTION OF CAPITALISM 254 (Richard V. Clemence ed., 1989); see also JOSEPH
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economist Jean-Baptiste Say portrayed the entrepreneur as an
“undertaker of industry who unites all the[] means of production,
and who finds in the value of the products which result from them,
the re-establishment of the entire capital he employs.”94 Today,
anyone can be considered an entrepreneur.95 Undoubtedly, the
actions of moral or social,96 political or regulatory97 “entrepreneurs”
are prevalent in society.98
Moral entrepreneurs, as described by Posner, do not base
arguments on logic but rather “mix appeals to self-interest with
emotional appeals” to create either a sense of unity or hostility
towards another group.99 The prison reform movement is a key
example of attempting to persuade the general population to see
prisoners as one of them instead of an “other.”100 Moral
entrepreneurship has also been used in the anti-same-sex
marriage movement to demonize same gendered marriages and
protection laws.101
A. SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, 57 (1954) (carrying out of new
combinations we call “enterprise”; the individuals whose function it is to carry
them out we call “entrepreneurs.”).
94. JEAN-BAPTISTE SAY, CATECHISM OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 36–37 (John
Richter trans., 1816).
95. See David E. Pozen, We Are All Entrepreneurs Now, 43 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 283, 283 (2008) (describing the growth of entrepreneurship in recent
decades).
96. See id. at 290–91 (“Nowadays, ‘social entrepreneurs’ tackle civic
problems through innovative methods, ‘policy entrepreneurs’ promote new forms
of government action, ‘norm entrepreneurs’ seek to change the way society thinks
or behaves, and ‘moral entrepreneurs’ try to alter the boundaries of duty or
compassion.”).
97. See Sharma & Chrisman, supra note 37, at 1 (“Entrepreneurship has
meant different things to different people.”); see also infra note 114 and
accompanying text.
98. See Pozen, supra note 95, at 283 (“Everyone, it seems, is an entrepreneur
these days.”); see also Thomas Kelley, Rediscovering Vulgar Charity: A Historical
Analysis of America’s Tangled Nonprofit Law, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437, 2463–64
(2005) (providing a taxonomy of social entrepreneurship, non-profits and “venture
philanthropy”).
99. See Richard Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111
HARV. L. REV. 1637, 1667 (1998) (“They teach us to love or hate whom they love
or hate.”).
100. See George Fisher, The Birth of the Prison Retold, 104 YALE L.J. 1235,
1237 (1995) (detailing the history of the prison reform movement).
101. See Deirdre M. Bowen, All that Heaven Will Allow: A Statistical Analysis
of the Coexistence of Same-Sex Marriage and Gay Matrimonial Bans, 91 DENV. U.
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Social entrepreneurship encompasses a “double bottom line”
of profit and social goods.102 Social entrepreneurs create
technologies to benefit people and the planet. Social
entrepreneurship generally has three main components:103 First,
identifying an unjust equilibrium that results in the exclusion,
marginalization, or suffering of a group in society lacking financial
or political power;104 second, finding an opportunity to challenge
the status quo;105 and lastly, creating a new equilibrium that does
away with the identified injustice.106 Social enterprises
manufacture products with beneficial environmental or other
social impact.107 They often distribute free products in developing
countries or employ workers that traditionally face obstacles to
finding employment.108 Founders of social enterprises hold
L. REV. 277, 308 (2014) (“Here, the social problem is the vulnerability of marriage
as a central institution of the family, and the connected social issue is homosexual
couples.”).
102. See Dana Brakman Reiser & Steven A. Dean, Hunting Stag with Fly
Paper: A Hybrid Financial Instrument for Social Enterprise, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1495,
1495 (2013) (proposing a hybrid corporate structure to accommodate the goals of
social entrepreneurship).
103. See J. Haskell Murray & Edward I. Hwang, Purpose with Profit:
Governance, Enforcement, Capital-Raising and Capital-Locking in Low-Profit
Limited Liability Companies, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 7 n.28 (2011) (listing the
three components of entrepreneurship).
104. See id. (explaining that the first factor consists of “identifying a stable
but inherently unjust equilibrium that causes the exclusion, marginalization, or
suffering of a segment of humanity that lack the financial means or political clout
to achieve any transformative benefit on its own” (citation omitted)).
105. See id. (explaining that the second factor consists of “identifying an
opportunity in this unjust equilibrium, developing a social value proposition, and
bringing to bear inspiration, creativity, direct action, courage, and fortitude,
thereby challenging the stable state’s hegemony” (citation omitted)).
106. See id. (explaining that the third factor consists of “forging a new, stable
equilibrium that releases trapped potential or alleviates the suffering of the
targeted group, and through imitation and the creation of a stable ecosystem
around the new equilibrium ensuring a better future for the targeted group and
even society at large” (citation omitted)).
107. See Reiser & Dean, supra note 102, at 1499 (“These enterprises
manufacture products using more expensive inputs to reduce their environmental
impact, or give away some of their products to those in need.” (footnote omitted)).
108. See id. (describing examples of how social entrepreneurs pursue social
good and profit).
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ownership if the technology in the enterprise turns out to be
successful outside of the social goal and has the potential to create
substantial profit.109 For example, Husk Power Systems, a social
enterprise based in India, had an innovative idea to create
environmentally friendly fuels by converting rice husks into
energy.110 The company raised $20 million in equity investment,
making it “one of the largest, if not the largest investment in the
mini-grid sector.”111 The company provides cost-effective power to
thousands of rural Indians.112
A political entrepreneur recognizes the group voting power of
an otherwise ignored demographic or category of individuals and
then mobilizes and educates the group to achieve an end.113
Regulatory entrepreneurs include companies such as Uber and
Airbnb that had to push for changes in policy and regulations in
order to enter certain markets previously hostile to them.114 Both
companies fought a long and hard battle against city councils.115
109. See Dana Brakman Reiser & Steven A. Dean, SE(c)(3): A Catalyst for
Social Enterprise Crowdfunding, 90 IND. L.J. 1091, 1093 (2015) (discussing
crowdfunding options for social enterprises).
HUSK
POWER
SYS.,
110. See
Innovations,
http://www.huskpowersystems.com/innovations/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2019)
(detailing the company’s biomass gasification process which utilizes biomass
waste, such as rice husks, to provide access to power for rural customers) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
111. Esha Chhabra, How This Social Enterprise Just Closed $20 Million in
(Jan.
29,
2018,
2:25
PM),
Funding,
FORBES,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/eshachhabra/2018/01/29/how-this-social-enterprisejust-closed-20-million-in-funding/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
112. See David Borenstein, A Light in India, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2011, 7:25
PM), https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/10/a-light-in-india/ (last
visited Feb. 13, 2019) (“[Husk] has 65 power units that serve a total of 30,000
households and is currently installing new systems at the rate of two to three per
week.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
113. See Dale B. Thompson, Political Obstacles to the Implementation of
Emissions Markets: Lessons from RECLAIM, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 645, 649
(2000) (“With the group mobilized, the entrepreneur can then direct its political
power to further the entrepreneur’s own purposes.”).
114. See Elizabeth Pollman & Jordan M. Barr, Regulating Entrepreneurship,
90 S. CAL. L. REV. 383, 435 (2017) (describing regulatory entrepreneurs as
enterprises acting with a specific agenda to organize people sympathetic to the
companies’ positions and change the regulatory environment).
115. See id. at 387–89 (summarizing Uber’s response to regulatory efforts in
New York City and Airbnb’s challenges in jurisdictions that limit short term
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What finally helped was their ability to rally enormous support
from citizens who advocated to change city provisions and allowed
these firms to enter the cab-driving and hotel markets,
respectively.116 Lastly, educational entrepreneurs advocate for
change in the educational realm.117 Today’s poster-child for
educational entrepreneurs are those advocating for charter schools
to replace traditional schools.118
2. The Men Who Get Things Done
Shifting the focus to for-profit entrepreneurs, according to
Schumpeter, these are principal agents of economic change and a
source of destabilizing forces within the economy.119
Entrepreneurs go beyond current perceptions and provide
legitimacy to the new product.120 These “economic leaders,” as
rentals).
116. See id. (noting Uber’s success in New York City and Airbnb’s success in
San Francisco); see also Joseph D. Bryant, Birmingham vs. Uber: Council
President Still Open to Talking to Company After Passing New Rules Uber Calls
Unfair,
BIRMINGHAM
NEWS
(July
29,
2014),
http://www.al.com/news/birmingham/index.ssf/2014/07/birmingham_vs_uber_co
uncil_pre.html (last updated July 29, 2015) (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (reporting
on Uber’s negative response to regulations that authorized mobile web apps like
Uber but still required compliance with traditional transit service rules) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
117. See David Groshoff, Unchartered Territory: Market Competition’s
Constitutional Collision with Entrepreneurial Sex-Segregated Charter Schools,
2010 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 307, 324–25 (considering the success of entrepreneurs’
innovations in charter schools relative to traditional public schools).
118. See id. at 310 n.12 (“[Since 1995], educational entrepreneurs have
successfully created approximately 3,000 charter schools.”).
119. See SCHUMPETER, supra note 50, at 261–83 (noting the effect of
entrepreneurial activity upon the industrial structure is the consequent process
of reoccurring destruction and reconstruction); see also Amir N. Licht, The
Entrepreneurial Spirit and What the Law Can Do About It, 28 COMP. LAB. L. &
POL’Y J. 817, 822 (2007) (“In a continuing ‘circular flow of economic life,’ the
economy never reaches an equilibrium but rather shifts from one disequilibrium
to another.”).
120. See Manuel A. Utset, Reciprocal Fairness, Strategic Behavior & Venture
Survival: A Theory of Venture Capital-Financed Firms, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 45, 101
(noting entrepreneurs’ perception of the prospects for success tend to be higher
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Schumpeter often described them, are avant-garde in that they
produce new combinations and creations that confront, and
eventually defeat, the existing economic order.121 Schumpeter’s
depiction of this economic process originated in the 1910s.122 Who
are those innovation agents in today’s economy?
Today, entrepreneurship involves the creative reading of the
present and the imaginative prediction of the future.123 Apple
engineers were able to do just that with the first model of the
iPhone.124 Apple CEO Steve Jobs realized the desire of consumers
to have a portable device that could do more than text or check
e-mail.125 He saw that technology was developing to allow more
processing power in tinier packages.126 Leading Apple at that time,
than profession managers).
121. See SCHUMPETER, supra note 58, at 74–75 (“[T]he carrying out of new
combinations we call ‘enterprise’; the individuals whose function it is to carry
them out we call ‘entrepreneurs.’”).
122. See SCHUMPETER, supra note 47, at ix (discussing how some of the ideas
submitted in the book date back to 1907 but the book was published for the first
time in German in 1911).
123. See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 133–35 (2006) (highlighting the
role of the network information economy in the creation of a Star Wars fan-film
as an example of active production in the economy instead of passive
involvement); Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory
of Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 45–48
(2004) (“Digital technologies offer people the liberty to participate in culture
through application of existing cultural materials, the ability to appropriate and
innovate using tools freely available to all.”).
124. Steve Jobs described the iPhone as a “world phone with quad-band GSM
technology that works great in the U.S., Europe and most of Asia.” Walt
Mossberg, Steve Jobs Answers My iPhone Questions, ALLTHINGSD.COM (June 26,
2007, 3:01 PM), http://mossblog.allthingsd.com/20070626/jobs-qa (last visited
Feb. 13, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
125. See id. (recollecting Steve Jobs’ statement that most users hate their
phones and the user interface, and that the lack of a physical keyboard “free[s]
iPhone’s entire large screen for reading email, browsing the Web, looking at maps,
enjoying photos and movies, and doing things we haven’t yet invented”).
126. See Press Release, Apple Reinvents the Phone with iPhone, APPLE (Jan. 9,
2007), http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2007/01/09Apple-Reinvents-the-Phonewith-iPhone.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (introducing the iPhone, combining
a phone, iPod, and internet device into one “small and lightweight handheld
device”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Steve Jobs,
Steve Jobs Introduces iPhone in 2007, YOUTUBE (Jan. 9, 2007),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MnrJzXM7a6o (last visited Feb. 13, 2019)
(“Every once and awhile, a revolutionary product comes along that changes
everything.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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Jobs revolutionized the way the world thinks about phones and
portability, and predicted the way the world would soon become.127
Entrepreneurship prospers on such deviations, as opposed to
traditional causation, and it involves adapting to disarray.128
Accordingly, certain characteristics such as creativity, risk-taking,
independence, confidence, and resilience may be common among
entrepreneurs.129 Many factors, including independence and
flexibility, have been found to affect entrepreneurial decisions to
take risks and be innovative.130 Yet, there is no consensus on the
qualities that are inherent to the entrepreneurial persona.131
Nevertheless, this Article theorizes the entrepreneurial
phenomenon as a process (rather than a trait) that contributes to
economic development.132 It relies on the perception of innovation
as a process that involves the transformation of resources into new
products, new market demand, and large economic gains.133
127. See Wendy Seltzer, Software Patents and/or Software Development, 78
BROOKLYN L. REV. 929, 936 (2013) (noting that Apple’s iPhone inspired a whole
line of related devices with touch screens).
128. See Licht, supra note 119, at 819 (“[B]eyond seeking material success the
crucial element in the entrepreneurial spirit is openness to change—an interest
in the different and in new experiences while deemphasizing the safe and the
proven.”); FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 269 (1921) (positing
that entrepreneurs differ their degree of confidence).
129. See, e.g., Licht, supra note 119, at 832 (“Entrepreneurs are indeed special
individuals in that they tend to exhibit a particular combination of psychological
attributes . . . .”); see Becker, Knudsen & Swedberg, supra note 49, at 16 (noting
that Schumpeter also emphasized “individual-level psychological factors”).
130. See Licht, supra note 119, at 823 (“[P]eople people differ in the qualities
necessary to engage in entrepreneurship. Relative to the average person, the
entrepreneur is therefore particularly ‘venturesome’ . . . .” (footnote omitted)); see
also Robert H. Brockhaus, Risk Taking Propensity of Entrepreneurs, 23 ACAD.
MANAG. J., 509, 510–11 (1980) (“The personal financial obligations that the
entrepreneur makes to an unsuccessful enterprise can result in major losses to
the entrepreneur as an individual and could jeopardize his future standard of
living.”).
131. See Carl P. Kaiser, Entrepreneurship and Resource Allocation, 16 E.
ECON. J. 9, 10 (1990) (“[P]rospective entrepreneurs will differ with respect to how
much risk they are willing to bear . . . .”).
132. See Smith & Ueda, supra note 43, at 357 (calling for a “focus on the study
of the optimal legal structures that facilitate the commercialization of
entrepreneurial opportunities”).
133. See SCHUMPETER, supra note 58, at 50 (“The exchange between money
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Nanotechnology discussed earlier, is an example of such process.134
Public-sector innovation agents usually begin the process by
exploring the basic building blocks of the technology.135 They are
able to sustain large economic losses because of their non-profit
nature.136 Once the building blocks are established, private entities
can work with universities or license the patents to use in their
own products.137 After a newer product has emerged, with novice
applications that establish new market demands, the private
sector accumulates large economic gains with the public sector
possibly taking part in the spoils, as well.138
Entrepreneurs are a destabilizing force and principle agents
of change in an economy.139 They are special because they create
“new combinations”; that is, they introduce new products, develop
new methods of production, devise new business models, and
create new markets.140 Their creations confront and eventually
defeat the existing economic order.141 They differ from ordinary
business people in the extent and nature of their actions, their
motives, and the conditions in which they act as agents of
innovation. Steve Jobs was notorious for his perfectionism.142 His
income and real income is therefore the salient point, is the place in the economic
process where personal exchange value and hence the price of money is formed.”).
134. See Lemley, supra note 83, at 618 (“Indeed, not since the birth of the
airplane a hundred years ago have we seen similar efforts by a range of different
inventors to patent basic concepts in advance of a developed market for end
products.”).
135. See id. at 616 (noting the dominance of universities in nanotechnology
patenting).
136. See id. (arguing that universities tend to focus on building block patents
rather than downstream implementations of a technology).
137. See id. at 626–27 (asserting that universities maximize licensing
revenues from patents by granting exclusive licenses to private firms).
138. See Lemley, supra note 84, at 614 (“Those university patents don’t sit
dormant; universities license them to companies for over $1 billion a year in
revenue.”).
139. See SCHUMPETER, supra note 93, at 262–63 (“What we observe is . . . the
effects of entrepreneurial activity upon the industrial structure that exits at any
moment . . . .”).
140. See id. at 262 (describing a behavioral pattern that “giv[es] effect to the
possibilities inherent in a given legal and social system both of which change in
the process”).
141. See id. at 263 (observing “the . . . process of destruction and
reconstruction that went on all the time”).
142. See Malcolm Gladwell, The Tweaker, NEW YORKER (Nov. 14, 2011),
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obsessive search for the next innovation or the next tweak that
would finally perfect a product (though it never did fully satisfy
Jobs) drove him to change and reinvent the computer and phone
industries, and the way we interact with the world entirely.143 He
insisted that all Apple products have a closed back to prevent any
interference with the inner workings144 because in his eyes it was
already perfect, and yet, he constantly sought after the latest idea
for the next product to be released just the following year.145 Bill
Gates is the great foil to Jobs’s character.146 Bill Gates was an
obsessive coder, not a perfectionist designer, who instead of
pushing a message of exclusivity and elitism as Jobs did, focused
on putting a PC in every single home.147
In this Article, entrepreneurship refers to the actions of
for-profit firms or individuals that are innovative, rather than
imitative, and who are likely to create products with new market
demand and contribute to economic growth. Economist Zoltán Ács
differentiated
between
necessity
entrepreneurship
and
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/11/14/the-tweaker (last visited Feb.
13, 2019) (“[Jobs] needed things to be perfect, and it took time to figure out what
perfect was.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
143. See id. (“Jobs’s sensibility was editorial, not inventive. His gift lay in
taking what was in front of him—the tablet with stylus—and ruthlessly refining
it.”).
144. See ‘Steve Jobs’: Profiling an Ingenious Perfectionist, NPR (Nov. 11, 2011),
https://www.npr.org/2011/11/11/142244048/steve-jobs-profiling-an-ingeniousperfectionist (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (“He loves to control everything from end
to end, which is why you can’t open up your iPhone . . . .”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
145. See Gladwell, supra note 142 (“[Jobs] forced the developers to do another
version, and then another, about twenty iterations in all, insisting on one tiny
tweak after another . . . .”); ‘Steve Jobs’: Profiling An Ingenious Perfectionist,
supra note 144.
146. See ‘Steve Jobs’: Profiling An Ingenious Perfectionist, supra note 144
(comparing Jobs and Apple—requiring end-to-end control of the product—to
Gates and Microsoft—encouraging collaboration with other companies).
147. See Nick Wingfield, Pamela Edstrom, Who Helped Shape Microsoft’s
Public
Image,
Dies
at
71,
N.Y.
TIMES,
(Mar.
31,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/31/business/obituary-pamela-edstrommicrosoft.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (noting Edstrom’s work in pursuit of
Microsoft’s mission of putting a PC in every home) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
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opportunity entrepreneurship.148 He found that the former arises
owing to a lack of other employment options, while the latter
results from the deliberate choice to pursue an unexploited or
underexploited business opportunity.149 He further articulated
that necessity entrepreneurship causes negative GDP growth,150
while opportunity entrepreneurship has a positive and significant
effect on social and economic development.151 For example, in 2012,
the start-up company ReWalk successfully developed a
battery-powered exoskeleton device that allows paralyzed
individuals to walk upright.152 The next section clarifies the
importance of such innovation agents in society.
3. The Significance of Entrepreneurs
What is it about entrepreneurs that merits distinct
consideration? Simply put, as agents of innovation, entrepreneurs
are instrumental in driving economic development.153 They destroy
148. See Zoltán J. Ács, How is Entrepreneurship Good for Economic Growth?,
1 INNOVATIONS 97, 98 (2006) (“We found that necessity entrepreneurship has no
effect on economic development while opportunity entrepreneurship has a
positive and significant effect.”).
149. See id. at 97 (distinguishing “‘necessity entrepreneurship,’ which is
having to become an entrepreneur because you have no better option, from
‘opportunity entrepreneurship,’ which is an active choice to start a new enterprise
based on the perception that an unexploited or underexploited business
opportunity exists”).
150. See id. at 98 (considering former wage workers forced into necessity
entrepreneurship by a lack of options).
151. See id. at 99 (“[W]e find a positive relationship between the opportunity
ratio and GDP per capita.”).
152. See Ilya Pozin, 10 Health Tech Companies Changing the World, FORBES
(June 1, 2014, 1:12 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ilyapozin/2014/06/01/10health-tech-companies-changing-the-world/#67157f8bdab0 (last visited Feb. 13,
2019) (“After an accident left Amit Goffer in a wheelchair for life, he started
developing a system that would enable people with spinal cord injuries to walk
again.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Heather
Kelly,
Young
Companies,
Big
Ideas,
CNN
(Oct.
2015),
https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2014/10/tech/cnn10-start-ups/
(detailing
upcoming start-ups, such as Airwave which develops software and application for
drones) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
153. See, e.g., PETER F. DRUCKER, INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP:
PRACTICE AND PRINCIPLES 21 (1985) (discussing the example of McDonald’s, which
did not invent a new product but “drastically upgraded the yield from resources,
and created a new market and a new customer”); PAUL GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER,
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the basis of the old economy and pave the way to a new economic
order of prosperity and welfare through their innovations.154 Take
WeWork for example, a recent start-up that rents out shared
workspaces and “community-building programming.”155 Its core
concept is that traditional cubicle-like office setting does not
contribute to workplace productivity and happiness.156 And
reporters claim it is on to something.157 WeWork provides
businesses a variety of options to rent relaxed office spaces, such
as an office, a suite, an entire headquarters, or just a desk in a
common area.158 It creates environments that increase
productivity, innovation, and collaboration via community
managers, professional and social events, and cocktail hours.159 It
also provides valuable networking opportunities among individual
workers and across company lines, creating new opportunities
FINANCIAL CONTRACT DESIGN IN THE WORLD OF VENTURE CAPITAL, THE VENTURE
CAPITAL CYCLE 10–11 (2d. ed. 2004) (examining empirically the various aspects of
economic contribution of venture capital fundraising by independent venture
partnerships); ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, COMPETITION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 81
(1978) (arguing that “entrepreneurship is important primarily in enabling the
market process to work itself out in all contexts”); FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK,
UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 41 (1921) (claiming that the entrepreneur plays a
unique importance in a productive economy as enterprise is the “only really
productive factor” while land, labor, and capital are the “means” of production);
SCHUMPETER, supra note 58, at 74 (referring to entrepreneurship as the
“fundamental phenomenon of economic development”).
154. See SCHUMPETER, supra note 58, at 74 (describing entrepreneurs as
carrying out a “new combination of means of production”).
155. Laura Bliss, How WeWork has Perfectly Captured the Millennial Id,
ATLANTIC (Mar. 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/
03/wework-the-perfect-manifestation-of-the-millennial-id/550922/ (last visited
Feb. 13, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
156. See id. (“[WeWork] promises to ‘humanize’ work, making the office a
more creative place, with the right lighting, the right snacks, and, crucially, the
right people.”).
157. See id. (“Despite the company’s occasional excesses, WeWork
offices are more pleasant than many a soulless cubicle farm . . . .”).
158. See Workspace, WEWORK, https://www.wework.com/workspace (last
visited Feb. 13, 2019) (providing membership options ranging from on-demand
access to private floors) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
159. See Bliss, supra note 155 (“Members are encouraged to mingle, network,
and leverage one another’s talents, frequently under the auspices of a corporate
sponsor.”).
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within their innovative spaces.160 This company not only
revolutionized the commercial real-estate industry, but also hosted
innovations in its space.161
Contemporary economic theorist William Baumol emphasized
the importance of entrepreneurs in stimulating economic
growth.162 He argued that economic evolution is dependent on two
determinants—namely, innovation and entrepreneurs.163 Baumol
argued that entrepreneurs are responsible for revolutionary
breakthroughs.164 He attributed the success of the capitalist
economy primarily to competitive pressures by players deploying
innovation as their primary weapon.165 Today, cutting-edge
innovation, rather than pricing, is the key to economic success.166
Facebook is a free social networking site, and yet, its founder Mark
Zuckerberg’s equity is worth around $73 billion.167 Facebook
completely changed the way humans interact, and as of May 3,

160. See id. (“Genuine connections do occur—sometimes at happy hours and
often through WeWork’s online member network, where people share marketing
tips, sell furniture, organize cryptocurrency seminars.”).
161. See id. (“Craft beer and cucumber water poured from kitchen taps.
Laptoppers in jeans and toques clacked along to MGMT in the wood-paneled
common area.”).
162. See WILLIAM BAUMOL, THE FREE MARKET INNOVATION MACHINE:
ANALYZING THE GROWTH MIRACLE OF CAPITALISM 2 (2002) (“[O]nce capitalism was
in place and fully operational, a flow of innovation and the consequent rise in
productivity and per capita gross domestic product were to be expected.”).
163. See id. at 10, 70 (noting that capitalism creates a “cascade of innovation”
and concluding that entrepreneurs “have played a critical role in the growth
performance of the capitalist economy”).
164. See id. at 20–21 (listing important innovations by U.S. small firms in the
twentieth century such as the incandescent lamp, the dial telephone, and the
electronic calculator).
165. See id. at 19 (“[T]he patently extraordinary growth record of the
free-enterprise form . . . is in large part attributable to the pressures of the free
market upon the business firm . . . .”).
166. See id. at 3–4 (“It is clear that innovation plays a far larger role in the
activities of many key firms and industries than the current theoretical literature
takes into account.”).
167. See Rob Wile, Mark Zuckerberg Has Made More Money Than Anyone
Else in 2017—Even Jeff Bezos, TIME (Aug. 8, 2017), http://time.com/
money/4891103/mark-zuckerberg-jeff-bezos-billionaires-net-worth-2017/
(last
visited Feb. 13, 2019) (“Zuckerberg has earned $23.1 billion year-to-date through
Monday, putting his overall wealth at $73.1 billion.”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
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2017, had almost two billion monthly users.168 Rapid diffusion of
such innovation throughout the economy ultimately results in
economic growth.169
Other scholars also view entrepreneurs as important agents
that stimulate an economy.170 American economist and Nobel
laureate Robert Solow acknowledged that “long-term economic
growth has moved to the top of the political and intellectual
agenda.”171 He established the primacy of innovations as
responsible for economic growth through increases in
productivity.172 Joseph Stiglitz also emphasized the central role of
entrepreneurs in driving technological progress and economic
development.173 They all postulated that entrepreneurial change is
a core variable of economic growth driven by the introduction of
innovation by entrepreneurs.174 Entrepreneurs contribute to
168. See Seth Fiegerman, Facebook Tops 1.9 Billion Monthly Users, CNN
MONEY (May 3, 2017), http://money.cnn.com/2017/05/03/technology/facebookearnings/index.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (“[T]he social network reported
hitting 1.94 billion monthly users as of the end of the March quarter.”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
169. See BAUMOL, supra note 162, at 4 (pointing to the computer industry for
example, “whose new and improved models appear constantly, each manufacturer
battling to stay ahead of its rivals”); BAUMOL, supra note 32, at ch. 1.
170. See, e.g., Edwin Harwood, The Sociology of Entrepreneurship, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 95 (Calvin A. Kent, Donald L. Sexton &
Karl H. Vesper eds., 1982) (“It is innovation that determines the distinction
between a run-of-the-mill small business and a new high-potential venture
organization is difficult to justify”); Licht, supra note 119, at 821 n.9 (drawing on
the academic efforts of Mirham Van Praag, Robert F. Hébert and Albert N. Link).
171. See Robert Solow, Review of Prophet of Innovation: Joseph Schumpeter
and Creative Destruction, by Thomas K. McCraw, ECONOMIST’S VIEW (May 17,
2007),
http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2007/05/robert_solow_on.ht
ml (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
172. See Robert M. Solow, Technical Change and the Aggregate Production
Function, 39 REV. ECON. & STAT. 312, 316 (1957) (“Thus about 8 cents of the 65
cent increase can be imputed to increased capital intensity, and the remainder to
increased productivity.”).
173. See generally NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ANALYSIS OF MARKET
STRUCTURE 519 (J. Stiglitz & G. Frank Mathewson eds., 1986) (providing sixteen
essays that test economic development hypotheses).
174. See Horst Hanusch & Andreas Pyka, Principles of Neo-Schumpeterian
Economics, 31 CAMB. J. ECON. 275, 276 (2007) (“Neo Schumpeterian Economics
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economic growth by creating new businesses and jobs, intensifying
competition, and increasing productivity.175 Sidecar was a start-up
founded in 2011 and was a ride-sharing company which
experimented with new services and features.176 This new business
model spawned many successful spin-offs, such as Uber and Lyft,
creating a multitude of new jobs for people all over the world.177 It
forced competition between ride-sharing companies, filling a niche
that inadequate public transportation and taxi companies had
been unable to fill.178 To summarize, entrepreneurial firms are
important drivers of new discoveries and economic growth.179 But
these drivers are not limited to exclusively entrepreneurial agents.
Innovation can also be fostered through a process of
intrapreneurship in divisions or employees within established
firms, as the next Part demonstrates.180
puts a strong emphasis on knowledge, innovation and entrepreneurship at the
micro level.”); Paul M. Romer, The Origins of Endogenous Growth, 8 J. ECON.
PERSP. 3, 3 (1994) (offering an assessment of scale-variant Schumpeterian growth
model).
175. See CHRISTENSEN, supra note 68, at 86 (contending that established firms
are “captive to [their] financial structure and organizational culture”).
176. See Douglas MacMillan, Sidecar Technologies Shuts Ride-Sharing and
Delivery
Service,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Dec.
29,
2015),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/sidecar-technologies-shuts-ride-sharing-anddelivery-service-1451450372 (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (“Sidecar, founded a year
after Uber in 2011, aimed to set itself apart from ride-sharing competitors by
experimenting with new services and features.”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
177. See Michael Goldstein, Uber And Lyft: The Cost and Benefits of
Disruption, FORBES (May 9, 2018, 4:39 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
michaelgoldstein/2018/05/09/uber-and-lyft-the-cost-and-benefits-of-disruption/
(last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (discussing part-time and full-time job opportunities
through Uber and Lyft) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
178. See id. (“Uber and Lyft, and its peers around the world, spend hundreds
of millions of dollars subsidizing the cost of cheaper rides for passengers and
doling out incentives to add new drivers.”).
179. See John Haltiwanger, Entrepreneurship and Job Growth, in
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, GROWTH, AND PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 44, at 119 (“[I]n the
United States, the market selection dynamics are productivity-enhancing.”).
180. See generally CHRISTENSEN, supra note 68, at 105 (describing the
phenomenon of intrapreneurship in a large knowledge-intensive industrial firm).
See also Arshad M. Khan & V. Manopichetwattana, Innovative and
Noninnovative Small Firms: Types and Characteristics, 35 MGMT. SCI. 597, 599
(1989) (describing a questionnaire employed to analyze innovation variables);
Smith & Ueda, supra note 43, at 356 (“Scholarly interest in intrapreneurship are
clustered around the issue of how to circumvent organizational inertia in
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III. Intrapreneurship

The last few decades have witnessed a growing interest in
legal scholarship on the topic of entrepreneurship.181 Nevertheless,
its companion—intrapreneurship—has garnered less attention.182
In the past, most entrepreneurs were self-employed or worked in
independently owned firms.183 As the world increasingly globalized
with the passage of time, it became clear that many discoveries
could not be delivered to the marketplace without certain
agents.184
Entrepreneurial firms and large conglomerates have often
been viewed as antipoles. While the former has been portrayed as
young, creative, and flexible firms,185 the latter symbolized
corporations with much bureaucracy, hierarchy, and stagnation.186
established firms and to get novel things done, as opposed to conducting routine
business.”).
181. See supra notes 37, 49, 185 and accompanying text.
182. See, e.g., Robert A. Burgelman, A Process Model of Internal Corporate
Venturing in the Diversified Major Firm, 28 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 223, 223 (1983) (“The
actual processes of corporate entrepreneurship and strategic change, however,
remain less well understood. This is probably because these processes in such
firms are complex and are difficult and costly to research.”); see also Ibrahim,
supra note 35, at 1741 (“[Intrapreneurship . . . is substantial, important, and
understudied.”); Smith & Ueda, supra note 43, at 356 (“Scholarly interests in
intrapreneurship are clustered around the issue of how to circumvent
organizational inertia in established firms and to get novel things done, as
opposed to conducting routine business.”).
183. See MANSEL G. BLACKFORD, A HISTORY OF SMALL BUSINESS IN AMERICA
104 (2d ed. 2003) (describing the way small, medium, and large size firms
interacted).
184. See id. (explaining that if the market potential of a product from a small
firm was too big, a large corporation would take it away).
185. See Wendy Guillies, Acting President and CEO, Ewing Marion Kauffman
Found., Kauffman Foundation 2015 State of Entrepreneurship Address (Feb. 11,
2015)
http://www.kauffman.org/~/media/kauffman_org/resources/2015/soe/2015_state_
of_entrepreneurship_speech.pdf (describing those firms in her speech). In her
speech, the Acting President and CEO of the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation
describes those firms. Id.
186. See Todd R. Zenger, Explaining Organizational Diseconomies of Scale in
R&D: Agency Problems and the Allocation of Engineering Talent, Ideas, and
Effort by Firm Size, 40 MGMT. SCI. 708, 709 (1994) (examining scale diseconomies

INNOVATION AGENTS

195

Indeed, as firms become larger and more complex, their ability to
maintain their growth rate, if based only on their mainstream
business, becomes more challenging. More established
organizations realized that if they wanted to remain viable they
had to engage in a degree of entrepreneurial activity.187 Sooner or
later, firms like Apple and IBM had to find and exploit other
related opportunities through internal corporate venturing or
acquisition of related innovative prototypes that they could
develop and market as their own.188 Consequently, a more refined
depiction of the innovation market began to incorporate two main
complementary private agents of innovation—namely, the
independent-entrepreneur and the established intrapreneurial
firm.189
With the passage of time, large complex conglomerates
assumed a dual role in the innovation process. First, they began to
acquire existing discoveries from independent entrepreneurs and
start-ups in order to develop and deliver them to the market.190 In
doing so, they have served as an exit hub for private
entrepreneurship.191 Second, these organizations began to
cultivate corporate entrepreneurship or internal corporate
venturing.192 The latter refers to the process whereby firms engage
and offering employment contracts as an explanation for diseconomies of scale in
R&D).
187. See Burgelman, supra note 42, at 1363 (stating that if organizations
want to continue to be viable they must support a degree of entrepreneurial
activity within them).
188. See Robert A. Burgelman, Designs for Corporate Entrepreneurship in
Established Firms, 26 CA. MGMT. REV. 154 (1984) (“Sooner or later, firms—Apples
and IBMs alike—have and exploit opportunities in marginally related, even
unrelated, areas through internal corporate venturing and/or acquisition.”).
189. See BAUMOL, supra note 32, at 26 (recounting Schumpeter’s expanded
definition of the term “innovation”).
190. See infra Part IV.B (describing the practice of firms attempting to
prevent employees from seeking employment with competitors).
191. See Michael J. de la Merced, Nick Bilton & Nicole Perlroth, Yahoo to Buy
TIMES,
(May
19,
2013)
Tumblr
for
$1.1
Billion,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/20/technology/yahoo-to-buy-tumblr-for-11- billion.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review). Facebook bought the start-up photo sharing company Instagram
for $1 billion. Id. In 2013, Yahoo acquired the popular blogging and social-media
site for $1.1 billion. Id. Both were done in an attempt to expand on their already
their established markets. Id.
192. See id. (describing Yahoo’s plan for growing corporate entrepreneurship).
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in diversification of its strategic operations through internal
development.193 Internal entrepreneurship became an important
tool for firms to remain viable and competitive, whether during
prosperous or turbulent economic times.194 Indeed, studies have
shown that innovation can also be fostered successfully through a
process of intrapreneurship in divisions or employees within
established firms.195
Schumpeter viewed the entrepreneur as one who “carries out
new combinations.”196 Similarly, large, complex organizations take
actions that result in new combinations of resources being carried
out.197 In the Schumpeterian sense, intrapreneurship is analogous
to the process of individual entrepreneurship performed in the
corporate entity by interlocking entrepreneurial activities of
multiple participants.198 Such internal development requires new
resource combinations to extend the firm’s activities in related
areas and opportunities.199 Apple’s expansion from iPhones to the
creation of the iPad in 2010 and the iWatch in 2013 exemplifies
this.200 While the majority of Apple’s profits derive from sales of
193. See id. (explaining how Yahoo is broadening its developmental goals).
194. See id. (explaining Yahoo’s strategy for staying relevant).
195. See generally CHRISTENSEN, supra note 68, at 105 (describing the
phenomenon of intrapreneurship in a large knowledge-intensive industrial firm).
See also Khan & Manopichetwattana, supra note 180, at 599 (describing a
questionnaire employed to analyze innovation variables); Smith & Ueda, supra
note 43, at 356 (“Scholarly interests in intrapreneurship are clustered around the
issue of how to circumvent organizational inertia in established firms and to get
novel things done, as opposed to conducting routine business.”).
196. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 10
(Redvers Opie trans., 1936) (“Economic activity may have any motive, even a
spiritual one, but its meaning is always the satisfaction of wants.”).
197. See R. R. Ellsworth, Entrepreneurship in Big Business: The Impossible
Dream?, in ENTREPRENEURSHIP: WHAT IT IS AND HOW TO TEACH IT 282 (John J. Kao
& Howard H. Stevenson eds., 1985) (describing the phenomenon of corporate
entrepreneurship by employees in big and complex firms).
198. See Burgelman, supra note 42, at 1349. In the Schumpeterian sense,
diversification through internal development is the corporate analog to the
process of individual entrepreneurship. Corporate entrepreneurship, typically, is
the result of the interlocking entrepreneurial activities of multiple participants.
199. See id. (describing entrepreneurship within a corporation).
200. See Andrew Clark, Rupert Murdoch Says Apple’s iPad is a
‘Game-Changer’
for
News
Media,
GUARDIAN
(Aug.
5,
2010),
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iPhones, its related products contributed to Apple’s dominance in
the market.201 Its revenues multiplied from $65.2 billion in 2010,
to $108.2 billion in 2011, to $182.8 billion in 2014, to $229.23
billion in 2017.202 Intrapreneurship, therefore, extends “the firm’s
domain of competence and corresponding opportunity set through
internally generated new resource combinations.”203 The following
section will describe the facets of this process.
A. Internal Corporate Venturing
Intrapreneurship can occur in many ways.204 Some scholars
view it as simply internal new business development in existing
corporations.205 Others consider it as strategic renewal that
https://www.theguardian.com/media/2010/aug/05/ipad-rupert-murdoch-applenewscorp (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (reporting Rupert Murdoch’s praise for
Apple’s iPad) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Nina V.
Gumberg, Apple Trademark Application Faces Challenges In Russia, LAW 360,
(Jan. 24, 2014, 7:00 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/500091/appletrademark-application-faces-challenges-in-russia (last visited Feb. 13, 2019)
(reporting that in 2013, Apple filed an application for a patent for a
multifunctional mobile device, which the user can wear as a wristwatch) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
201. See Clark, supra note 200 (describing the impact the iPad has on the
market).
202. See Global Revenue of Apple from 2004 to 2017 (in billion U.S. dollars),
STATISTA (Nov. 2017), https://www.statista.com/statistics/265125/total-net-salesof-apple-since-2004/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (providing a graphic depiction of
Apple’s revenue) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
203. Burgelman, supra note 188, at 154.
204. In this paper the terms “intrapreneurship” and “internal corporate
venturing” will be used interchangeably. In recent years, there has also been
other forms of internal entrepreneurship such as the Internal Corporate Joint
Venturing (ICJV) that has characteristics of both traditional joint ventures and
internal corporate venturing. See Edward J. Zajac, Brian R. Golden & Stephen M.
Shortell, New Organizational Forms for Enhancing Innovation: The Case of
Internal Corporate Joint Ventures, 17 MGMT. SCI. 170, 171 (1991) (“[T]he (“ICJV
involves the creation of an internally-staffed venture unit that is
semiautonomous, with the sponsoring organization maintaining ultimate
authority.”).
205. See Stephen Edward McMillan et al., Millenials and Social
Entrepreneurship: A Multiple Streams Analysis of Problems, Prospects, and
Implications for Policy and Practice, 21 GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV. 1, 8 (2016)
(“Intrapreneurship is defined as working for a stable firm, with a stable position
and paycheck, but with the autonomy to behave and innovate like an
entrepreneur within the firm.”); Smith & Ueda, supra note 43, at 357 (“Given the
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involves the internal creation of new combinations of resources.206
It often includes developing innovation that requires significant
company resources beyond the year in which the expenditure is
made.207 Yet, usually extensions of the firms’ existing products or
services are not considered within the definition of the term.208
Internal corporate venturing can deliver innovations through
various channels.209 It includes, but is not limited to, new product
departments, special business units, micro new internal ventures,
new venture divisions, independent subsidiaries, and others.210
Companies from the convenience store 7-11, Boots the Chemists,
Visa and Citigroup financial firms, and BMW are investing in
internal ventures and buying start-ups to keep up with cheap and
constant R&D.211 Lockheed Martin, Inc. has created a group
known as “Skunk Works” where members of its group operate as
their own division and are given complete freedom to develop
innovative ideas.212
traditional connections between economics and entrepreneurship studies, it is not
surprising that the study of law and entrepreneurship has flourished among
economists.”).
206. See William D. Guth & Ari Ginsberg, Guest Editors’ Introduction:
Corporate Entrepreneurship, 11 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 5, 6 (1990)
(“Entrepreneurship involves the identification of market opportunity and the
creation of combinations of resources to pursue it.”).
207. See Ronald J. Gilson, Locating Innovation: The Endogeneity of
Technology, Organizational Structure, and Financial Contracting, 110 COLUM. L.
REV. 885, 904 (2010) (“The employer of an innovative employee and a venture
capital fund have different capabilities and therefore different assessments of the
value of the innovation that the employee has offered at auction.”).
208. See Day, supra note 57, at 156 (“Not included were product/service
extensions of existing product lines, capacity additions, or brand introductions by
existing businesses.”).
209. See id. (defining an internal corporate venture).
210. See Burgelman, supra note 188, at 163 (portraying the process of
developing innovation in divisions in the same corporation).
211. See If You Can’t Beat Them, Buy Them, ECONOMIST (Nov. 20, 2014),
https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2014/11/20/if-you-cant-beatthem-buy-them (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (explaining how corporate enthusiasm
for venture capitalism has increased) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
212. See Belinfanti, supra note 35, at 77 (explaining the benefits of such
venture).
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Successful intrapreneurship was found to depend on factors
such as the availability of independent entrepreneurial activity at
the operational level,213 the ability of middle-level managers to
promote these initiatives, and the capacity of top management to
allow viable entrepreneurial initiatives to influence the corporate
strategy.214 Some firms treat intrapreneurship simply as a “safety
valve” or “insurance.”215 They utilize it when the organization is
not doing very well or is in need of extreme measures to reverse a
continuous decline in sales and profits.216 Scholars noted that this
type of approach is not productive in the long run, and does not
contribute to the development of the firm.217 Successful
intrapreneurial firms typically follow a “moving, anchored search”
for new opportunities for growth and tend to invest greatly in
R&D.218 In order to cultivate successful internal venturing,
intrapreneurial firms need to encompass both flexibility and
213. See MALCOLM S. SALTER & WEINHOLD A. WOLF, DIVERSIFICATION
THROUGH ACQUISITION 5 (1979) (indicating that administrative challenges of
managing different kinds of diversified companies are important aspects of the
process of diversification through acquisition).
214. See Burgelman, supra note 182, at 223 (reaching these conclusions
during a study of “diversified major firms” or large agglomerates with widely
diverse yet related businesses grouped into divisions whose general managers
report to central corporate management); see also Eric von Hippel, Successful and
Failing Internal Corporate Ventures: An Empirical Analysis, 6 INDUS. MARKETING
MGMT. 163, 163 (1977) (conducting a study on ICV up to the commercialization
phase without distinguishing between new product and new business
development).
215. See Javed Navyar Malik & Rosli Bin Mahmood, Facilitating Corporate
Entrepreneurship in Public Sector Higher Education Institutions: A Conceptual
Model, 6 ISSUES IN SOC. & ENV. ACCT. 26, 29 (2012) (proposing a conceptual model
that explains the public sector corporate entrepreneurial process).
216. See Ibrahim, supra note 35, at 1761 (arguing that well-run companies
do not need to and do not have the motivation to invest in new technologies and
innovations, when they have a large customer base already and have no need to
go into less desirable and unexplored markets).
217. See Burgelman, supra note 42, at 1361 (“Only manipulating the
structural context constitutes a rather crude and ineffective approach because the
current structural context reflects the current concept of strategy, and
autonomous strategic behavior necessarily falls outside the scope of the latter.”).
218. See Gaurab Bhardwaj, John C. Camillus & David A. Hounshell,
Continual Corporate Entrepreneurial Search for Long-Term Growth, 52 MGMT.
SCI. 248, 251 (2006) (using DuPont’s decision-making documents from 1900 to
1925, the authors developed process theory explanations for continual corporate
entrepreneurial search for long-term growth).
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structure.219 An effective combination of these antonyms requires
experimentation and adjustment.220
Studies found that successful intrapreneurship requires new
managerial approaches and innovative administrative methods
from top management as well.221 Thus, middle-level managers play
a crucial role in the innovation process in intrapreneurial firms.222
They
support
autonomous
strategic
initiatives
by
employees-intrapreneurs, combine them with the firm’s
capabilities, and pitch them to top management.223 Management’s
critical contribution is in recognizing opportunities for change and
allowing intrapreneurs to redefine the organizational strategic
context 224 The PlayStation has been a key player in the gaming
console market and was invented by a low-level employee who
tinkered with his daughter’s Nintendo.225 His immediate
supervisors at Sony did not enthusiastically celebrate his ideas,
but more senior leaders saw the potential in this new creation and
pushed for the creation and introduction to market of the
PlayStation.226

219. See Burgelman, supra note 42, at 1349 (1983) (similarly discussing the
need for diversity and order for successful internal corporate venturing).
220. See id. (“Large, diversified organizations need both order and diversity
in strategy for their continued survival.”).
221. See id. (noting that top management should control the level and the rate
of change rather than the specific content of entrepreneurial activity).
222. See id. (“Middle level managers play a crucial role in this through their
support for autonomous strategic initiatives early on, by combining these with
various capabilities dispersed in the firms operating system, and by
conceptualizing strategies for new areas of business.”).
223. See id. (“[N]ew managerial approaches and innovative administrative
arrangements are required to facilitate the collaboration between entrepreneurial
participants and the organizations in which they are active.”).
224. See id. at 1350 (“The task of strategic management is to maintain an
appropriate balance between these fundamentally different processes. These
insights have implications for the design of organizational arrangements and for
the development of strategic managerial skills.”).
225. See Ibrahim, supra note 35, at 1755.
226. See id. (“Though his immediate supervisors were not particularly
amused, senior leaders saw the promise of the new creation and were open to
innovation at a time before ‘intrapreneurship’ was a developed principle.”).
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Intrapreneurial enterprises sustain themselves by making
sure they spend as much on innovation as their competitors do.227
They compete in a race over who gets access to breakthroughs
first.228 Since these conglomerates constantly compete over R&D
efforts, they dare not unwind their investments in innovation.229
Apple, Amazon, and Google are perhaps today’s biggest rivals.230
They are all large conglomerates and in some ways arch enemies
when it comes to innovative new products and services.231 In 2016,
Apple spent $10.39 billion on R&D, the most it had ever spent in
one year at that point.232 However, it still trailed behind Amazon
and Google who are the biggest spenders on R&D.233 Overall,
society benefits from this type of rivalry, as it guarantees a
constant flow of innovations.234
Quick product lifecycles result in the restrained ability of the
firm to recoup R&D investments.235 Therefore, intrapreneurial
227. See BAUMOL, supra note 32, at 28 (describing the competition as an arms
race, in which the firms feel they need to match their competitors spending on the
innovation process).
228. See id.
229. See id. (“The arms race character of innovation in these large firms drives
each company to seek ways of minimizing the chance that its rivals will gain
access to outside breakthroughs before it does.”).
230. See Paul J. Lim & Taylor Tepper, Apple, Amazon, or Google: Who Will
Win the Battle of the Tech Titans?, TIME (Jan. 8, 2015),
http://time.com/money/3656571/apple-amazon-google/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2019)
(describing the rivalry between Apple, Amazon, and Google) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
231. See id. (describing the rivalry between Microsoft, Intel, and Cisco
Systems in the 1990s and Apple, Google, and Amazon as their successors).
232. See Kif Leswig, Apple is Spending Billions on Secret R&D Projects—and
It Keeps Spending More, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 1 2017, 10:49 AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/apple-rd-spend-charts-2017-2 (last visited Feb.
13, 2019) (reporting that Apple spent $10.39 billion on R&D in 2016) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
233. See Justin Fox, The Big Spenders on R&D, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 29, 2016,
4:17 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-04-29/amazon-andfacebook-are-big-spenders-on-r-d (last updated May 2, 2016, 8:05 PM) (last visited
Feb. 13, 2019) (reporting that Apple spends less on R&D than Amazon and
Google) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
234. See BAUMOL, supra note 32, at 28 (equating the competitive rivalries with
an arms race).
235. See Gilson, supra note 207, at 904 (explaining that at some point
increasing internal incentives creates costs to the employer’s R&D that are
greater than the innovation’s value).
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enterprises often focus on predictable success by implementing
categorical discoveries with proven commercial potential.236 In
2006, the yogurt company Danone developed an enriched yogurt
with essential nutrients known as Grameen Danone, a twist on
their already-existing products.237 Danone then partnered with the
Bangladeshi government to deliver the product cheaply to its
population to help with the malnourishment problem.238 Through
this innovation, they were able to leverage their success and create
their renowned Activia yogurt.239 Without the work on the yogurt
for Bangladesh, Danone executives admitted they probably would
never have come up with Activia and prevailed in their market.240
Intrapreneurial firms also pursue innovations by making
incremental improvements and adding product features that
enhance their products’ functionality and accessibility.241 These
improvements may be more significant than a revolutionary
prototype discovery to end users at times.242 Every incremental
development may seem insignificant on its own, but when added
together, these developments turn out to be quite remarkable.243
For example, the first Intel processor was slow, bulky, and clumsy,
236. See Dr. Ad Huijser, Exec. Vice President and Chief Tech. Officer, Royal
Phillips Electronics (Tilburg, The Neth., Sept. 2003) quoted in BAUMOL, supra
note 32, at 25. In established businesses, innovation is mostly shaped through
small, incremental steps of additional features to augment basic functionalities.
With short product lifecycles, time to recoup R&D investments is limited. Success
is relatively predictable through the execution of well-defined innovation
processes and in-depth knowledge of their markets in the respective business
units.
237. See Belinfanti, supra note 35, at 82 (conducting a case study of Danone).
238. See id.
239. See id. (describing how Activia yogurt was developed).
240. See id. (“Activia has allowed Danone to broaden their yogurt offerings
and market potential.”).
241. See Gladwell, supra note 142 (explaining how Steve Jobs often developed
his products by tweaking other inventions and making improvements).
242. See id. (providing examples of occasions where an initial inventor may
be overshadowed by the improvements of others shortly after the initial
invention).
243. See id. (describing how the visionary starts the task, then the tweaker
makes improvements, which are then tweaked and result in an even better
product).
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but incremental upgrades over the years made it speedy, small,
and powerful.244 Collectively, small enhancements contributed to
the development of powerful computing power—a discovery that is
arguably much more revolutionary and beneficial to society than
that of the first laptop in 1981.245 True, the initial invention, led by
entrepreneur Adam Osborne, was necessary to ignite Intel’s later
upgrades.246 Yet, it was the combination of both entrepreneurial
and intrapreneurial agents that made the effective portable
computer available to us all.247
Intrapreneurial conglomerates usually possess an enhanced
ability to defray the high costs of the research and experimentation
required to take innovation breakthroughs to the next level.248 The
operation economies of scale, age, and scope in mass production
and distribution work to their benefit.249 Before its launch, Apple
spent over $150 million on the first prototype of the iPhone, with
the project taking almost three years.250 Their large team of
intrapreneurs worked seven days a week, and Jobs himself worked
over eighty hours a week.251 In the first ten years since the iPhone’s
244. See BAUMOL, supra note 32, at 33 (describing the first Intel processor).
245. See id. at 33 (“[S]uch improvements surely contribute far more
computing capacity than as provided by the original revolutionary
breakthrough—the invention of the electronic computer.”).
246. See Matt Rosoff, The Rise and Fall of the Man Who Invented the Portable
Computer,
BUS.
INSIDER
(Apr.
1,
2011,
10:01
AM)
https://www.businessinsider.com.au/the-amazing-rise-and-fall-of-the-firstportable-computer-2011-4 (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (explaining that Adam
Osborne was actually the first person to invent the portable computer) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
247. See BAUMOL, supra note 32, at 33 (explaining how the combined efforts
of both Blockbuster and incremental innovators made possible the computers that
serve us today).
248. See id. at 28 (explaining that funding for innovation is increasingly
supplied by oligopolistic enterprises).
249. See Mirit Eyal-Cohen, The Cost of Inexperience, 69 ALA. L. REV. 1, 5
(2017) (demonstrating the advantage of entities possessing economies of
experience in defraying regulatory costs).
250. See Fred Vogelstein, And Then Steve Said, “Let There Be an iPhone,” N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 4, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/06/magazine/and-thensteve-said-let-there-be-an-iphone.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (“One senior
executive believes that more than $150 million was spent creating the first
iPhone.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
251. See id. (describing the amount of time and work that went into creating
the iPhone).
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inception, Apple sold 1.2 billion devices with an estimated $100
billion dollars of profit for the company.252 In addition, Apple’s
large output and vast experience has allowed Apple to reduce the
average unit cost.253 Through the operation of the law of large
numbers, economies of scale reduce the average unit cost as the
scale of output increases.254 Indeed, Schumpeter recognized
technological innovation as a scale-intensive activity positively
related to organizational size.255
Economies of age are also beneficial in providing
intrapreneurial firms with insight, both as players within the
marketplace and of the marketplace environment.256 The older the
enterprise, the more time its decision-makers have had to become
informed about the marketplace and become acquainted with the
landscape.257 Bill Hewlett and Dave Packard founded HP in 1939
by selling audio oscillators from a car garage.258 Today, the
company’s products include an extensive range of IT products such

252. See Ian Morris, Apple Has Sold 1.2 Billion iPhones Worth $738 Billion
in 10 Years, FORBES, (June 29, 2017, 12:25 PM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/ianmorris/2017/06/29/apple-has-sold-1-2-billion-iphones-worth-738-billionin-10-years/#4848dd961a18 (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (reporting on the sales and
profits of the iPhone) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
253. See GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 71 (1968)
(explaining the theory of the economies of scale). At some point we observe
diseconomies of scale, namely when the cost per unit ceases to fall (minimum
efficient scale) and then begins to increase with scale. See Eyal-Cohen, supra note
249, at 880. From this point on, larger entities produce goods and services at
increased cost-per-unit. Id. Some reasons that attribute to this phenomenon can
be traced to increasing bureaucracy, duplication of efforts, office politics, etc. Id.
254. See R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, Organizational Diseconomies
of Scale, 4 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 399, 400 (1995) (pointing to hierarchical
distance increases between the information source and the decision maker as the
reason for this phenomenon).
255. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 5
(1942) (arguing that Marxism was successful because of scientific achievement).
256. See Eyal-Cohen, supra note 249, at 872 (“[E]conomies of age can be
beneficial to achieving dual marketplace familiarity advantages.”).
257. See id. at 872–73 (explaining the benefits of an older enterprise).
258. See HP: Making it Matter, SUCCESSSTORY, https://successstory.com/
companies/hewlett-packard (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (reviewing HP’s history)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).

INNOVATION AGENTS

205

as hardware and software services.259 International Business
Machines Corporation (IBM) was founded in 1911 and initially
focused on producing computing scale machines and time clocks.260
Nowadays, it is the world leader in computer hardware,
middleware and software, and also provides hosting and
consulting services.261 Information about the structure,
composition, rules, politics, state of competition, and possible
failures are examples of such beneficial knowledge.262 Since
market information is a valuable and costly factor of production,
new entrants to the market experience a net increase in their cost
per unit as they pursue such knowledge.263 This, in turn, lowers
the present value of their future profits.264
Economies of scope are similar to economies of age when
observed in connection with market experience; yet, the focus of
economies of scope is not on the longevity of the enterprise, but on
its previous market interaction.265 Expertise and specialized
knowledge constitute the essence of economies of scope.266 An
enterprise can reduce its overall cost-per-unit when it produces
two or more interrelated products, compared to enterprises that
produce each product separately and in similar quantities.267 For
259. See id. (listing HP’s current products).
260. See
IBM
is
Founded,
IBM,
http://www03.ibm.com/ibm/history/ibm100/us/en/icons/founded/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2019)
(exploring IBM’s history) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
261. See IBM Buys Merge Healthcare to Boost Watson Health Cloud,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 6, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2015-0806/ibm-buys-merge-healthcare-to-boost-watson-health-cloud (last visited Feb. 13,
2019) (detailing HP’s latest acquisition and venture into the health care industry)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
262. See Eyal-Cohen, supra note 249, at 873 (listing examples of beneficial
knowledge).
263. See id. (explaining the barriers to market entry).
264. See id. (concluding that new entrants to markets will experience a loss
to prevent value of future profits).
265. See Edward B. Brook, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of
Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 465 (1991) (discussing
economies of scale in connection to the production function of the collective good).
266. See Eyal-Cohen, supra note 249, at 875 (“The essence of economies of
scope is expertise and specialized knowledge.”).
267. Nevertheless, economies of scope do not necessitate that goods be sold
together. See Ian Ayres, Rationalizing Antitrust Cluster Markets, 95 YALE L.J.
109, 117–18 (1985) (stating that economies of scope do not necessitate that goods
be sold together).
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example, Apple may use existing knowledge, expertise, and
equipment from its iPhone and iPad to produce the iWatch,
thereby decreasing the cost-per-unit for its entire line of products
compared to a single-product manufacturer. Amazon began as an
online bookstore but easily diversified its products to audiobooks
and video downloads/streaming. In other words, producers’
average production cost decline as they increase their range of
products (scope of production) within similar categories.268
Individual entrepreneurs perform a critical role in uncovering
opportunities and knowledge that would otherwise remain
hidden.269 However, they may not have what it takes to effectively
execute their discoveries in the marketplace.270 Entrepreneurs lack
economies of experience (size, scope, and age) that help defray
various costs.271 Economies of experience allow intrapreneurial
conglomerates to recognize and capitalize on the innovative ideas
of entrepreneurs by offering attractive terms that induce
entrepreneurs to sell their innovations.272 Walmart purchased the
e-commerce start-up Jet.com, a company that developed a
real-time pricing algorithm that prices goods based on their
locations in distribution centers.273 General Electric agreed to buy
ServiceMax, a software program that “provides information about
off-site workers and equipment repairs.”274 For entrepreneurs,
268. See id. at 117 (“[P]roducts that are explicitly tied together by producers
are routinely aggregated into one market.”).
269. See BAUMOL, supra note 32, at 26 (distinguishing between innovative and
replicative entrepreneurs).
270. See id. at 26–27 (“[F]or example, large firms like Boeing, which took on
the task of improving the Wright brothers’ invention.”).
271. See Eyal-Cohen, supra note 249, at 876 (“Entities lacking economies of
experience may have no choice but to merge with entities possessing sufficient
experience.”).
272. Cf. id. (“It is easier for these firms to vertically integrate with newcomers
or take over their competitors.”).
273. See Hadley Malcolm, Why Walmart is Spending $3B for Online Seller
TODAY
(Aug.
8,
2016),
Jet.com,
USA
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2016/08/08/walmart-acquires-jetcom-for3-billion/88386988/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (explaining why Walmart acquired
Jet.com) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
274. Leslie Picker, For Non-Tech Companies, If You Can’t Build It, Buy a
Start-Up, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2017, at B1.
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time is of the essence as they desire both capital and ways to
develop and distribute their innovation quickly.275 They know
competitors will attempt to duplicate discoveries as soon as the
knowledge is made accessible.276 Instead of developing the product
and distribution network independently, many entrepreneurs
prefer to move faster by adjoining existing larger firms with
resources, market power, and proven record.277 More notably,
certain R&D with high risk and long progression, such as
pharmaceuticals drugs, is better developed within large firms that
possess FDA protocols, productions facilities, and market
reputation.278
Although economies of experience generally constitute a
beneficial feature of intrapreneurship by lowering the costs of
innovation research and production, increases in age and scope
may result in enlarged costs.279 This phenomenon is referred to as
diseconomies of experience, and it can occur for a variety of
reasons.280 For instance, established firms may suffer from
duplication of efforts and office politics.281 Firm bureaucracy and
lower-level organizational inertia often directly correlates to firm
size and can undermine innovativeness.282 Other factors such as
275. See Eyal-Cohen, supra note 22, at 981 (arguing that entrepreneurs have
a short time frame to capitalize on their innovations).
276. See id. at 981–82 (“Other market participants become motivated to learn
how to reproduce these discoveries.”).
277. See DONALD A. HAY & DEREK J. MORRIS, INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS: THEORY
AND EVIDENCE 10 (1979)
278. See Wesley M. Cohen & Richard C. Levin, Empirical Studies of
Innovation and Market Structure, in 2 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
1059, 1067 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989) (claiming that
certain nonmanufacturing activities may be better developed within large firms).
279. See, e.g., Jesper B. Sørensen & Toby E. Stuart, Aging, Obsolescence, and
Organizational Innovation, 45 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 81, 82 (2000) (finding that a firm’s
age is associated with not only increases in rates of innovation but also the
difficulties of keeping pace with external developments).
280. See Eyal-Cohen, supra note 249, at 880 (“[O]ld-timers begin to produce
goods and services at an increased cost-per-unit.”).
281. See Donald C. Hambrick & Ian C. MacMillan, Efficiency of Product R&D
in Business Units: The Role of Strategic Context, 28 ACAD. OF MGMT. J. 527, 530
(1985) (noting medium-sized firms have lower negative effects of firm
bureaucracy).
282. See Michael L. Tushman & Elaine Romanelli, Organizational Evolution:
A Metamorphosis Model of Convergence and Reorientation, in 7 RESEARCH IN
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 171, 181 (Barry M. Straw & L.L. Cummings eds.,
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increased bureaucratic processes, multi-level administrative
procedures, controlling management, and adherence to traditions
can also hinder innovation in established firms.283 The arc of
Kodak’s rise and fall in the camera industry is illustrative. For
much of the twentieth century, Kodak was the leading innovator
in cameras and film, pioneering push-and-shoot cameras and
Kodachrome film.284 Its technological breakthroughs resulted in a
90% market share of the photographic film industry and an 85%
market share in the camera industry.285 Steve Sasson, an engineer
for Kodak, created the first digital camera in the 1970s.286 Rather
than capitalize on the innovation, Kodak remained focused on film
cameras, partly out of management’s fear that digital cameras
would cannibalize their lucrative sale of film.287 Despite the
technological head start, when digital cameras became prevalent
1985) (“[P]erformance and inertia . . . constitute underlying forces driving
evolution.”).
283. See John C. Panzar & Robert D. Willig, Economies of Scope, 71 AM. ECON.
REV. 268, 268 (1981) (discussing the multi-product cost function of economies of
scope as a form of complementarity in production).
284. See David Usborne, The Moment it All Went Wrong for Kodak,
INDEPENDENT
(Jan.
20,
2012),
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/analysis-and-features/themoment-it-all-went-wrong-for-kodak-6292212.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2019)
(narrating Kodak’s history) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
285. See id. (arguing that Kodak controlled the camera film industry in 1976).
286. See Claudia H. Deutsch, At Kodak, Some Old Things Are New Again,
N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2008, at C1 (detailing Kodak’s reaction to the first filmless
camera).
287. See id. (quoting Steve Sasson as saying, “My prototype was big as a
toaster, but the technical people loved it. But it was filmless photography, so
management’s reaction was, ‘that’s cute—but don’t tell anyone about it’”). Kodak
executives were aware of the effect that the first digital camera would have on
the film market. See Usborne, supra note 284 (quoting a former Kodak
vice-president as saying, “We developed the world’s first consumer digital camera
but we could not get approval to launch or sell it because of fear of the effects on
the film market”). However, business analysts believe that there may be other
reasons why Kodak failed to capitalize on its innovation. See Scott D. Anthony,
Kodak’s
Downfall
Wasn’t
About
Technology,
HARV. BUS. REV.,
https://hbr.org/2016/07/kodaks-downfall-wasnt-about-technology (last visited
Feb. 13, 2019) (positing that Kodak’s failure may be rooted in a failure to
understand how digital cameras would be used, rather than a rejection of
innovation) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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in the 1990s and 2000s, Kodak found itself trailing its competitors
in market share.288 By 2012, Kodak was preparing for
bankruptcy.289 Therefore, economies of experience can both boost
or impede the ability of established conglomerates to take risks
and deliver innovations to the market.
To conclude, many intrapreneurial firms that possess
economies of scale, scope, and age usually have an increased
capability to develop internally or acquire external innovations.290
However, they may also encounter diseconomies that will impede
their ability to pursue breakthroughs.291 This is where the
complementary actions of other innovation agents such as
employees-intrapreneurs become vital, as described in the next
section.
B. Employees-Intrapreneurs
In the last few decades, entrepreneurs acting as employees
inside giant conglomerates became more prominent in the
innovation process.292 Large conglomerates began to realize that
innovation could yield supra-competitive profits.293 As a result,

288. See Clark Gilbert & Joseph L. Bower, Disruptive Change: When Trying
Harder
is
Part
of
the
Problem,
HARV.
BUS.
REV.,
https://hbr.org/2002/05/disruptive-change-when-trying-harder-is-part-of-theproblem (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (noting that Kodak management’s failure to
recognize opportunities in the digital market opened the door for industry
outsiders like HP, Canon, and Sony to control the evolution of the digital camera
and digital storage market) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
289. See Mike Spector & Dana Mattioli, Kodak Teeters on the Brink, WALL ST.
J.
(Jan.
5,
2012),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405297
0203471004577140841495542810 (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (reviewing Kodak’s
attempt to catch up in the filmless camera industry) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
290. See Eyal-Cohen, supra note 249, at 872–80 (discussing the economies of
scale, scope and age).
291. See id. at 880.
292. See infra notes 294–296 (listing examples of giant corporations
encouraging employees to be innovative).
293. See infra notes 294–296.
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companies like Apple,294 IBM,295 and Google296 began encouraging
employees to pursue individual projects of their choice.297 These
conglomerates instigated opportunities for their workers to think
like entrepreneurs and develop their ideas via special processes.298
In an interview with Newsweek in 1985, Steve Jobs noted the
following: “The Macintosh team was what is commonly known now
as intrapreneurship—only a few years before the term was
coined—a group of people going in essence back to the garage, but
in a large company.”299
Business history is filled with stories about employees that
successfully transformed their firms through innovations.300 As
294. See Jessica E. Lessin, Apple Gives in to Employee Perks, WALL ST. J. (Nov.
12, 2012), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732407350457811507
11549 10456 (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (describing Apple’s Blue Sky Program
which allows select employees to spend a few weeks on personal projects) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
295. See Think Friday: Taking the Time to be Innovative, IBM.COM: BLOGS
(Aug.
10,
2012)
https://www.ibm.com/developerworks/community/blogs/nfrsblog/entry/think_frid
ay_taking_the_time_to_be_innovative4?lang=en (last visited Feb. 13, 2019)
(explaining IBM’s “Think Friday” method which gives employees the freedom to
spend time every week engaging in personal projects) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
296. See Andrea Huspeni, Google’s 20 Percent Rule Actually Helps Employees
Fight Back Against Unreasonable Managers, ENTREPRENEUR (June 7, 2017),
https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/295372 (last visited Feb. 13, 2019)
(detailing Google’s “20% Rule” that allows employees to spend 20% of their work
week on personal projects) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
297. See supra notes 294–296 (listing examples of corporations who encourage
employees to pursue personal projects).
298. See Huspeni, supra note 296 (“Let your employees pursue wild ideas that
may raise your eyebrows.”).
299. Gerald C. Lubenow, Jobs Talks About His Rise and Fall, NEWSWEEK
MAGAZINE, https://www.newsweek.com/jobs-talks-about-his-rise-and-fall-207016
(last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see
Gautam Ahuja & Curba Morris Lampert, Entrepreneurship in the Large
Corporation: A Longitudinal Study of How Established Firms Create
Breakthrough Inventions, 22 STRAT. MANAG. J. 521, 522 (2001) (modeling
breakthrough inventions in established firms).
300. See Jake Swearingen, Great Intrapreneurs in Business History, CBS
NEWS, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/great-intrapreneurs-in-business-history/
(June 17, 2008) (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (listing examples of great
intrapreneurs) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).

INNOVATION AGENTS

211

mentioned above, Sony’s decision to support the personal project of
one of its in-house engineers ultimately helped revolutionize the
gaming industry.301 Sony intrapreneur Ken Kutaragi was working
as a Sony sound labs employee when he helped Sony develop its
own gaming system known as the PlayStation.302 In 1994,
Kutaragi began working with Nintendo to develop a
CD-ROM-based Nintendo machine to improve video game
quality.303 Upon learning of his collaboration with Sony’s business
competitor, Sony executives sought to fire Kutaragi.304 However,
then-CEO Norio Ohga realized the value of this innovation and
encouraged Kutaragi’s efforts.305 Sony continued to develop this
gaming endeavor with Nintendo.306 Nintendo ultimately passed on
Kutaragi’s CD-ROM based gaming system, which Sony later used
to develop the PlayStation.307 Kutaragi is now hailed as “the
Father of the PlayStation,” and has since founded Sony Computer
Entertainment, one of Sony’s most profitable divisions to date and
invented the highest selling gaming system of all time, the
PlayStation 2.308
Similarly, Texas Instruments researcher Larry Hornbeck’s
prominence is highlighted by his receipt of an Emmy for
Outstanding Achievement in Engineering and Development.309
While employed at Texas Instruments, Hornbeck developed the
Digital Micromirror Device (DMD) in 1987.310 The company
301. See id. (explaining how Sony created the Playstation).
302. See id. (stating that the then CEO realized Kutaragi’s innovation and
encouraged him to pursue it).
303. See id. (explaining how intrapreneurship created the Playstation).
304. See id.
305. See id. (“Norio Ohga realized the value of his innovation and encouraged
Kutaragi’s efforts.”).
306. See id. (stating that Kutaragi had Sony’s blessing to work with
Nintendo).
307. See id. (“Kutaragi helped Sony develop its own gaming system . . . .”).
308. See Daniel Van Boom, Kaz Hirai Steps Down as Sony CEO, Moves to
Chairman Role, CNET (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.cnet.com/news/kaz-hirai-sonystep-down-chairman-ceo-playstation/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (describing
Sony’s focus on gaming and phones under Hirai’s leadership) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
309. See Ankit Kumar & Er. Poonam, Micromirror, 5 INT’L J. TECH. RES. 1, 2
(2016) (surveying innovations and achievements in this field).
310. See TEXAS INSTRUMENTS INC., THE DIGITAL MICROMIRROR DEVICE, A
HISTORIC MECHANICAL ENGINEERING LANDMARK 1–8 (2008) (explaining the history
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initially used this technology to print out airline tickets, but then
Hornbeck realized that DMD technology could greatly shrink the
size and cost of a digital projector. Accordingly, Texas Instruments
executives launched an internal venture called the “Digital
Imaging Venture Project” and named Hornbeck the program
leader.311 This innovative discovery ultimately created digital
projectors weighing less than five pounds, which “revolutionized
the movie theater business and allowed Texas Instruments to
compete in the HDTV market.”312
The intrapreneurial conglomerate structure presents a unique
set of opportunities for employees-intrapreneurs.313 The benefits of
economies of scale, scope, and age of large, complex organizations
provide prospects for employees-intrapreneurs to learn and
develop their skills.314 They may tap into their firms’ pool of unused
resources.315 It is part of the inherent internal impulse of
intrapreneurs for growth.316 For example, a study conducted by
Professor Hamberg found that large companies had substantial
research and development advantages.317 First, they have greater
diversification and marketing that increases the likelihood that
of the digital micromirror device); Digital Micromirror Device, ASME,
https://www.asme.org/about-asme/who-we-are/engineeringhistory/landmarks/243-digital-micromirror-device (last visited Feb. 13, 2019)
(same) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
311. TEXAS INSTRUMENTS INC., supra note 310.
312. Id.
313. See, e.g., Ibrahim, supra note 35, at 1759–60 (2016) (recognizing the
attractiveness of a well-resourced company holds for an employee seeking to
innovate, but unwilling to bear the financial burden and unpredictability of
traditional entrepreneurship).
314. See id. at 1744–45 (stating that large corporations have more resources
than start-ups).
315. See EDITH PENROSE, THE THEORY OF THE GROWTH OF THE FIRM 78 (1959)
(arguing that intrapreneuers are able to get the most out of a corporation’s
resources).
316. See id. (“[W]e can fairly conclude that he believes there are productive
services inherent in that resource about which as yet he knows little or nothing
about.”).
317. See DANIEL HAMBERG, R & D: ESSAYS ON THE ECONOMICS OF RESEARCH
AND DEVELOPMENT 47 (1966) (“It seems fairly evident that size of firm is a very
important determinant . . . .”).
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the firm can exploit new discoveries.318 Second, these firms have
long-term resources that allow them to undertake long-range
projects.319 Lastly, they have superior laboratories, research
teams, and access to substantial resources.320
Similarly, Israel Kirzner has described the corporate form of
business organization as an “ingenious, unplanned device that
eases the access of entrepreneurial talent to sources of large-scale
financing.”321 He portrayed intrapreneurs as those that possess
discretionary freedom of action which enables them to act as
entrepreneurs and implement their ideas without themselves
becoming owners.322 As part of his theory of “alertness” to
opportunities as the foundation for all entrepreneurial activity, he
emphasized the importance of alertness both internal as well as
external to the organization.323
Indeed, recent studies have also found that innovation can
occur through teams of entrepreneurs.324 Moreover, some surveys
have gone so far as to indicate that established firms that
encourage intrapreneurship are more successful at pursuing

318. See id. at 37–38 (“A large firm is also typically a diversified one . . . .”).
319 See id. at 37 (arguing that large corporations have more funds to
contribute to research and development projects).
320 See id. at 39 (arguing that it is profitable for large corporations to
attempt innovation because its few winners will be able to pay out against the
many losers).
321. ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, PERCEPTION, OPPORTUNITY, AND PROFIT 104 (1979).
322. Id. at 105.
323. See ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, DISCOVERY AND THE CAPITALIST PROCESS 85 (1985)
Alertness is a concept sufficiently elastic to cover not only the
perception of existing arbitrage oppor tunities, but also the
perception of intertemporal speculative opportunities that can
be definitively realized only after the lapse of time, and even also
the percepti on of intertemporal opportunities that call for creative
and imaginative innovation.
324. See MARTIN RUEF, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL GROUP: SOCIAL IDENTITIES,
RELATIONS, AND COLLECTIVE ACTION 168 (2010) (finding entrepreneurship in group
to be more efficient); Hans K. Hvide, The Quality of Entrepreneurs, 119 ECON. J.
1010, 1010 (2009) (demonstrating that groups in established firms produce
entrepreneurs of higher quality than smaller firms); see also ROSABETH MOSS
KANTER, THE CHANGE MASTERS: INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN AMERICA
209–10 (1983) (portraying “corporate entrepreneurs” as “the people who test the
limits and create new possibilities for organizational action by pushing and
directing the innovation process”).
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innovative projects than start-ups.325 Accordingly, the firm’s age in
and of itself no longer can stand as the sole characteristic in the
model of successful innovation.326 By pioneering innovations
within
the
existing
organizational
structure,
employees-intrapreneurs contribute to the firm’s entrepreneurial
viability while strengthening their own creative spirit.327 Thus, the
phenomenon of intrapreneurship has positive effects on employees
as well as organizational growth and profitability.328
What roles do those employees-intrapreneurs employ in their
firms? Depending on the type of firm, industry, and venture,
intrapreneurship can be observed as a bottom up or top down
occurrence.329 Creating innovations often requires creative
insights and forecasting market demands.330 It may also
necessitate bridging technical gaps with scientific knowledge and
technical lab skills.331 Those who come from the lower levels of the
325. See Timothy Dunne et al., Patterns of Entry and Exit in U.S.
Manufacturing Industries, 19 RAND J. ECON. 495, 513 (1988) (stating an empirical
study on entry and exit rates for both start-ups and diversifying entrants); P.A.
Geroski, What Do We Know About Entry?, 13 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 421, 424–25
(1995) (“De novo entry is more common but less successful than entry by
diversification.”). But see Avishalom Tor, The Fable of Entry: Bounded
Rationality, Market Discipline, and Legal Policy, 101 MICH. L. REV. 482, 485
(2002) (criticizing those studies for being limited by not including all diversifying
firms, including those who enter by changing their product mix in an existing
facility).
326. See Diego B. Avanzini, Designing Composite Entrepreneurship
Indicators, in ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 37, 39–40 (Wim
Naudé ed., 2011) (arguing that existing indicators of entrepreneurial activity
(amongst them the Kaufman new firm index) that have been considered good
proxies are not adequate to entrepreneurial development).
327. See Ibrahim, supra note 35, at 1744 (listing the benefits of employee
intrapreneurship).
328. See Bostjan B. Antoncic & Robert D. Hisrich, Intrapreneurship:
Construct Refinement and Cross-Cultural Validation, 16 J. BUS. VENTURING 495,
496 (2001) (“[T]he results of this study support the notion that intrapreneurship
is an important predictor of firms growth in terms of absolute growth . . . .”).
329. See Niels Bosma, Erik Stam & Sander Wennekers, Entrepreneurial
Employee Activity: A Large Scale International Study, UTRECHT UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES 12, at 3 (2012) (distinguishing
between top down and bottom up processes).
330. See id. (defining “innovative work behavior”).
331. See ROBERT A. BURGELMAN AND LEONARD R. SAYLES, INSIDE CORPORATE
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organization are likely to possess more technological knowledge
and expertise.332 Those who come from the management level may
serve as visionaries and develop efficient business strategies to
implement the innovation.333
Pinchot
and
Pellman
claim
that
while
employees-intrapreneurs must be leaders, they differ considerably
from ordinary managers.334 They seek innovative opportunities,
engage in teamwork, and make rapid decisions under
uncertainty.335 Intrapreneurs act like entrepreneurs, only with
better access to research and funding than entrepreneurial agents
normally have.336 They seek profitable opportunities and learn
from past failures without having to participate in the endless race
for funding, or being exposed to the risks of financial accountability
typically associated with entrepreneurial failure.337 Accordingly,
they possess similar characteristics to entrepreneurs such as
creativity, risk-taking, leadership, and self-motivation.338
Other scholars claim that managers can also assume the role
of intrapreneurs within certain organizations.339 They may help
the internal venture navigate the company’s social-political
environment.340 While intrapreneurs-managers may have other
INNOVATION: STRATEGY, STRUCTURE, AND MANAGERIAL SKILLS 5 (1986) (observing
internal entrepreneurship from the bottom up).
332. See Modesto A. Maidique, Entrepreneurs, Champions, and Technological
Innovation, SLOAN MGMT. REV. 59, 64 (1980) (noting intrapreneurs can come from
lower levels as well as middle and upper levels of the firm).
333. See id. at 66 (stating that the CEO of Kloss was in charge of overseeing
“the concept of the product”).
334. GIFFORD PINCHOT & RON PELLMAN, INTRAPRENEURING IN ACTION: A
HANDBOOK FOR BUSINESS INNOVATION 87 (1999) (distinguishing intrapreneurs
from middle managers).
335. See id. at 81–86 (discussing the general qualities of successful
intrapreneurs).
336. See Michael Livingston, Risky Business: Economics, Culture and the
Taxation of High-Risk Activities, 48 TAX L. REV. 163, 214 (1993) (discussing the
factors contributing to intrapreneur’s access to greater resources).
337. See Swearingen, supra note 300 (discussing how intrapreneur Larry
Hornbeck used Texas Instrument’s multi-million-dollar contract award granted
to them by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency to invent DMD
technology).
338. See id. (providing examples of successful intrapreneurs).
339. See Day, supra note 57, at 148 (describing intrapreneurs as “champions”
of innovation in the organizations).
340. See S. Venkataraman, Ian C. MacMillan & Rita G. McGrath, Progress in
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responsibilities that keep them away from monitoring all key
functions of the discovery, they often advocate for its continuous
expansion, resources, and legitimacy.341 Intrapreneurial ventures
may be costly and high-profile, embodying substantial risks for the
organization and significant threats to the status quo.342 The
hierarchical power of managers-intrapreneurs and their
organizational knowledge enables them to foster highly innovative
(and costly) ventures.343
Intrapreneurs also have the ability to assume a dual role in
the innovation process.344 They may advance existing discoveries
through the commercialization process in their firm. For instance,
the Post-it note was invented by a 3M scientist via the company’s
bootlegging program.345 The program permitted 3M employees to
spend some of their time at work developing innovative ideas.346
Intrapreneurs may also seek new discoveries independently
outside of their firm.347 As mentioned above, Sony employee Ken
Kutaragi embarked independently on a joint venture to create new
CD-ROM gaming technology with Sony’s competitor, Nintendo.348
Research on Corporate Venturing, in THE STATE OF THE ART OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP
487, 503 (Donald L. Sexton & John D. Kasarda eds., 1992) (“[A] new venture idea
requires one or more powerful agents within the organization who will exercise
the required social and political effort . . . to galvanize support for a business
concept.”).
341. See Day, supra note 57, at 153 (discussing top management as dual-role
intrapreneurs).
342. See Tushman & Romanelli, supra note 282, at 179 (describing how shifts
in strategy, or reorientations, can fundamentally change an organization’s
character).
343. See Day, supra note 57, at 153 (noting that top management “may
provide the
right mix of knowledge and information, as well as hierarchical
power, to foster certain kinds of highly innovative ventures”).
344. See Swearingen, supra note 300 (discussing intrapreneurs who worked
to promote ventures within their companies).
345. Id. (“The Post-it, now as indispensable to the typical office worker as a
chair and desk, might never have made it to market without 3M’s longstanding
‘bootlegging’ policy.”).
346. See id. (“The company’s program allows employees to spend up to 15
percent of their time at work developing their ideas.”).
347. See id. (discussing intrapreneurs who innovated outside their
companies).
348. See id. (“With Sony’s blessing, Kutaragi worked with Nintendo to develop
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Intrapreneurs develop a strong entrepreneurial identity and
sense of responsibility when they are empowered to claim
ownership of their tasks.349 Their motivation to innovate may be
maintained through job design, formal ownership structures, or
monetary incentives.350 They identify gaps between intra-firm
capabilities and market discoveries and import or create new
products or services.351
A study that assessed successful intrapreneurial
environments emphasized five distinct factors: management
support, employee-work discretion, organizational boundaries,
rewards and reinforcement, and time availability.352 Google, for
instance, utilizes an “innovation time off” program, which allows
employees to spend part of their workday developing their
own intrapreneurial projects.353 Notable programs such as Gmail
and Google News were developed through Google employees’
efforts within the innovation time off program.354 Microsoft
employs innovation initiatives known as “The Garage,” which
“supports and encourages problem solving in new and innovative
ways.”355 The program provides space, personal incentives, and
a CD-ROM-based Nintendo.”).
349. See LOBEL, supra note 28, at 173–95 (discussing how self-identification
and “fitness” foster work environments conducive to creativity and innovation and
noting individuals must view their human capital as part of their identity to
maximize their innovative capacity).
350. See PINCHOT & PELLMAN, supra note 334, at 12 (discussing Fleischmann’s
Company’s strategic innovation program as part of the company’s job design); Id.
at 26–27 (explaining that some companies set up seed money funds to promote
innovation).
351. See Swearingen, supra note 300 (discussing intrapreneur Larry
Hornbeck’s development of the Digital Micromirror Device which reinvented
modern Hollywood cinema projects).
352. See Jeffrey S. Hornsby, Donald F. Kuratko & Shaker A. Zahra, Middle
Managers’ Perception of the Internal Environment for Corporate
Entrepreneurship: Assessing a Measurement Scale, 17 J. BUS. VENTURING 253, 254
(2002) (discussing the factors determined by the Corporate Entrepreneurship
Assessment Instrument (CEAI)).
353. See Ibrahim, supra note 35, at 1754 (explaining Google’s “innovation
time off” program).
354. See id. at 1754–55 (“Notably, half of the programs Google launched in
the latter half of 2005 were developed through this program, including Gmail and
Google News.”).
355. See What is The Garage?, MICROSOFT, https://www.microsoft.com/enus/garage/about/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee
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project development tools to stimulate innovation.356 It allows
Microsoft employees to use Microsoft products to develop new
projects with guidance from technical and market advisors.357 The
program also delivers a unique release process which helps
employees distribute their experiments quickly.358 Both of these
programs are indicative of how large companies enable
employee-work discretion and managerial support to increase
innovative discoveries within the firm.359
Lastly, research also emphasizes the importance of providing
intrapreneurs with autonomy.360 When provided with
independence, intrapreneurs play a vital role in changing their
competitive environment.361 Yet, when management’s interest is
not matched with that of intrapreneurs, the latter seek
opportunities outside of the organization.362 Why particular
individuals choose to advance opportunities in a self-directed way,
rather than as part of an organization, may also be idiosyncratic.
Whether working as an employee or embarking on an independent
road, society ultimately benefits from intrapreneurial
knowledge.363

Law Review).
356. See id. (noting that “The Garage” provides “spaces for hacking and
making,” tools to allow innovators to test experiments, and allows innovators to
gain valuable insights “regardless of results”).
357. See id. (explaining that “The Garage” provides teams across the company
with the ability to get expert advice on their innovations).
358. See id. (“Project teams get . . . a lightweight release process to help teams
get their experiments out quickly.”).
359. See supra notes 353–358 and accompanying text.
360. See KANTER, supra note 324, at 171 (noting that individuals at two
high-innovation companies “perceived a great deal of ‘running room’ (freedom) in
the course of completing their accomplishments”).
361. See id. at 241 (“Corporate entrepreneurs . . . still get their projects done
by crafting coalitions and building teams of devoted employees who feel a
heightened sense of joint involvement and contribution to decisions.”).
362. See supra note 348 and accompanying text.
363. See KANTER, supra note 324, at 19 (noting the “clear and pressing need
for more innovation” due to “social and economic changes of unprecedented
magnitude and variety”).
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IV. The Positive Spillovers of Intrapreneurship
A. The Greenhouse Effect
How do intrapreneurial firms contribute to this type of
knowledge spillover? Simply put, they serve as “human capital
greenhouses.”364 Aside from job training, they provide their
employees-intrapreneurs with first-hand experience of the various
stages of developing innovations without personally enduring the
financial and reputational consequences of entrepreneurial
failure.365 Google delivers training programs and opportunities for
development in various ways, such as discussions, simulations,
and on-the-job training.366 Its People Operations team (known
elsewhere as HR) lives by the mantra “find them, grow them, keep
them,” and is dedicated to talent development in a distinct and
inclusive culture.367 These employees can later share that
experience with other market players or utilize it in their own
ventures.368
Organizations committed to innovation may groom employees
to develop entrepreneurial skills.369 Through management
education as well as a process of discovery that enables team
members to deploy new skills, they can improve employees’
expertise and motivate them to become corporate visionaries.370
These corporate entrepreneurial development programs may be
364. See, e.g., id. at 23 (explaining that high-innovation organizations are
those “that make it possible to experiment, to create, to develop, to test”).
365. See Ibrahim, supra note 35, at 1750 (contrasting intrapreneurship,
where an employee stays in-house to pursue an idea, with entrepreneurship,
where an innovator assumes all risks in terms of capital and reputation).
366. See Laura He, Google’s Secret to Innovation: Empowering Its Employees,
FORBES (Mar. 29, 2013, 5:29 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/laurahe/
2013/03/29/googles-secrets-of-innovation-empowering-its-employees/#1e1bebcc5
7e7 (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (listing the company’s various channels to promote
discussion and innovation) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
367. Google Careers, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/intl/es_ALL/about/
careers/fields-of-work/people/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
368. See He, supra note 366 (discussing Google’s management practices that
inspire innovation).
369. See PINCHOT & PELLMAN, supra note 334, at 36–42 (discussing the use of
training programs to develop employees’ intrapreneurial skills).
370. See id.
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formal or informal.371 For instance, through Adobe’s KickStart
program, employees are offered two-day innovation workshops
along with a $1,000 gift card to develop an idea or prototype.372
Studies show that organizations can train managers to act like
entrepreneurs and that these actions can result in significant new
value creation.373
Cultivating
development
practices
can
elevate
entrepreneurial conduct in various circumstances and support
employees’ involvement.374 The innovative environment requires
adjustment to changing market demands and staying informed
371. See Neal E. Thornberry, Corporate Entrepreneurship: Teaching
Managers to be Entrepreneurs, 22 J. MGMT. DEV. 329, 330 (2003) (listing four
types of corporate entrepreneurship: corporate venturing, intrapreneurship,
organizational transformation, and industry rule-breaking).
372. Jacob Morgan, The Innovation Game: Adobe’s New Strides to Keep
Employees Engaged, FORBES (Feb. 25, 2015, 12:55 AM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/jacobmorgan/2015/02/25/the-innovation-game/#36d8630a41e6 (last visited
Feb. 13, 2019) (describing Adobe’s Kickstart innovation program) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
373. See Thornberry, supra note 371, at 331 (explaining that a “company’s
service delivery was given both a speed and cost advantage over their
competitors” because of middle manager’s innovation); see also KRISTIINA
ERKKILA, ENTREPRENEURIAL EDUCATION: MAPPING THE DEBATES IN THE UNITED
KINGDOM AND FINLAND 5 (2000) (noting that entrepreneurship education is
focused on small business and enterprise education is directed more toward the
development of enterprising behavior); Lan Li, Eliza Ching-Yick Tse & Jing-Ling
Zhao, An Empirical Study of Corporate Entrepreneurship in Hospitality
Companies, 10 INT’L. J. HOSPITALITY & TOURISM ADMIN. 213, 225 (2009)
(evaluating the impact of organizational structure to positively or negatively
impact innovation within the firm); Ali Reza Ma’atoofi & Kayhan Tajeddini, The
Effect of Entrepreneurship Orientation on Learning Orientation and Innovation:
A Study of Small-Sized Business Firms in Iran, 1 INT’L. J. TRADE, ECON. & FIN.
254, 258 (2010) (finding a significant positive relationship between
entrepreneurship orientation and increased innovation in eighty-two small
firms).
374. See James C. Hayton, Promoting Corporate Entrepreneurship Through
Human Resource Management Practices: A Review of Empirical Research, 15
HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. REV. 21, 33–38 (2005) (discussing the need for
organizational learning and collaboration to promote entrepreneurial activity of
employees); Bård Kuvaas & Anders Dysvik, Exploring Alternative Relationships
Between Perceived Investment in Employee Development, Perceived Supervisor
Support and Employee Outcomes, 20 HUM. RESOURCES MGMT. J. 138, 144–49
(2010) (discussing the impact of direct supervisor support and relationships in
fostering and improving work quality, retention, and development).
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Accordingly,
many
about
the
newest
technologies.375
intrapreneurial firms invest continuously in professional
development, as well as individualized coaching and learning
opportunities.376 SquareSpace offers such individualized coaching
through “All Hands Meetings” and “CEO Office Hours” where
employees can get access to advice and guidance from top
management.377
Scholars note that this type of investment in intrapreneurs
empowers them to react creatively to new challenges, adjust to
dynamic situations, and manage uncertain conditions.378
Moreover, it is an effective venue for employees to appreciate the
value of cooperation and cross-functional perspectives.379 Lastly,
intrapreneurs gain political skills and receive first-hand
knowledge on approaches to acquire funding and ways to avoid
early exposure of new ideas and discoveries.380 Entrepreneurial
networks are built through the development of ideas and
ventures.381 Investors in entrepreneurial ventures are often
intrapreneurs themselves, who acquired familiarity with the
375. See Inder Sidhu, How Amazon Maintains Its Edge, FORBES (Sept. 13,
2010, 4:20 PM), https://www.forbes.com/2010/09/13/amazon-innovation-changemanagement-leadership-managing-human-capital-10disruption.html#2d6a97584e6f (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (discussing Amazon’s
ability to develop new technology and apply it to different marketplaces and
applications) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
376. See infra note 377 and accompanying text.
377. See Careers, SQUARESPACE, https://www.squarespace.com/about/careers
(last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (“Our monthly All Hands meetings, email newsletters,
and CEO Office Hours are just a few of the programs we run to bring our three
offices together and share key aspects of the business across the entire
organization.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
378. See MICHAEL H. MORRIS, DONALD F. KURATKO & JEFFREY G. COVIN,
CORPORATE ENTREPRENEURSHIP & INNOVATION 190 (2010) (“This type of training
approach enables employees to respond in unique ways to new challenges, adapt
to dynamic environmental conditions, and feel comfortable with ambiguity.”).
379. See id. (noting that training programs can teach employees to value
collaboration and shared achievements).
380. See id. (“[T]here is some value in teaching political skills to prospective
entrepreneurs, including ways to obtain sponsors, build resource networks, and
avoid early publicity of new concepts and ventures.”).
381. See
THOMAS
HELLMANN
&
VEIKKO
THIELE,
FOSTERING
ENTREPRENEURSHIP: PROMOTING FOUNDING OR FUNDING?
2 (2017),
http://eureka.sbs.ox.ac.uk/6297/1/2017-04.pdf
(“Successful
entrepreneurs
accumulate both the expertise and the wealth to then fund the next generation of
entrepreneurs.”).
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unique process of innovative ventures.382 Serial intrapreneurs
frequently use their networking abilities to obtain funding more
easily.383 For example, Facebook was initially funded by Peter
Thiel, the co-founder of PayPal and a former partner at the
accelerator Y Combinator.384 Andy Bechtolsheim, chief hardware
designer and co-founder of Sun Microsystems and consultant to
Xerox, was one of the initial investors in Google.385
Lastly, intrapreneurial firms may also instill in their
employees ways to remain alert to opportunities.386 Researching
new market demands and seeking technological gaps are some
techniques utilized in such organizations to remain attentive to
new possibilities.387 Studies note some effective training may
include development of entrepreneurial mindset by emphasizing
acceptance of change, willingness to take risks and assume
responsibility, and collaborative attitudes and practices.388
382. See id. (“In practice, the first check of successful start-ups often comes
from angel investors who were successful entrepreneurs before: think of Andy
Bechtolsheim, co-founder of Sun Microsytems, who wrote the first check for
Google, or Peter Thiel, co-founder of PayPal, who wrote the first check for
Facebook.”).
383. See infra notes 309–310 and accompanying text.
384. See Tracey Lien, Peter Thiel’s Resume Includes PayPal, Facebook and
Supporting Trump. And He's Coming to L.A., L.A. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2018, 11:30
AM),
http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-who-is-peter-thiel20180215-story.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (“[Thiel’s] first major foray into
technology came in 1999 when he co-founded PayPal with Elon Musk, Max
Levchin, Luke Nosek and Ken Howery.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review); David Z. Morris, Y Combinator Has Quietly Cut Ties with Peter
Thiel, FORTUNE (Nov. 19, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/11/19/y-combinatorpeter-thiel/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (discussing Theil’s departure from being
part-time partner at Y Combinator) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
385. See John Markoff, Even Sun Microsystems Had Its Roots at Xerox PARC,
N.Y. TIMES BLOG (May 28, 2014, 7:00 AM), https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/
2014/05/28/even-sun-microsystems-had-its-roots-at-xerox-parc/ (last visited Feb.
13, 2019) (discussing Bechtolsheim’s role at Sun Microsystems as well as his role
at other companies) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
386. See infra notes 387–389 and accompanying text.
387. See He, supra note 366 (explaining that Google’s training and
development encourage employees to suggest new areas for development,
highlight technological gaps, and develop prototypes to fill those gaps).
388. See MORRIS, KURATKO & COVIN, supra note 378, at 190 (“Training
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Researchers found that this type of entrepreneurial training in
intrapreneurial firms generated the highest performance and
distinguished more entrepreneurial organizations from less
entrepreneurial organizations.389 As discussed next, such exit risks
may
be
more
career-related
decisions,
rather
than
390
compensation-driven.
B. Maintaining Exit Opportunities and Knowledge Spillover
Information quickly diffuses to other market players391 There
is a sharp decline in the marginal cost of discovery once such
knowledge is made publicly available.392 Others learn about the
new discovery, improve it, and apply it to other uses and
industries.393 The outcome of this knowledge spillover process
is the transformation of the entrepreneurial special premium
into common business profits.394 This is the transient nature of
process
increases
the
entrepreneurial
success.
This
programs should include an attitudinal component . . . where acceptance of
change, a willingness to take risks and assume responsibility, and the value of
collaborative innovation and shared achievements are central themes.”).
389. See id. at 192 (finding that performance appraisal and
training/development were the areas that “generated the highest numbers of
practices that distinguish more entrepreneurial from less entrepreneurial
organizations”).
390. Infra Part III.B.
391. See Dan L. Burk, The Role of Patent Law in Knowledge Codification, 23
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1009, 1009–34 (2008) (debating the effectiveness of patents);
Daniel B. Kelly, Strategic Spillovers, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1680 (2011)
(discussing strategic knowledge spillovers when negotiating with a strategic
party that agrees to disclose certain information); Janusz Ordover, A Patent
System for Both Diffusion and Exclusion, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 43, 54–55 (1991)
(examining the correlation between knowledge spillovers and property rights
when research joint ventures are involved); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents
Disclose Useful Information?, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 545, 564 (2012) (“[P]atent
citations do provide a statistically significant signal of knowledge ‘spillover’—i.e.,
that patentees are learning from roughly half the patents they cite.”).
392. Schumpeter, supra note 93, at 260 (“[E]ntrepreneurial gain may also be
called a monopoly gain, since it is due to the fact that competitors only follow at
a distance . . . .”).
393. See supra notes 384–385 and accompanying text.
394. See Schumpeter, supra note 93, at 260 (“But it is this increase in asset
return itself rather than the returns that constitute the entrepreneurial gain, and
it is in this way that industrial fortunes are typically created.”).
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competitiveness of the market and interchangeability of innovative
knowledge in society.395
Indeed, intrapreneurial firms serve as major contributors to
the development of human capital as greenhouses for future
entrepreneurs.396 When these firms provide training, knowledge,
experience, and capital, they create appropriate conditions for
creative intrapreneurs to flourish.397 Regardless, these employees
may leave to work for a competitor or seek to pursue independent
projects.398 In those moments, intrapreneurial firms become major
facilitators of knowledge spillovers.399 By allowing intrapreneurs
to exit with their innovative knowledge and seek opportunities
elsewhere, intrapreneurial firms serve an important role in
facilitating cross-fertilization and expansion of innovation that is
beneficial to society.400 These firms inadvertently participate in
welfare-increasing diffusion of knowledge from intrapreneurial
agents to entrepreneurial agents to society.401 Indeed, Steve Jobs
and Steve Wozniak worked at Atari, Inc. and Hewlett-Packard,
respectively, prior to founding Apple Computers.402
395. Often times, entrepreneurial failure is followed by successful
entrepreneurial actions of others. See, e.g., ANNA LEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL
ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 111, 128
(1994) (arguing that learning from failure increases the competitiveness of the
region); see also Edward L. Glaeser, William R. Kerr & Giacomo A.M. Ponzetto,
Clusters of Entrepreneurship, 67 J. URB. ECON. 150, 151 (2010) (claiming that
entrepreneurship is higher when fixed costs are lower and when there are more
independent suppliers).
396. See supra note 388 and accompanying text (describing the skills
entrepreneurial training can help develop).
397. See supra note 388 and accompanying text.
398. See infra note 402 and accompanying text (providing examples of
entrepreneurs who left their companies to pursue independent work).
399. Supra note 391 and accompanying text.
400. Infra note 403 and accompanying text.
401. Infra note 403 and accompanying text.
402. See Steve Jobs Biography, A&E TELEVISION NETWORKS (Apr. 2, 2014),
https://www.biography.com/people/steve-jobs-9354805 (last updated Sept. 11,
2018) (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); Steve Wozniak Biography, A&E TELEVISION NETWORKS (Apr. 2, 2015),
https://www.biography.com/people/steve-wozniak-9537334 (last updated Apr. 27,
2017) (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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Research has long demonstrated that open markets with free
labor market mobility function as conduits for facilitating the
dissipation of knowledge.403 Entrepreneurial talent turnover is a
crucial part of the innovation process that leads to economic
growth.404 Employees-intrapreneurs may utilize their knowledge
in new ways to develop innovations in other industries or
technologies.405 Scholars, such as Jaffe, Thompson, and Shane,
have contended that innovative knowledge not only facilitates
technological change but also generates opportunities for third
parties.406 Knowledge encourages “increased rates of learning and
access to knowledge on a rapidly developing research frontier.”407
In the Boston biomedical industry, knowledge spillover has

403. See, e.g., AUDRETSCH, KEILBACH & LEHMANM, supra note 66, at 5
(“[E]ntrepreneurship makes an important contribution to economic growth by
providing a conduit for the spillover of knowledge that might otherwise have
remained uncommercialized.”); ANDRÉ VAN STEL, EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 1 (2006) (“The importance of
entrepreneurship for achieving economic growth in contemporary economies is
widely recognized, both by policy makers and economists.”). See generally,
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION, AND THE GROWTH MECHANISM OF THE
FREE-ENTERPRISE ECONOMIES (Eytan Sheshinski et al. eds., 2007).
404. Steven Klepper reiterated these ideas in a study on knowledge spillover
in Silicon Valley. See Steven Klepper, Silicon Valley, A Chip off the Old Detroit
Bloc, in ENTREPRENEURSHIP, GROWTH, AND PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 44, at 79,
113 (“[R]egions need to have in place legal and economic policies to enable
talented employees to leave established firms and venture out on their own.”).
405. Supra note 404 and accompanying text.
406. See Adam B. Jaffe, Manuel Trajtenberg & Rebecca Henderson,
Geographic Localization of Knowledge Spillovers as Evidenced by Patent
Citations, 108 Q.J. ECON. 577, 577 (1993) (“Generally speaking, this research has
shown that the productivity of firms or industries is related to their R&D
spending, and also to the R&D spending of other firms or other industries.”); Scott
Shane, Technological Opportunities and New Firm Creation, 47 MGMT. SCI. 205,
219 (2001) (concluding that importance, radicalness, and patent scope determine
“that a new invention will be exploited through the creation of a new firm”); Peter
Thompson & Melanie Fox-Kean, Patent Citations and The Geography of
Knowledge Spillovers: A Reassessment, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 450, 459 (2005) (finding
evidence of localized knowledge spillovers at the national level).
407. See Jason Owen-Smith & Walter W. Powell, Knowledge Networks as
Channels and Conduits: The Effects of Spillovers in the Boston Biotechnology
Community, 15 ORG. SCI. 5, 6 (2004) (demonstrating that geographic propinquity
and organizational form fundamentally alter the flow of information through a
network).
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allowed for increased output and innovation through strategic
alliance partnerships.408
As the knowledge context increases, spillover effects around
intrapreneurial firms stimulate an increasing number of related
innovations.409 This positive externality of intrapreneurial
enterprises is beneficial to the economy.410 Several studies found
that employee turnover contributed to important innovations in
geographical clusters of high technology areas such as Silicon
Valley and Route 128.411 They concluded that employee mobility is
vital in information technology clusters because it facilitates the
reallocation of talent and resources toward firms with superior
innovations.412
By their nature, many creative employees-intrapreneurs
aspire to begin their own independent journey.413 The ideas of
408. See id. (showing that third-party contractual linkages among physically
proximate organizations represent relatively transparent channels for
information transfer).
409. Infra note 411 and accompanying text.
410. See, e.g., Ács, Audretsch & Strom, supra note 66, at 2 (noting that the
public policy community “started looking to entrepreneurship as an engine of
economic growth, employment, and a high standard of living”); AUDRETSCH,
KEILBACH & LEHMANM, supra note 66, at 4 (stating that entrepreneurship has
become important in fostering growth and creating jobs).
411. See LOBEL, supra note 28, at 40 (“In fact, high employee turnover—talent
moving fluidly among businesses—is positively correlated with productivity,
particularly in industries in which research and development are core
activities.”); SAXENIAN, supra note 395, at 34–35 (discussing Silicon Valley’s high
level of job-hopping and noting that “these high rates of mobility forced technology
companies to compete intensely for experienced engineering talent”); Bruce
Fallick et al., Job-Hopping in Silicon Valley: Some Evidence Concerning the
Microfoundations of a High-Technology Cluster, 88 REV. ECON. & STAT. 472, 473
(2006) (describing the human capital extenalities that job-hopping create
including reducing incentives to invest in new knowledge); Gilson, supra note 207,
at 904–05 (explaining why innovators are likely more incentivized to innovate in
a start-up than within a larger company).
412. See Fallick et al., supra note 411, at 481 (“[F]requent job-hopping
facilitates the rapid reallocation of resources toward firms with the best
innovations.”).
413. See Licht, supra note at 119, at 823 (noting that entrepreneurs tend to
act independently and be self-confident); Thornberry, supra note 371, at 330
(warning companies that engage in entrepreneurial training programs from the
pitfalls of newly trained corporate entrepreneurs leaving the firm).
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autonomy and starting fresh are the main characteristics of the
innovative development process and affects those dealing with it
day-to-day.414 From the intrapreneur’s perspective, often working
for a few years inside an intrapreneurial firm is necessary in order
to learn to deal with competitive pressures, protect themselves
from liability, enter strategic groups and industries, or just to
improve networking and connections.415 Thereafter, intrapreneurs
may take knowledge they were exposed to during their
employment (that was ignored or would otherwise remain
uncommercialized) to launch their own ventures.416 Consequently,
they may leave secure positions and wages to pursue their
interests autonomously and take with them their valuable
knowledge and experience.417 Take Anastasia Leng, who had a
secure position at Google but left to pursue her own
entrepreneurial venture.418 Leng embarked on an independent
initiative, founding Makeably—a market place for custom
designed goods—which she said has made her feel more
accomplished and victorious than ever before.419 Jasper Vallance
also left a job at Google as a retail industry manager to pursue his
own online consulting business.420 He felt the company was
414. See Licht, supra note at 119, at 823–25 (noting that entrepreneurs tend
to prefer autonomy and are willing to deal with uncertainty).
415. See Richard A. Peterson & David G. Berger, Entrepreneurship in
Organizations: Evidence from the Popular Music Industry, 16 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 97,
97 (1971) (providing that corporate entrepreneurship is usual means for coping
with competitive threats).
416. See Rajshree Agarwal et al., The Process of Creative Construction:
Knowledge Spillovers, Entrepreneurship, and Economic Growth, 1 STRATEGIC
ENTREPRENEURSHIP J. 263, 264 (2007) (discussing how entrepreneurial ideas and
opportunities are generated and how knowledge spillovers create a process of
creative construction).
417. See infra note 418 and accompanying text.
418. See Megan Rose Dickey, Google Begged This Woman to Stay, But She
Left to Start Her Own Company, BUS. INSIDER (May 26, 2013, 8:01 AM)
https://www.businessinsider.com/anastasia-lengs-startup-makeably-2013-5 (last
visited Feb. 13, 2019) (discussing Leng’s departure from Google) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
419. See id. (“And yet, I've never felt more accomplished because the mistakes
you make are yours and the victories you have are yours, too.”).
420. See Declaration of Independence: 8 Entrepreneurs Who Left Big
(July
4,
2014),
Corporate
Jobs
for
Startups,
OPENVIEW
https://labs.openviewpartners.com/left-corporate-jobs-forstartups/#.W8fLB2hKg2w (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (explaining Vallance’s
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becoming “too corporate” for him and wanted to pursue
opportunities independently despite the financial toll of leaving a
secured job and starting anew.421
Intrapreneurship, therefore, is important in providing a hub
for intrapreneurs to commercialize knowledge and ideas that
might otherwise remain uncommercialized by the firm.422 It
contributes to economic growth by improving and refining existing
breakthroughs and delivering them to the market through other
innovation agents—independent entrepreneurs.423 Consequently,
intrapreneurs are instrumental in creating the next generation of
entrepreneurs that will establish new businesses and create new
jobs, intensify competition, and increase economic productivity.424
Employees-intrapreneurs are constantly alert to other
opportunities.425 Accordingly, autonomous strategic behavior is
very likely to manifest itself.426 Employees-intrapreneurs with
entrepreneurial aspirations may leave regardless of carrots

decision to leave Google) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
421. See id. (explaining that Vallance left Google’s Sydney office because the
“operation had become a bit too corporate for him”).
422. See Ács, Audretsch & Strom, supra note 66, at 8 (advancing the argument
that many of today’s most successful companies were created by future
entrepreneurs whose ideas were rejected by the “decision-making bureaucracy” of
larger corporations). Examples include “Apple Computer, SAP, Xerox,
Microsoft . . . and Intel.” Id.; see also CHRISTENSEN, supra note 68, at 85–86
(discussing the purchase of new 1.8 inch disk drive technology from “little startup
compan[ies]” that were seemingly unavailable from larger disk drive companies
with well-trained decision-makers and CEOs); supra note 404 and accompanying
text.
423. See supra note 403 and accompanying text.
424. See CHRISTENSEN, supra note 68, at 87–88 (discussing the decline of the
U.S. steel industry due to major companies’ failure to invest in and employ
“minimill” steel-making technology). This technology is more output-efficient and
cost-competitive, producing steel of equivalent quality at a 15% lower cost than
the average integrated mill. Id. at 88. Minimills “virtually dominate” the North
American markets and are predicted to account for half of all steel production by
the turn of the century. Id.
425. See KIRZNER, supra note 321, at 7 (discussing the “central role” of
entrepreneurial alertness to the discovery of changed market conditions and
overlooked possibilities).
426. Supra notes 418–21 and accompanying text.
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dangled in front of them or bones thrown their way.427 They take
their innovative knowledge, training, and sometimes trade secrets
with them to their next employer or independent endeavor.428
While knowledge spillover is essential to the development of
innovation in a society, it can be detrimental to intrapreneurial
firms.429 Their investments in human capital remain transient,
susceptible to immediate harm, and dependent on factors beyond
the control of the firm.430 As a result, intrapreneurial firms often
adopt lock-in strategies, as the next Part reveals.431
V. The Negative Spillovers of Intrapreneurship
Prior to founding Walmart, Sam Walton worked as a
managerial trainee at J.C. Penney Company.432 He was often
frustrated by the paperwork and other corporate constraints.433
Walton decided to leave J.C. Penney and take lessons in sales.434
He took a risk by developing a new customer-focused, low-pricing
model which developed into today’s retail giant.435 Similarly, Steve
Jobs worked at Atari, Inc. prior to leaving and founding Apple
427. Supra notes 418–421 and accompanying text.
428. Supra notes 418–421 and accompanying text; see also Acs, Audretsch &
Strom, supra note 66, at 8 (discussing the success of Google and Genetech as a
result of entrepreneurs taking their knowledge developed at universities and
starting new firms).
429. See discussion infra Part V.
430. See Michael D. Lord & Annette L. Ranft, Acquiring New Knowledge: The
Role of Retaining Human Capital in Acquisitions of High-Tech Firms, 11 J. HIGH
TECH. MGMT. RES. 295, 298 (2000) (discussing the importance and difficulties in
retaining human capital during acquisitions).
431. See discussion infra Part V.A. (explaining the phenomenon of the
“human capital lock-in”).
432. Thomas C. Haynes, Sam Walton is Dead at 74; the Founder of Wal-Mart
Stores, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1992, at A1 (describing Sam Walton’s intrapreneurial
journey as an undervalued employee that as a result went on his independent
way).
433. See id. (opening up about his disagreements with Chicago executives
over Walton’s plan to expand franchises to rural areas).
434. See id. (discussing his stent as a trainee with a small-town retailer in
Des Moines after leaving the J.C. Penney Company).
435. See id. (referencing Walmart’s “high sales volume at low prices” scheme
that brought financial ruin to hundreds to small town merchants across the South
and Midwest).
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Computers.436 Jobs later created Pixar Animations, which was
thereafter acquired by Disney.437 In 2011, Sachin Agarwal left
Apple, taking along lessons in developing a culture of collaboration
between management and developers as a tool to empower
employees to innovate.438 Agarwal implemented lessons he learned
at Apple when founding Posterous, a successful blogging platform
that was purchased later by Twitter.439
Employee turnover is a common phenomenon across all type
of firms, not necessarily intrapreneurial.440 Yet, intrapreneurial
firms are unique in that their process of developing innovation
involves distinct elements. Intrapreneurial firms are inclined to
invest more than ordinary organizations on research and
knowledge procurement in hopes of discovering the next
breakthrough.441 The entrepreneurial decision-making process
436. Steve Jobs Biography, A&E TELEVISION NETWORKS (Apr. 2, 2014),
https://www.biography.com/people/steve-jobs-9354805 (last updated Sept. 11,
2018) (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review) (providing a detailed biography of Steve Jobs and his intrapreneurial
journey).
437. See id. (Steve Jobs had a talent to identify innovations and pursue them
in various ventures).
438. See Bianca Male, 8 Management Lessons I Learned Working at Apple,
INSIDER
(Aug.
2,
2010,
2:30
PM),
https://www.
BUS.
businessinsider.com/management-lessons-i-learned-working-at-apple-2010-7
(last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (explaining the manager-employee culture of respect
and the system of close-knit project teams) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
439. See id.
440. See Liz Ryan, Employee Turnover Is a Leadership Problem, FORBES (Aug.
1, 2016, 10:50 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/lizryan/2016/08/01/employeeturnover-is-a-leadership-problem/#50b198d83bc8 (last visited Feb. 13, 2019)
(expressing concern over having to “constantly hire[] and train[]” new employees
due to “extremely high” turnover in a tech support firm) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also The High Costs of Staff Turnover,
ECONOMIST (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.economist.com/business/2018/09/22/thehigh-costs-of-staff-turnover (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (discussing a 2016 Deloitte
survey’s findings that the American software sector had an annual employee
turnover rate of 24% in the second quarter of 2018) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
441. See infra note 450 and accompanying text; see also Eyal-Cohen, supra
note 22, at 963 (stating that some firms invest a high proportion of their income
in knowledge procurement in the hopes of deriving profits and expanding their
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includes not only known calculable risks, but tremendous
uncertainty about potential markets for the new discovery, its
possible uses, and its forthcoming effects.442 Lastly, the non-rivalry
nature of innovative knowledge and the constant threat of
competing firms underscores the transiency of the entrepreneurial
process.443 Accordingly, employees-intrapreneurs’ exit can be
extremely devastating to intrapreneurial organizations who not
only are losing the returns on their investments in human capital,
but are also at risk of losing monopoly on their discovery and their
competitive position in the market.444
The question of whether and to what extent the law should
interfere to determine who owns or controls innovative knowledge
remains open.445 Intrapreneurs find themselves in a
predicament—feeling trapped by non-compete agreements,
confidentiality agreements or other firm restrictions preventing
them from utilizing their knowledge abilities.446 Yet, the interests
of the intrapreneurial firms and the innovative process are also
relevant to consider when discussing employee mobility
questions.447 This Part attempts to fill this gap by considering the
negative spillover of the innovation process from the
intrapreneurial organizations’ perspective.

labor force).
442. See Eyal-Cohen, supra note 22, at 957 (“Entrepreneurs make their
decisions in a state of uncertainty, without being able to calculate the likelihood
or probabilities of an imminent sequence of events.”).
443. See Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Mandating Access to
Telecom and the Internet: The Hidden Side of Trinko, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1822,
1844 (2007) (emphasizing the key role that short-run supra-competitive returns
play in the horizontal competition).
444. See discussion infra Parts V.A–B.
445. See Drummonds, supra note 31, at 400 (questioning whether the law of
trade secrets, non-competition agreements, employee duty of loyalty, and tortious
interference encourage employee mobility in a knowledge-based economy).
446. See id. (noting that these legal processes “often operate to constrain
employee mobility”).
447. See id. (acknowledging employer interest in safeguarding their secrets
and investments).
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A. Human Capital Lock-In

Mobility of intrapreneurial human capital can greatly
contribute to economic growth.448 It may be instrumental in
providing a missing link in the development of specific
opportunities.449 Intrapreneurial firms usually have plenty of
resources to invest in the training and development of human
capital.450 By doing so, they maintain the supply of entrepreneurial
talent. Investments in intrapreneurs provide them with
knowledge, skills, and awareness to ideas that they can use in their
next organization or independent venture.451 Some of this
information may be protected under intellectual property rights
such as patents, trade secrets, and copyrights.452 Yet, there are
many organizational processes, undeveloped opportunities,
strategic planning, and other innovative measures that cannot be
legally protected.453 For example, Facebook regularly holds
“hackathon”—all-night coding sessions where employees focus on
a project of their choosing, as long as it is different from their day
job.454 This exemplifies creative organizational processes that
448. See Klepper, supra note 404, at 79 (discussing knowledge spillovers
amplified by human capital mobility).
449. See, e.g., Ács, Audretsch & Strom, supra note 66, at 1; AUDRETSCH,
KEILBACH & LEHMANM supra note 66, at 1 (describing the process of knowledge
spillover and its importance to developing innovation).
450. See Derek Thompson, Google X and the Science of Radical Creativity,
ATLANTIC (Nov. 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/11/xgoogle-moonshot-factory/540648/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (describing Google X,
an innovation-focused Google subsidiary providing employees with resources and
autonomy to develop new technology and inventions) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
451. See Catherine Clifford, How Mark Zuckerberg Keeps Facebook’s 18,000+
Employees Innovating: ‘Is This Going to Destroy the Company? If Not, Let Them
Test It.’, CNBC (June 5, 2017, 10:55 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/05/howmark-zuckerberg-keeps-facebook-employees-innovating.html (last visited Feb.
13, 2019) (endorsing a company structure that encourages risk-taking and fosters
aggressive innovation by allowing employee engineers the freedom to “run their
own experiments”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
452. See supra notes 6–8, 83–84 and accompanying text; infra note 456 and
accompanying text.
453. See supra note 465 and accompanying text.
454. See Matt Weinberger, ‘There Are Only Two Rules’—Facebook Explains
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develop a culture of innovation and encourage employees’ alertness
to opportunities.455
Accordingly, in the past decade many firms began utilizing
contractual measures to protect their investment in human
capital. Companies began to require employees to sign unilateral
work-for-hire or corporate authorship agreements to establish
ownership of the innovation knowledge.456 Firms also initiated
non-compete agreements to restrict employees from working in
certain geographical regions, industries, or competitor firms.457
Other legally binding arrangements that became common practice
are
non-disclosure
and
confidentiality
agreements,458
non-solicitation
and
non-dealing
agreements,459
and
bonus-forfeiture agreements.460 These legal arrangements aim to
How ‘Hackathons,’ One of Its Oldest Traditions, Is Also One of Its Most Important,
BUS. INSIDER (June 11, 2017, 10:00 AM), https://www.businessinsider.
com/facebook-hackathons-2017-6 (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (providing a brief
history and explaining the concept of the “hackathon”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
455. See Doug Gross, Coding and Red Bull: Facebook Holds All-Night
Hacking Session, CNN (May 18, 2012, 2:00 PM), https://www.cnn.com/
2012/05/17/tech/social-media/facebook-night-before/index.html (last visited Feb.
13, 2019) (commenting on Facebook’s culture of promoting innovation by
encouraging employees to tweak software and engage with projects of their
choice) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
456. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (defining the concept of “work made for hire”
under the 1976 Copyright Act). See generally U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., CIRCULAR 9
REP. ON WORKS MADE FOR HIRE (2012), https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ09.pdf.
457. See Evan Starr, J.J. Prescott & Norman Bishara, Non-Competes in the
U.S. Labor Force 2 (U. of Mich. L. & Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18–103,
2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2625714 (finding that in 2014, 38.1% of
Americans have at some point been subject to a non-compete agreement, while
18.1% of Americans are currently working under a non-compete agreement).
458. See Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications
of the Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519,
577–78 (2001) (recognizing that litigation over restrictive covenants have become
prevalent in the realm of employment contracts).
459. See Norman Bishara, Kenneth J. Martin & Randall S. Thompson, An
Empirical Analysis of Noncompetition Clauses and Other Restrictive
Postemployment Covenants, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1, 2 (2015) (examining CEO
contracts and finding that 87.1% contain non-disclosure agreements, 75.6% of
them bar solicitation of firm employees, and 50.8% contain provisions forbidding
the solicitation of customers or clients).
460. See, e.g., Tatom v. Ameritech Corp., 305 F.3d 737, 745 (7th Cir. 2002)
(stating the proposition that anticompetitive clauses may be enforced as long as
they are reasonable); Fearnow v. Ridenour, Swenson, Cleere & Evans, P.C., 138
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deter employees-intrapreneurs from leaving their firms and taking
their knowledge with them.461 Lastly, under the federal Economic
Espionage Act,462 organizations can pursue criminal prosecution of
their employees or competitors for commercial spying.463
In recent years, there has been considerable controversy
surrounding these post-employment legal arrangements.464 Unlike
registered patents, these types of contractual covenants usually do
not expire and have the potential to create a perpetual monopoly
on
ambiguously
defined
“protected
information.”465
P.3d 723, 726, 730 (Ariz. 2006) (en banc) (concluding that while an outright
restriction on competition would be invalid, the court will enforce a
forfeiture-for-competition arrangement that meets the standard for
reasonableness); Brockley v. Lozier Corp., 488 N.W.2d 556, 563–64 (Neb. 1992)
(acknowledging that while forfeiture-for-competition provision was unreasonable,
such agreements are valid restrictive covenants if reasonable).
461. Larry A. DiMatteo, Strategic Contracting: Contract Law as a Source of
Competitive Advantage, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 727, 765 (2010) (contending that the
purpose of the “often litigated” covenant not to compete is to deter employee
movement to a competitor).
462. 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (2012).
463. See James H. A. Pooley, Mark A. Lemley & Peter J. Toren,
Understanding the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 5 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 177,
179 (1997) (“[T]he Economic Espionage Act was intended to address both the
general need for a federal criminal deterrent against trade secret theft and the
apparent threat of industrial espionage sponsored by foreign states.”).
464. See, e.g., Bishara, Martin & Thompson, supra note 459, at 5 (“[T]he last
decade saw the advent of new or revised statutes and proposed legislation
designed
to
refine
how
employers
use
these
clauses
to
restrict . . . post-employment mobility and choices.”); Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal
Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128,
and Covenants to Not Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 578 (1999) (examining
different high tech industrial districts and concluding the differences lie between
the enforcement of non-competes); Orly Lobel, Enforceability TBD: from Status to
Contract in Intellectual Property Law, 96 B.U. L. REV. 869, 870–71 (2016)
(detailing congressional efforts to limit restrictive covenants for employment). But
see Jonathan Barnett & Ted M. Sichelman, Revisiting Labor Mobility in
Innovation Markets 5, 12, 20 (USC Gould Ctr. of L. & Soc. Sci. Research, Working
Paper No. 16–15 (2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2758854 (arguing that these
studies misconstrue legal differences across states and otherwise are flawed,
incomplete, or limited in applicability).
465. See Lobel, supra note 28, at 875 (“The broad language embedded . . . lists
information that spans beyond the definition of trade secrets and explicitly
includes information that is neither copyrightable nor patentable.”).
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Post-employment arrangements aim to place constraints on the
employee’s ability to carry knowledge and skills outside the
organization.466 Although scholars remain divided on the question
of who owns innovation knowledge, these practices purport to
legally allocate it ex ante to the firm, rather than the employee.467
These post-employment restricting covenants have been applied
even to lower-ranking employees in companies such as Jimmy
John’s and Starbucks.468 These agreements became so common
that they are utilized not only in entrepreneurial firms, but also in
professional service firms.469
Moreover, the legal regimes regarding post-employment
constraints vary from state to state. In states like California470 and
North Dakota, labor mobility is highly protected and most
non-compete agreements are unenforceable.471 Other state laws

466. See Bishara, Martin & Thompson, supra note 459, at 7 (arguing that
non-disclosure agreements that restrict the use and transfer of knowledge are
designed to limit what would otherwise be “permissible competitive behavior”);
supra note 548 and accompanying text.
467. See id. (observing that the security of a tailored restrictive covenant
essentially gives the employer a “limited quasi-property right in . . . human
capital”).
468. See Drummonds, supra note 31, at 400 nn.93–98 (discussing agreements
imposed on Jimmy John’s employees restricting their ability to work within three
miles of a Jimmy John’s location that makes more than 10% of its revenue from
selling sandwiches); see also Ben Rooney, Jimmy John’s Under Fire for Worker
Contracts,
CNN
(Oct.
14,
2014,
12:00
PM),
https://money.cnn.com/2014/10/22/news/jimmy-johns-non-compete/index.html
(last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
469. See id. at 417 (“[T]he Securities and Exchange Commission brought an
enforcement action under whistleblower rules and statutes against
technology/engineering firm KBR[,] Inc. for requiring employees to sign
confidentiality agreements that warned employees they could be fired if they
discussed internal investigations with outside parties without . . . approval from
KBR’s lawyers.”).
470. Section 16600 of the California Business Professional Code voids
contracts that restrain people from engaging in a “lawful profession, trade, or
business of any kind.” CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (2018); see Viva R. Moffat,
Making Non-Competes Unenforceable, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 939, 944 (2012) (criticizing
the messiness and forum shopping of non-compete enforcement and calls for
uniformity in non-compete laws).
471. See Moffat, supra note 470 (“California and North Dakota both have
statutes rendering virtually all non-competition agreements unenforceable.”).
Montana, Oklahoma, and Georgia have similar statutes or constitutional
provisions. Id.
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uphold such agreements with significant deference.472 Accordingly,
these measures have been subject to inconsistent judicial
enforcement.473 In recent years, several courts have narrowed the
scope of protection granted to employers and favored employees’
mobility and entrepreneurship.474 Others have provided limited
ownership of the innovative knowledge to the firm and prevented
employees from taking up certain positions.
There are elevated negative externalities to the use of labor
restricting practices in the intrapreneurial context. These
arrangements may decrease the intrapreneurs’ outside worth in
the labor market, and thus hamper society's interest in
interchangeability of knowledge and ideas.475 Moreover,
intrapreneurial firms themselves benefit from spillovers and a
healthy labor market with a greater pool of future employees that
are more knowledgeable, skillful, and proficient to choose from.476
Thus, limitations on firms’ ability to free intrapreneurs may, at the
same time, prevent them from acquiring said talent.
From an organizational perspective, intrapreneurial firms
disclose valuable information to intrapreneurs, invest in their
training, provide them with access to competitive information, and
entrust them with confidential data not intended to leave the
472. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.774a (2018) (“An employer may
obtain . . . an agreement or covenant which protects an employer’s reasonable
competitive business interests and . . . prohibits an employee from engaging in
employment or a line of business after termination . . . if [it] is reasonable as
to . . . duration, geographical area, and the type of employment or line of
business.”).
473. See Daniel D. Quick, Physician, Meet Thy Covenant, 86 MICH. BAR J. 22,
22 (2007) (examining a “national split of authority” as to how physician
non-competes are viewed by the courts).
474. See, e.g., W.R. Grace & Co. v. Hargadine, 392 F.2d 9, 20 (6th Cir. 1968)
(choosing to construe a restrictive covenant narrowly, thus rendering it
unenforceable).
475. See discussion supra Part III.B (acknowledging the importance of
allowing intrapreneurs to exit with their own knowledge and ideas in order to
facilitate an expansion of innovation that is beneficial to society).
476. See discussion supra Part III.A (noting that employers committed to
talent development often groom employees to develop entrepreneurial skills and
knowledge that they can later share with other market players or utilize in their
own ventures).
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organization.477 Thus, firms may also seek a form of assurance that
they will be able to receive a fair return on their investment in
their employees’ human capital.478 Via restrictive covenants, firms
prohibit intrapreneurs from exploiting the knowledge gained
during their employment.479 They attempt to restrict the ability of
employees to use knowledge they acquired in future employment
or in independent endeavors.480 Next, this Article describes
measures that address limitations on future employers’ ability to
hire intrapreneurs.
B. Human Capital Lock-Out
Free competitive markets will always entail competition, and
that may involve hiring the employees of other employers.481 Firms
may attempt to prevent valuable employees from leaving the
organization.482 Yet, once these employees have made up their
mind, in light of the risk of losing competitive information,
intrapreneurial firms may use various techniques in an attempt to
lock the employee out of securing employment elsewhere.483
Anti-poaching is one technique intrapreneurial firms may use.484
Poaching in the intrapreneurial context refers to when an
external organization strategically attempts to hire intrapreneurs
away from their current employers.485 This is a fundamental
477. See supra notes 450–51 and accompanying text.
478. See generally Bishara, infra note 549 (attempting to balance the interests
of employers protecting their own investment in human capital with the interests
of society in encouraging the future development of human capital via employee
mobility).
479. Supra notes 456–61 and accompanying text.
480. See Starr, Prescott & Bashara, supra note 457, at 2 (noting that
employers seek to curtail product-market competition by preventing valuable
information and skills learned in their previous endeavors from reaching
competitors).
481. See Drummonds, supra note 31, at 405 (observing that recruiting
employees working for other employers is a central aspect of free labor markets).
482. See discussion supra Part V.A (detailing various forms of restrictive
covenants between employers and employees).
483. See infra notes 502, 529, 535 and accompanying text.
484. See infra notes 502–528 and accompanying text.
485. See Lobel, supra note 28, at 828 (explaining the purpose of non-poaching
clauses).
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element of free labor markets and the freedom to contract.486 What
is unique in the intrapreneurial context is that companies actively
look at the abilities and careers of certain intrapreneurs, their
level of knowledge and inside information.487 They aggressively
recruit those intrapreneurs who seem to have obtained the
greatest valuable organizational knowledge in order to acquire
that knowledge for free, improving the poacher’s competitive
position in the market.488 Labor law scholars have described such
aggressive hiring of competitors’ employees as free riding and
raids, and have questioned whether the law should interfere to
prevent such incidents.489 Others have argued that an inability to
control employee mobility may disincentivize companies from
investing in employee training.490
This type of behavior is not unique to the innovative
industry.491 Employers in different industries—including
academia—seek to engage in the lateral hire of experienced
486. See Drummonds, supra note 31, at 405 (discussing the critical role of
poaching in wealth creation, innovation, and the “traditionally American style of
structuring business relationships around free markets and competition”).
487. See id. (observing that “hot startups” like Uber and Airbnb “attack” more
established firms like Google and Apple seeking their employees’ knowledge, skill,
and ideas). Likewise, start-ups “raid each other for employees and their cognitive
property, ideas, and knowledge.” Id.
488. See id. (quoting Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos’s statement that employees
from established companies like Amazon “are recruited every day by other
world-class companies”).
489. See LOBEL, supra note 28, at 4 (calling upon free market approach that
relies very much on employee reputation in the labor market).
490. Brandon S. Long, Protecting Employer Investment in Training:
Noncompetes vs. Repayment Agreements, 54 DUKE L.J. 1295, 1302 (2005) (“A lack
of protection against employee mobility acts as a ‘double hit’ to the employer,
which not only loses its monetary investment in developing the employee’s skill
set but also sacrifices potential market advantage to the competitor . . . .”).
491. Uliana Pavlova & Leslie Patton, States Want Fast Food Chains to Allow
Employee
Poaching,
BLOOMBERG
(July
9,
2018,
3:36
PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-07-09/fast-food-gets-a-newheadache-as-states-target-hiring-practices (last updated July 9, 2018, 6:13 PM)
(last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (discussing impending investigations by state attorney
generals into the “no-poaching agreements” at some of the fast food industry’s
largest chains, including Arby’s, Burger King, Dunkin’ Donuts, Five Guys,
Panera, and Wendy’s).
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workers from rivals with institutional knowledge and training.492
It saves them from making the same investment in knowledge
themselves—“such is the American way.”493 On the other hand,
poached firms also seek to safeguard their investments in human
capital and their organizational knowledge.494 Yet, they would like
to reserve the opportunity to be poachers themselves and tap into
the talent, skill, knowledge, and ideas of their competitors’
employees.495
While in non-compete and non-disclosure agreements,
employees-intrapreneurs are being sued by their former
organizations.496 In poaching cases, the organization-plaintiff
usually aims for deeper pockets;497 organizations sue their
competitors for stealing their trade secrets, confidential
information, and organizational knowledge by luring their
intrapreneurs away.498 For instance, in late 2017, Office Depot
492. See Paul Basken, Boom in Academic Poaching Is Fueled by Vision of
Economic
Development,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (July
23,
2015),
https://www.chronicle.com/article/Boom-in-Academic-Poaching-Is/231859
(last
visited Feb. 13, 2019) (detailing the academic poaching climate at several
American research universities, including the University of Southern California’s
recruitment of a leading researcher of Alzheimer’s disease from the University of
California at San Diego) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see
also Stephen Murphy, Duke, UNC, and Nonpoaching Agreements—What Not to
Do, LAW360 (June 24, 2015, 10:17 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/
670750/duke-unc-and-nonpoaching-agree ments-what-not-to-do (last visited
Feb. 13, 2019) (noting that many universities and medical facilities in close
geographic proximity engage in the poaching practice) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
493. Drummonds, supra note 31, at 404–06.
494. See Long, supra note 490, at 1303 (recognizing that employers reserve a
right to protect investments in their own business); supra note 478 and
accompanying text.
495. See supra note 487 and accompanying text.
496. See Koby Levin, As Non-compete Agreements Proliferate, So Do Lawsuits,
AP NEWS (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/70f0855282de43299
08957fa7b1e278d (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (noting that large employers
typically bring non-compete suits against high-level employees) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). Claims against employees in smaller
industries have also increased significantly. See id. (referencing lawsuits filed
against a salon technician, a wheelchair design operator, and even a pest control
specialist).
497. See infra notes 498–499 and accompanying text.
498. See Eriq Gardner, Viacom Sues Netflix for Employee Poaching,
HOLLYWOOD REP. (Oct. 16, 2018, 11:33 AM), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/
thr-esq/viacom-sues-netflix-employee-poaching-1152721 (last visited Feb. 13, 2019)
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filed suit against its smaller rival, HD Supply, claiming that HD
improperly gained access to Office Depot’s “confidential,
proprietary and trade secret information” through the hiring of a
highly-ranked manager.499 Office Depot’s suit accuses HD Supply
of engaging in unfair competition and aiding and abetting the
employee’s “breach of restrictive covenants, breach of fiduciary
duty and breach of loyalty.”500 The court has yet to decide this
case.501
Nevertheless, in recent years we have witnessed the opposite
phenomenon. Hiring conspiracies, anti-poaching, and no-raid
agreements between organizations have begun to draw antitrust
authorities’ attention.502 Under these agreements, top
management agrees ex ante to avoid approaching, recruiting, or
(reporting that Viacom has filed a lawsuit against streaming giant Netflix for
poaching its employees “in an effort to illegally augment its own
workforce . . . regardless of the nature of [the employees’] ongoing contractual
obligations to their current employer”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); see also Grace Dobush, First Ebay Sent Amazon a Cease-and-Desist
Order.
Now
It’s
Suing,
FORTUNE
500
(Oct.
18,
2018),
http://fortune.com/2018/10/18/ebay-amazon-poaching-sellers-lawsuit/
(last
visited Feb. 13, 2019) (“E[b]ay is now accusing Amazon of intentional interference
with contractual relations and economic relations . . . .”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Drummonds, supra note 31, at 406–07
(providing numerous examples of poaching disputes, including a lawsuit brought
by Tyco against its rival, Conbraco Industries, alleging trade secret use and a
lawsuit brought by human-fitness-tracking firm Jawbone against Fitbit, Inc.).
499. Jeff Ostrowski, Office Depot Sues HD Supply, Accuses Rival of Raiding
Employees, Trade Secrets, PALMBEACHPOST (Oct. 27, 2017, 12:01 AM),
https://www.palmbeachpost.com/business/office-depot-sues-supply-accuses-rivalraiding-employees-trade-secrets/U7OkaOmaBZ6zEjmVJx9nOP/ (last updated
Oct. 27, 2017, 4:44 PM) (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
500. Id.
501. See id. (stating that as of October 2017, HD Supply had not yet responded
in court).
502. See Mark L. Krotoski, DOJ Antitrust Division Announces Imminent
Criminal Prosecution for ‘No Poaching’ Agreements, NAT’L L. REV. (Feb. 6, 2018),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/doj-antitrust-division-announcesimminent-criminal-prosecution-no-poaching (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (stating
that the DOJ would be seeking harsher criminal penalties against companies that
engage in no-poaching agreements in violation of the Sherman Act due to the
popularity of such illegal conduct) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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employing another organization’s employees and vice versa.503
These agreements are depicted as anticompetitive and a
confinement of labor and trade.504 They are viewed as hiring
collusions on the ability of employees to move freely in the
employment market.505
Reports show that Apple’s founder Steve Jobs and Google’s
CEO Eric Schmidt mutually agreed not to recruit each other’s
employees.506 These practices were routinely utilized with Google
and Apple’s business partners, as well.507 In fact, in September
2015, Apple, Google, Intel, and Adobe agreed to pay employees
$415 million in order to settle claims that these Silicon Valley tech
giants conspired in illegal anti-poaching activities.508 Filed by
former employees of the respective companies, the lawsuit alleged
that major tech industry players had formed an illegal pact to
refrain from poaching or hiring each other’s staff.509 Plaintiffs
argued such agreements limited their career mobility and stifled
attempts to earn higher salaries.510 The settlement followed a 2009
antitrust investigation into the companies by the Department of
Justice (DOJ).511 During this investigation, the DOJ determined
that the same group of Silicon Valley companies—Adobe, Apple,
503. See infra note 506 and accompanying text.
504. See Drummonds, supra note 31, at 407 (“[A]nti-poaching or no raid
agreements suffer presumptive condemnation in our law as an anti-competitive
restraint of trade in the labor markets.”).
505. Infra notes 506–514 and accompanying text.
506. See David Streitfeld, Engineers Allege Hiring Collusion in Silicon Valley,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2014, at A1 (reporting class-maction lawsuit that accused
industry executives of agreeing between 2005 and 2009 not to poach one another’s
employees).
507. Id.
508. Lance Whitney, Apple, Google, Others Settle Antipoaching Lawsuit for
$415 Million, CNET (Sept. 3, 2015, 8:32 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/applegoogle-others-settle-anti-poaching-lawsuit-for-415-million (last visited Feb. 13,
2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
509. See id. (“Email exchanges among . . . top executives . . . revealed how
requests were made not to hire certain employees away from each other.”).
510. See id. (chronicling employee concerns).
511. See Tom Krazit, DOJ Settles No-Recruit Claims Against Tech
Companies, CNET (Sept. 24, 2010, 1:59 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/dojsettles-no-recruit-claims-against-tech-companies/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2019)
(“Six Silicon Valley companies have agreed not to enter into further
non-solicitation agreements as the result of a settlement with the Department of
Justice.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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Google, Intel, Intuit, and Pixar— agreed not to solicit or “cold call”
employees of other companies.512 Although the agreements did not
explicitly prohibit companies from hiring employees altogether,
the DOJ felt that the pact was “broader than reasonably necessary
for any collaboration between the companies.”513 Following the
Apple–Google anti-poaching case, many other similar settlements
over anti-poaching allegations resurfaced involving conglomerates
such as Microsoft, Oracle, eBay, Ask.com, DreamWorks
Animation, and others.514
Anti-poaching agreements have been denounced as “an
unreasonable restraint of trade” and a violation of antitrust
laws.515 In the case of agreements not to compete for customers,
the latter end up “paying higher prices because of the lack of
competition.”516 Whereas in the case of agreements not to poach
employees, workers “receiv[e] lower wages because of the lack of
competition.”517 Intrapreneurs could achieve similar results by
making sure their employees are not looking to leave.518
In 2014, the online auction site eBay also settled a suit
accusing it of engaging in a secret deal with software company
Intuit to avoid hiring each other’s employees.519 Following a DOJ
512. Id.
513. Id.
514. See Drummonds, supra note 31, at 408–09 (recapping a host of “spin-offs”
from the Google/Apple deal that triggered more allegations of collusion).
515. See Silicon Valley’s No Poaching Case: The Growing Debate over
Employee Mobility, U. PENN. (Apr. 30, 2014), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.
edu/article/silicon-valleys-poaching-case-growing-debate-employee-mobility/(last
visited Feb. 13, 2019) (referencing Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
516. Id.
517. Id.
518. David Streitfeld, Ebay Settles No-Poaching Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 1,
2014 (stating that “[t]he [federal antitrust settlement], announced by the Justice
Department . . ., follows the pattern of the department’s 2010 settlement against
Google, Apple, Intuit and other Silicon Valley companies over similar
accusations”).
519. See Howard Mintz, Ebay Settles No-Poaching Case with California,
MERCURY
NEWS
(May
1,
2014,
6:52
AM),
https://www.mercurynews.com/2014/05/01/ebay-settles-no-poaching-case-withcalifornia-and-u-s-government/ (last updated Aug. 12, 2016, 9:35 AM) (last visited
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investigation, eBay entered into a consent decree that bars the
company from entering into anticompetitive agreements for five
years.520 The popularity of anti-poaching agreements has led the
DOJ to take more extreme measures.521 In 2018, the Antitrust
Division announced that it would be proceeding with criminal
charges against companies that engage in anti-poaching
agreements rather than simply pursuing civil settlements.522
Aside from antitrust concerns and negative publicity,
anti-poaching agreements also negatively affect intrapreneurial
firms’ ability to procure intrapreneurs in their industry and to
effectively combine resources. In many situations, firms play a
dual role; they may be both the poached and the poachers.523
Companies utilize contractual restrictions on employees’ freedom
during and after employment.524 Yet, firms may face the same
restrictions when attempting to recruit intrapreneurs.525 Firms’
recruitment
efforts
to
maintain
their
team
of
employees-intrapreneurs may be restricted by the prevalence of
those same agreements.526 When hiring or retaining talented
intrapreneurs, intrapreneurial firms may be gridlocked by similar
employment-restricting covenants signed by sought after
employees.527 Consequently, they are left with either internal
talent (that might leave), new and inexperienced intrapreneurs, or
employees from other industries. Accordingly, their ability to
benefit from knowledge spillover and rejuvenated alertness to
innovative opportunities is lessened.528
Feb. 13, 2019) (noting that the government’s 2012 lawsuit against eBay focused
on allegations that top executives, including the company’s former CEO, entered
into anti-poaching “side deals” with Intuit) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
520. Id.
521. See Krotoski, supra note 502 and accompanying text.
522. See supra note 502 and accompanying text.
523. Drummonds, supra note 31, at 406 (“[T]oday’s poached employer may be
tomorrow’s poaching employer.”).
524. See supra note 466 and accompanying text.
525. See supra notes 487, 494–495 and accompanying text.
526. See supra notes 487, 494–495 and accompanying text.
527. Drummonds, supra note 31, at 407 (acknowledging that anti-poaching
agreements can be detrimental to a firm’s efforts to improve its workforce by
“tapping the labor available” in a free market).
528. See discussion supra Part III.B (stressing the importance of knowledge
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At times, companies who would like to attract instrumental
intrapreneurs will engage in “acqui-hiring”—buying the entire
company, rather than individual employees.529 In several of
Facebook and Google’s recent start-up acquisitions,530 it was not
the firm’s technology or resources that motivated the purchase.531
Rather, their main purpose was to enlist a contingent of the
start-up’s product engineers.532 This strategy helped to fulfill
intrapreneurial organizations’ intense demand for engineering
talent.533 Acqui-hiring, therefore, utilizes the human capital in the
firm, but forces the firm to relinquish the projects.534
Lastly, garden leave agreements are another form of lock-out
agreements.535 These covenants are signed by employees prior to
commencement of their employment at the firm or during a
post-employment settlement.536 Under those contracts, employees
continue to get paid their full salary during a period in which they
spillover and information-sharing among market players through employee exit
opportunities).
529. See John F. Coyle & Gregg D. Polsky, Acqui-Hiring, 63 DUKE L.J. 281,
283–84 (2013) (describing the process of firm purchase instead of employee
hiring).
530. See id. at 283 (noting that Facebook, Google, and other leading
companies in the Silicon Valley have been purchasing start-up companies “at a
brisk pace”).
531. See id. (“[T]he buyer has little interest in acquiring the startup’s projects
or assets.”).
532. See id. (reasoning that the buyer’s “primary motivation is to hire some
or all of the startup’s software engineers”).
533. See id. at 294 (recognizing that acqui-hiring allows large technology
companies to obtain the services of several talented engineers and entrepreneurs
“in one fell swoop”).
534. See Miguel Helft, For Buyers of Web Start-ups, Quest to Corral Young
Talent, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2011, at A1 (“Companies like Facebook, Google[,] and
Zynga are so hungry for the best talent that they are buying start-ups to get their
founders and engineers—and then jettisoning their products.”).
535. A garden leave clause, unlike a restrictive covenant, requires that the
employee provides the employer with a “specific, reasonably long period of notice
before terminating the employment.” Greg T. Lembrich, Note, Garden Leave: A
Possible Solution to the Uncertain Enforceability of Restrictive Employment
Covenants, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2291, 2292 (2002).
536. See id. at 2313 (criticizing pre-employment covenants restricting
post-employment periods).
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are restricted from competing with their former employers.537
Garden leave agreements have been mainly used in Europe,538 and
are based on the idea that “the employer pays the employee to stay
at home and tend to his or her ‘garden.’”539 They often also include
provisions similar to non-competition prohibitions.540
To conclude, keeping knowledge in the firm is a crucial
resource to encourage intrapreneurial firms to invest in human
capital.541 Yet, these types of lock-out labor restrictions may be a
step too far, creating several negative externalities.542 Aside from
placing a limitation on the ability of intrapreneurs to seek out and
utilize innovative opportunities, it inhibits the recruitment efforts
of intrapreneurial firms themselves.543 It inhibits innovative
knowledge spillover, and thus is harmful to society.544 The
restrictions placed via human capital lock-out practices seem
excessive because in contrast with human lock-in practices, they
not only limit the use of confidential knowledge but also place
restrictions on the freedom of employee mobility.545 The next Part
537. See id. at 2292 (noting also that the employer cannot force the employee
to perform any work during this period).
538. See Jeffrey S. Klein & Nichols J. Pappas, ‘Garden Leave’ Clauses in Lieu
of Non-Competes, 241 N.Y. L.J. 24, 24 (2009) (noting that employers in the U.K.
have been using these clauses for years, but that they are becoming increasingly
common among U.S. employers).
539. Id.
540. See id. at 25 (explaining that garden leave agreements often contain
provisions “prohibiting the employee from working for another employer during
the term of the agreement”).
541. See discussion supra Part III.B (emphasizing the importance of training
and knowledge within intrapreneurial firms in order to maintain “human capital
as greenhouses for future entrepreneurs”).
542. See Drummonds, supra note 31, at 417 (arguing that employees who may
feel bound by a restrictive agreement “not to use the ideas, skills, knowledge, and
creative and innovative potential they have acquired,” thus negatively impacting
the employee, the collective employers, and the larger economy).
543. See id. (acknowledging that the flow of information and
cross-fertilization inherent in changing employers is so often restricted by the
“vague application of trade secrets . . . and the existence of [non-disclosure
agreements] and similar contractual restrictions applying post-employment”).
544. See discussion supra Part III.B (emphasizing the importance of
knowledge spillover to the development of innovation in society).
545. Gilson, supra note 464, at 595 (“[A]n individual employer has an obvious
competitive interest in protecting its intellectual capital which . . . is
accomplished by restricting employee mobility.”).
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will attempt to find a balance between the positive and negative
spillovers of intrapreneurships.
VI. Balancing the Interests of Innovation Agents
The continuous supply of entrepreneurial talent, exit
opportunities, and knowledge spillovers are central social benefits
produced by intrapreneurial firms.546 However, the latter also
creates social harms by attempting to curb the drift of competitive
knowledge out of the firm or free ride it by raiding other firms’
employees.547
Post-employment
restrictive
contracts
or
anti-poaching arrangements do not foster idea sharing or alertness
to new opportunities.548 They confine the freedom and exchange of
knowledge across organizations, industries, and markets.549
Intrapreneurial firms may motivate employees’ loyalty daily
by adopting various practices. 550 Bonuses, financial incentives,
and ownership participation based on long-term individual
546. See discussion supra Part III.
547. See supra Part IV.
548. See Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña, Spill Your (Trade) Secrets: Knowledge
Networks as Innovation Drivers, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1561, 1590 (2017)
(explaining that non-competes and trade secrets deter employees from sharing
information across boundaries of departments and firms and also deter employers
from hiring employees who have been deeply involved in projects to avoid costly
litigation).
549. See Norman D. Bishara, Covenants Not to Compete in a Knowledge
Economy: Balancing Innovation from Employee Mobility Against Legal Protection
for Human Capital Investment, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 287, 308 (2006)
(arguing that eliminating non-competes allows for technical information and
innovation to be shared quickly, without restrictions, and noting this type of
sharing and the ban on non-competes allowed Silicon Valley to be innovative and
successful, while other industries have decidedly floundered in comparison).
550. See Norman D. Bishara, Covenants Not to Compete in a Knowledge
Economy: Balancing Innovation from Employee Mobility Against Legal Protection
for Human Capital Investment, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 287, 308 (2006)
(arguing that eliminating non-competes allows for technical information and
innovation to be shared quickly, without restrictions, and noting this type of
sharing and the ban on non-competes allowed Silicon Valley to be innovative and
successful, while other industries have decidedly floundered in comparison); see
MORRIS, KURATKO & COVIN, supra note 378, at 192 (describing employee
motivation to “achieve awards” that “can take any number of forms”).
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performance are some examples.551 Emphasizing job security is
another.552 Yet, in many situations involving intrapreneurs these
are not sufficient.553 Competitors’ poaching, dissatisfaction from
organizational bottlenecks, or the urge to embark on an
independent path contribute to the desire of some intrapreneurs to
exit firms and take with them the knowledge they attained.554
Although many of the capabilities of the firm are “fungible” and
can be applied to different productive activities, much of the firm’s
knowledge cannot be codified and remains implicit.555 This
“organizational technology and knowledge” is separate and greater
than the individual intrapreneurs’ knowledge.556 The latter often
cannot completely identify and separate their own part in it.557
Why should firms continue to groom intrapreneurial agents
knowing that they may act autonomously or strategically?

551. See id. (“Some people seek financial rewards; others seek power and
status; while still others strive for personal development and career
enhancement, self-actualization, or social rewards (e.g., friendships and
camaraderie).”).
552. See id. at 194 (listing job security among a long list of potential intrinsic
and extrinsic rewards that may provide entrepreneurial motivation).
553. See Samuel Bacharach, How to Retain Your Intrapreneurs, INC. (Jan. 2,
2014), https://www.inc.com/samuel-bacharach/how-to-retain-intrapreneurs.html
(last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (stating that when innovation is hampered within a
company, intrapreneurs may be driven out to seek entrepreneurial opportunities)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
554. See id. (explaining that bureaucratic procedures and inflexible company
policies may harm the creativity of intrapreneurs and cause them to look for work
elsewhere).
555. See Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Law School Matrix: Reforming
Legal Education in a Culture of Competition and Conformity, 60 VAND. L. REV.
515, 521–22 (2007) (noting that culture is “knowledge, techniques, norms, rules,
and behavioral patterns” that employees essentially absorb throughout their
employed time at a company. It can include “collective rites of passage, . . . how
value is assessed and communicated, and how status is negotiated . . . .”).
556. See Rachel S. Arnow-Richman, Bargaining for Loyalty in the Information
Age: A Reconsideration of the Role of Substantive Fairness in Enforcing Employee
Noncompetes, 80 OR. L. REV. 1163, 1189 (2001) (stating that “not all proprietary
information can be easily captured or defined” within a company because it is
frequently “composite or abstract”).
557. See MICHAEL POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE: TOWARDS A POST-CRITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 5 (1958) (explaining the great difficulty for individuals to objectively
understand their contributions).
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The answer to the question above lies in the innovation
process. Strategic behavior of intrapreneurs, in and of itself,
provides the means for extending the firms’ frontiers of
discovery.558 Intrapreneurial mobility reveals unique resource
combinations and expands firms’ synergies and capabilities.559 It
enlarges the firms’ organizational abilities and provides new
avenues for future development.560
There are various private ordering measures intrapreneurial
players can take that may be effective. Whether financial,
professional, or social, rewards greatly impact employees’
motivation and retention.561 Some influential factors that
contribute to successful retention of intrapreneurs include power
and status,562 personal development and career advancement,563

558. See Ibrahim, supra note 35, at 1746–47 (claiming that entrepreneurial
disruptive innovations can destroy or end up occupying the niche filled by a
corporation in some way, while internal entrepreneurship or intrapreneurship
can strategically avoid disruptions that replace them, and put them on the
forefront of innovation).
559. See Charles A. Sullivan, Tending the Garden: Restricting Competition via
“Garden Leave,” 37 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 293, 319 (2016) (arguing that
“heightened employee mobility ensures knowledge spillovers”); see also Magnus
Henrekson, Entrepreneurship and Institutions, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 717,
737–38 (2007) (noting that mobility between tasks and groups is an ideal
condition, and the productivity growth of a company has been seen to correlate
with the gross flow of workers).
560. See Long, supra note 490, at 1320 (allowing companies to retain trained
employees helps protect the economic investment in people which is an interest
they are looking to protect).
561. See MORRIS, KURATKO & COVIN, supra note 378, at 192 (“Clearly, rewards
represent a very potent tool to influence employee behavior on the job . . . .”).
562. See Matthew Kenney & Bahaudin G. Mujtaba, Understanding Corporate
Entrepreneurship and Development: A Practitioner View of Organizational
Intrapreneurship, 12 J. OF APPLIED MGMT. & ENTREPRENEURSHIP 73, 74 (2007)
(arguing that successful entrepreneurial firms encourage competition and
recognition for successful innovations).
563. See id. at 78 (discussing the importance for firms to provide training and
support for intrapreneurial employees).
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self-completion,564 or friendship and social rewards.565 Naturally,
intrapreneurs also seek solid financial rewards and pay system.566
Scholars argue that these financial rewards must be extensive in
order to motivate employees-intrapreneurs not to leave the
organization and pursue entrepreneurship independently.567
Intrapreneurs may also attempt to narrow the scope of their
post-employment agreements specifically to the use of protected
knowledge, rather than to future employment in general.568
Knowing that intrapreneurs may leave, intrapreneurial firms
can take the following precautions to lower their risk.569 They may
limit access to the sensitive information available to each
intrapreneur or restrict access to only a few trusted employees.570
Firms may assign ownership interest to these individuals to
increase their incentives for positive participation in the
enterprise..571 Firms may also act more rapidly in rewarding or
564. See id. at 75 (describing the need to encourage employees to be in charge
of their innovation project and negotiate for the ability to bring the new process
or product to the market).
565. See MORRIS, KURATKO & COVIN, supra note 378, at 193–94 (noting that
other contributing factors include: compensation and/or reward practices,
emphasized job security over high pay, selection of staffing, and job design).
566. See Marianna Makri, Peter J. Lane & Luis R. Gomez-Mejia, CEO
Incentives, Innovation, and Performance in Technology-Intensive Firms: A
Reconciliation of Outcome and Behavior-Based Incentive Schemes, 27 STRATEGIC
MGMT. J. 1057, 1058 (2006) (discussing the need for both outcome-based and
behavior-based bonuses to incentivize CEO innovation and implementation of
new developments).
567. See PINCHOT, supra note 334, at 95 (noting that financial rewards are
important but are not the only factor that motivates intrapreneurs).
568. See Matthew Rossetti, Non-Competes: Useful or Futile?, FORBES (Jan. 30,
2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbeslegalcouncil/2018/01/30/noncompetes-useful-or-futile/#45f493426581 (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (reporting
that employers bear the burden of proving the reasonableness of non-competes
and employees are encouraged to look over the agreement with a lawyer before
signing and bargain for the most reasonable agreement) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
569. See id. (using non-compete clauses as a way to combat potential loss of
intrapreneurs); Chris Opfer, The Coca-Cola Hack and Who’s on Hook for Office
Cybersecurity, BLOOMBERG NEWS, (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.bna.com/cocacolahack-whos-n73014474058/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (providing restriction of
information as another method of reducing loss—should employees decide to
leave) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
570. For example, Coca-Cola restricts employee access to its secret formula.
See Opfer, supra note 569.
571. See MORRIS, KURATKO & COVIN, supra note 378, at 194 (mentioning that
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firing intrapreneurial actors based on their performance.572 In
order to prevent the problem of other companies’ free-riding
investment in human capital, firms may also take advantage of
repayment agreements.573 These covenants require employees to
reimburse firms for their training expenses if they resign before
their employer recoups such investments.574 Although cases
involving such agreements are rare, courts have shown willingness
to enforce them.575 Such agreements could, therefore, be used to
offset some of the negative effects of poaching of low or middle-rank
employees.576
Nevertheless, in some cases, private ordering solutions may
not work and parties acting opportunistically may threaten the
firm’s future operations or limit employment freedom.577
Organizational information, client lists, confidential information,
strategic planning, and product-planning data may encompass
trade secrets and competitive knowledge that are the frequent
subject of litigation.578 Yet, if such protected information will be
a potential reward for an employee is “equity or shares in the company”).
572. See Richard A. Peterson, Entrepreneurship and Organization, in
HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN 10 (Paul C. Nystrom & William H.
Starbuck eds., 1981) (describing four ways to efficiency design entrepreneurship
in an organization).
573. See Long, supra note 490, at 1297 (“[R]epayment agreements offer a
sensible alternative whereby an employer’s level of protection moves in lockstep
with the cost of, and value derived from, the training.”).
574. See id. (explaining the benefit of repayment agreements compared to
non-compete agreements because of the ability to directly regain an investment
made in training).
575. See, e.g., Milwaukee Area Joint Apprenticeship Training Comm. v.
Howell, 67 F.3d 1333, 1340 (7th Cir. 1995) (upholding a repayment clause when
it required an electrical apprentice to repay the cost of his training to an
apprentice training trust fund after he chose to work for a competitor).
576. See id. at 1340 (explaining public benefits of this type of provision so that
“freeloading” companies do not benefit from funds spent by others to train their
employees).
577. See Bishara, supra note 549, at 301 (describing the incentives which
motivate employees to leave for other companies to “maximize her wages”
allowing another opportunistic company to benefit from their investment in
training).
578. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (AM. LAW INST.
1995) (defining a trade secret as something that is not readily or publicly known,
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construed narrowly, intrapreneurial firms will adjust their
practices and coordinate the appropriate degree of exposure of each
employee-intrapreneur to other factors such as rewards,
advancement, and equity.579
On the other hand, since innovative knowledge is non-rival
and uncertain, there is also a need to reassure firms that will
invest in its procurement and in training future entrepreneurs.580
In cases such as the Uber–Google saga, it seems appropriate to
limit the ability to use confidential information, rather than limit
the intrapreneurs’ mobility. A balance can be struck by limiting
the ability of such employees to work on projects (not firms) with
similar technology for a reasonable period of time.581 In such
circumstances, legal doctrines such as fiduciary and loyalty duties
can be construed widely.582 Utilizing these doctrines,
intrapreneurs should be restricted from misappropriating
confidential information directly to compete with their employer or
to solicit customers or employees to leave the organization.583 On
the same token, while employed, intrapreneurs should not be
utilizing the organization’s property and time while pursuing
has commercial value because of its secrecy, and the company or corporation has
taken reasonable steps to ensure that the information remains a secret); see also
Edmund W. Kitch, The Expansion of Trade Secrecy Protection and the Mobility of
Management Employees: A New Problem for Law, 47 S.C. L. REV. 659, 660 (1996)
(arguing that the Restatement’s new expansive definition impacts a much larger
number of people now).
579. See James Bessen, How Companies Kill Their Employees’ Job Searches,
ATLANTIC, (Oct. 17, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/10/
how-companies-kill-their-employees-job-searches/381437/ (last visited Feb. 13,
2019) (reporting overall, enforcement of these non-competes reduces investment
into employees) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
580. See supra note 443 and accompanying text.
581. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2012) (providing a cause of action for unfair
competition).
582. See Arnow-Richman, supra note 556, at 1207 (arguing that the duty of
loyalty is part of the fiduciary duty, and under tort law, stops employee from
directly competing or in any way acting against the employer’s interest while the
employee works for the employer).
583. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.05 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (stating
that an employee cannot “use or communicate confidential information” of his
employer for the employee’s own benefit or purposes or for a third party’s benefit
or purpose); see also Leslie Larkin Cooney, Employee Fiduciary Duties: One Size
Does Not Fit All, 79 MISS. L.J. 853, 855 (2010) (declaring that if “an employee uses
the employer’s property or communicates confidential information, the employee
violates an agent’s duty of loyalty”).
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independent
opportunities.584
And
when
leaving
the
intrapreneurial firm, intrapreneurs’ duties prevent them from
taking advantage of opportunities they learned about while
working at their previous organization.585
Moreover, post-employment agreements should not seek to
punish the intrapreneur for leaving the firm.586 They may also not
seek to over restrict their mobility for reasons mentioned above.587
Rather, intrapreneurial firms may limit the use of knowledge
employees possess to secure a return on their immense
investments in procuring innovation.588 Legal arrangements
should play a key role in upholding an effective balance between
the two goals.589 Courts should prohibit exiting intrapreneurs from
misusing intangibles and trade secrets rested in their intellects.590
Such is the case of military and intelligence personnel who are
exposed to sensitive materials and whose mobility is kept through
robust legal protection and application of classified information
laws.591 With the appropriate balance of free mobility and
584. See Cooney, supra at note 583, at 859 (claiming that the duty of loyalty
encompasses activity and conduct of the employee that is inconsistent with his
employer’s interests and goals).
585. See Bishara, supra note 549, at 289 (explaining it is common to create
contractual duties by agreeing that “they would not use confidential information
gained from their employment, or for a limited time, compete against their former
employers”).
586. See Long, supra note 490, at 1308 (stating that contractual terms that
are “particularly injurious” are more likely to violate public policy and be
invalidated by a court).
587. See id. (following similar logic, severe restrictions on geographic location
may also make the term unenforceable).
588. See id. at 1304 (using restrictive covenants to prevent employees from
sharing acquired knowledge may protect the company, but they likely reduce the
employer’s ability to hire employees who value job mobility).
589. See id. at 1305 (“[C]ourts use a balancing test whereby the various policy
considerations are weighed to determine the outcome best attuned to the interests
of the employee, employer, and the general public.”).
590. See id. at 1303 (“Noncompete advocates also argue that restrictions are
necessary to subvert attempts by rogue employees to poach trade secrets and
customer lists, which could be used to gain advantage over former employers.”).
591. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 798 (2012) (punishing disclosure of classified
information); Counterintelligence and Security Enhancements Act of 1994, Pub.
Title VIII of P.L. No. 103–359, §§ 801–04, 108 Stat. 3421 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§
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restricted use, firms might begin treating their former employees
as alumni and their exit as a revolving door.592
Achieving a balance between protecting the interests of both
intrapreneurial firms and employees-intrapreneurs will allow the
latter to leverage their skills and knowledge in the external labor
markets.593 It will preserve intrapreneurial firms’ ability to
safeguard their competitive information, to recruit future
intrapreneurs, and to train the next generation of
entrepreneurs.594 It will serve the social interests of
cross-fertilization and alertness to innovations.595
B. Tax Law
In his essay, The Microtheory of Innovative Entrepreneurship,
Baumol discussed the classical tripartite division of “factors of
production”—land, labor, and capital.596 He added the supply of
entrepreneurship and created “a genuine four-group subdivision of
the economy’s inputs.”597 To amend the effect of market failures of
innovation, namely uncertainty and non-rivalry that result in
underinvestment in innovation, the government utilizes the tax
3161–64 (2012) (explaining the procedures for gaining access to classified
government information as well as investigations of alleged leaks of classified
information). See generally JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21900,
THE PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK (2017),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/RS21900.pdf (summarizing the current laws that
form the legal framework protecting classified information).
592. See LOBEL, supra note 28, at 210 (pointing to the benefits of creating a
network of former employees in hiring new employees and learning about new
opportunities).
593. See Long, supra note 490, at 1301 (protecting both sides is necessary
because “employers will invest in training only if they recoup that investment by
exploiting the skills of those who receive the training” and workers will not sign
overly restrictive contracts that may seriously affect their future rights).
594. See Bishara, supra note 549, at 296 (“Business efficiency and profitability
are driven by effective hiring, training, and retention of productive employees.”).
595. See Ibrahim, supra note 35, at 414 (opining that these employment
restrictions constitute legitimate employer interests that the law may properly
protect).
596. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, THE MICROTHEORY OF INNOVATIVE
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 18 (2010) (explaining these factors of production are
distinguished from one another based on their supply conditions).
597. Id. at 189.
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system by deploying various tax rules and incentives.598 Each of
these institutions operates differently. Yet, the literature
exploring these innovation-spending programs has paid little
attention as to how to coordinate and harmonize them with
innovation.599 I argue here that tax policies should more accurately
match the choice of spending mechanism to the kind of innovation
process it seeks to embolden. More specifically, I suggest that tax
incentives that aim to bolster entrepreneurship should focus on
capital creation, while tax spending on intrapreneurship ought to
target labor and human capital.
The process of creating innovation is not homogenous and
different actors necessitate diverse treatment. Various agents of
innovation unpack innovation in a discrete way, and thus, deserve
distinct tax consideration. For example, issues of entity taxation,
taxation of labor and capital, and innovation tax incentives should
be reconsidered alongside the challenges and boundaries of
innovation theory. Applying similar spending programs on
dissimilar innovation agents does not necessarily promote the
same type of desired outcome.
The literature that discusses the intersection of public
spending and innovation has generally focused on the effectiveness
(or lack thereof) of tax incentives in reducing or eliminating chronic
market failures.600 And scholars that argued for or against using
such indirect spending focused on factors such as administrability,
efficiency, and the complexity of such incentives.601 Others argued
598. See David Hasen, Taxation and Innovation—A Sectorial Approach, 2017
U. ILL. L. REV. 1043, 1048 (2017) (stating there is underinvestment in innovation
because although “parties value the information and would pay for it if they were
compelled, but because they are not compelled, information producers end up
undercompensated”).
599. See id. at 1059 (“[M]ost tax regimes designed to promote innovation
needlessly trade off equity and efficiency, and come at the cost of introducing new
distortions in other sectors, as rates must be raised there to pay for tax benefits
for innovation.”).
600. See id. at 1045 (“Most of the tax scholarship . . . begins from
the . . . proposition that policy-makers ought to use the tax law . . . to ameliorate
the problem of information underproduction. Adopting or expanding special tax
rules that in some way favor innovation will result in more information
production, thereby mitigating the market failure.”).
601. See id. at 1085 (explaining a wide range of incentives exist from “ex ante
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that special tax rules for innovation are inappropriate. Their
assumption lays on the notion that tax incentives do not correct
externalities, but compensate for them with other mechanisms
that create deadweight loss.602 Lastly, scholars also claimed that
the tax system may be inappropriate to administer innovation
spending under certain circumstances.603 Yet, this debate in
literature is incomplete. It lacks an understanding of the way
public spending correlates to the innovation process. Innovations
are not created equally or taxed in the same manner.
To name a few examples, young entrepreneurial ventures do
not have much ability to rely on after-tax equity or external debt
financing.604 The risk-smoothing effect of deductible losses is less
relevant for these innovation agents with mostly negative net
income.605 They have a lesser ability to reduce taxes on successful
projects by utilizing past losses.606 The R&D tax credit is focused
on capital investments, rather than targeting training and
development of future entrepreneurs, and claimed mainly by
intrapreneurial firms, although in its inception it set to embolden
incentives [that] include principally government grants and tax deductions or
credits, while ex post incentives include principally patents, prizes, and reduced
taxes for income from innovative activity”).
602. See id. at 1089 (proposing that rather than adopting special tax rules
policymakers should instead adopt rules that counteract excessively large
tax-induced risk taking distortions).
603. See, e.g., Jacob Nussim & Anat Sorek, Theorizing Tax Incentives for
Innovation, 36 VA. TAX REV. 25, 81 (2017) (concluding if the government wants to
efficiently incentivize innovation then “cash transfers are generally superior to
tax incentives” and they should be administered by a “subject-matter agency”
rather than a tax agency); David A. Weisbach, Tax Expenditures, Principal-Agent
Problems, and Redundancy, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1823, 1824 (2006) (explaining
the IRS may be the most appropriate administrator to handle “income and in
processing paper” but in other areas different specialized agencies may be more
efficient and therefore better administrators).
604. See Magnus Henrekson & Tino Sanandaji, Entrepreneurship and the
Theory of Taxation, 37 SMALL BUS. ECON. 167, 168 (2011) (explaining that the
options for those starting new businesses are limited because they lack these two
options for eliminating taxation costs).
605. See Louis Kaplow, Taxation and Risk Taking: A General Equilibrium
Perspective, 47 NAT’L TAX J. 789, 794 n.6 (1994) (“[E]ntrepreneurs voluntarily bear
nonsystematic risk to improve their incentives, the provision of government
compulsory partial insurance through taxation would be welfare reducing.”).
606. See Henrekson, supra note 604, at 181 (“Since entrepreneurial
investments are discrete in nature, and since entrepreneurs are not able to carry
over losses from bad to good investments, a distortion will arise as a result.”).
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entrepreneurship.607 Taxation of stock options does not take into
account the strong desire of employees-intrapreneurs to become
independent entrepreneurs and exit the company.608 Taxation of
intellectual property is relevant generally to intrapreneurial firms
that are in a position of ripping profits609 compared to
entrepreneurial agents that are first and foremost occupied with
transforming their human capital into such intangible rights.610
The cost of the capital framework and the principle of neutrality
have both been valuable tools for economists and policymakers.
Yet, cost of capital formulas have been originally rested on
observations of the behavior of large, public firms. Consequently,
these formulas have a tendency to underestimate the distortions
caused by taxing entrepreneurial agents.611
Policymakers endeavoring to create a more accurate allocation
of innovation-spending programs first need to inquire about what
type of innovation process they seek to embolden.612 Direct
spending granted ex ante tend to be more beneficial to
funding-constrained entrepreneurial agents.613 Tax incentive
programs that involve complex calculations and planning will
607. See 26 U.S.C. § 41 (2012) (describing the tax credit available for research
activities that meet the listed qualifications).
608. See Bacharach, supra note 553 and accompanying text.
609. See Hasen, supra note 598, at 1049 (discussing the tax system which
allows deductions of costs “if the inventor plans to market the patent in the
inventor’s own trade or business,” favoring larger companies over entrepreneurs
who may be forced to license their intellectual property rights and therefore must
capitalize the costs).
610. See Bishara, supra note 549, at 296 (explaining “the value of many of
today’s companies, particularly high-tech companies and other knowledge-based
industries, is tied up in the creative services provided by the human capital of
their employees” because they are the innovators who drive intellectual property
creation).
611. See Hasen, supra note 598 and accompanying text.
612. See Henrekeson, supra note 604, at 176 (“[F]irms and sectors that largely
utilize physical capital reap greater benefits from tax code provisions that favor
debt financing. This aspect of the tax system favors capital-intensive industries
and modes of production over labor and knowledge intensive ones, which works
to the detriment of entrepreneurial, often equity-constrained firms.”).
613. See id. at 168 (stating small and less diversified companies have a harder
time reducing tax impact compared to larger public firms).
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usually be utilized by more established intrapreneurial agents that
benefit from certain economies of experience in tax compliance and
administration.614 In an economy with limited resources,
intrapreneurial agents that possess economies of scope, scale, and
age are not necessarily in need of high-level innovation tax
incentives that aim to boost research and experimentation.
Through the potential for supra-competitive premiums that the
innovative process offers, they already possess such inherent
incentives.
VII. Conclusion
It has been long established that technological innovations
enhance productivity and are key drivers of economic growth.615
Innovations provide a missing link by commercializing discoveries
that might otherwise remain dormant and providing opportunities
for social mobility.616 Yet, this Article argued that different
innovation agents unpack discoveries in distinct ways.
Understating the taxonomy of innovation agencies has
implications in broader policy debates in corporate governance,617
taxation of labor and capital,618 employment litigation,619 and so on.
614. See id. at 168 (“[D]ebt financing is less costly and more readily available
for larger and more established firms, high statutory tax rates couple with
tax-deductible interest payments work to the disadvantage of smaller firms and
potential entrepreneurs.”).
615. See Schumpeter, supra note 50, at 260 (criticizing Say’s contribution to
the theory of entrepreneurship, describing it as “the pithy statement that the
entrepreneur’s function is to combine the factors of production into a producing
organism” where “[s]uch a statement may indeed mean much or little”).
616. See, e.g., Ács, Audretsch & Strom, supra note 66, at 1; Klepper, supra
note 404, at 79 (describing successful entrepreneurship as a form of social
mobility and increasing standard of living).
617. See Ilene Knable Gotts, The “Innovation Market”: Competitive Fact or
Regulatory Fantasy?, 44 PRAC. LAW. 79, 79 (1998) (stating that “[i]nnovation can
play an important role in the marketplace by affecting both the pace and extent
of new product development”).
618. See Brett Frischmann, Innovations and Institutions: Rethinking the
Economics of U.S. Science and Technology Policy, 24 VT. L. REV. 347, 354 (2000)
(explaining how the market can be affected or modified by “R&D tax incentives”).
619. See Viral V. Acharya, Ramin P. Baghai & Krishnamurthy V.
Subramanian, Labor Laws and Innovation, 56 J.L. & ECON. 997, 997 (2013)
(investigating “whether the legal framework governing the relationships
between employees and their employers affects the extent of innovation in an
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Innovation theory provides various challenges to the boundaries of
legal doctrines.
Intrapreneurial enterprises stimulate innovation and have a
unique way of inciting market changes.620 They have considerable
resources and funding to invest in innovation and to attract and
incentivize employees-intrapreneurs.621 These innovation agents
benefit from economies of experience that enables them to make
large investments in knowledge procurement.622 Yet, competitive
pressures from other conglomerates and the will to “stay in the
game,” motivate intrapreneurial firms to free-ride and poach
employees from each other, which increases litigation relating to
confidential knowledge and constraints on employee mobility.623
Maintaining successful private sector innovation necessitates a
careful balance between the interests of intrapreneurial
organizations, intrapreneurs, and society.624
This Article conceptually integrated the idea of “corporate
entrepreneurship” with innovation theory and legal doctrines
economy”).
620. See id. at 298.
621. See Becker et al., supra note 49, at 18–19 (noting criticism of the
Schumpeterian hypothesis that large firms are more innovative than small
firms); see, e.g., William B. Gartner & Nancy M. Carter, Entrepreneurial Behavior
and Firm Organizing Processes, in HANDBOOK OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP RESEARCH
195 (Zoltán J. Ács & David B. Audretsch eds., 2003) (“Entrepreneurial behavior
involves the activities of individuals who are associated with creating new
organizations rather than the activities of individuals who are involves with
maintaining or changing the operations of on-going established organizations.”).
622. BAUMOL, supra note 32, at 28 (pointing to the benefits of economies of
size in commercialization of innovations); see also Beth Altringer, A New Model
for Innovation in Big Companies, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov. 19, 2013),
https://hbr.org/2013/11/a-new-model-for-innovation-in-big-companies
(last
visited Feb. 13, 2019) (describing how entrepreneurial teams work within big
firms to generate and refine new products) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
623. See Bishara, supra note 549, at 296 (“Employers are aware that the
quality of a business’s employees is an inescapable component of a business’s
success and is worth fighting to protect. Business efficiency and profitability are
driven by effective hiring, training, and retention of productive employees.”).
624. See LOBEL, supra note 28, at 77 (explaining British Economist Alfred
Marshall’s theory that the tendency is for free labor markets to flourish in certain
areas and ultimately contribute to knowledge spillover).
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relating to human capital. Yet, many related questions remain
open. It seems appropriate to conclude this paper by restating
some of them. Do courts effectively distinguish between exiting
intrapreneurs that in good faith serve the innovation process and
those that hamper it? What are the short-term and long-term
effects of legal constraints of employees-intrapreneurs on the
market? While this paper did not provide definite answers to these
questions, it did mark an effort to raise awareness of the issues
intrapreneurial firms and employees-intrapreneurs face in the
search for opportunities in the innovative process.
Further empirical research and theoretical inquiries are
desirable to improve our understanding of strategic behavior of
intrapreneurial players.625 Such efforts could also shed more light
on the symmetry–asymmetry of the relationship between the
organization, exiting intrapreneurs, and former employees.
Finally, intrapreneurship in the pharmaceutical, IT, or service
industries are not equal. The conditions under which legal designs
affect intrapreneurial firms in different industries need further
study. Progress in understanding the process of corporate
entrepreneurship may help the development of new legal
approaches to facilitate the collaboration between entrepreneurial
individuals and the organizations in which they are willing to exert
their innovative spirit.
****

625. See Muhammad Farrukh, Chong Wei Ying & Shaheen Mansori,
Intrapreneurial Behavior: An Empirical Investigation of Personality Traits, 11
MGMT. & MARKETING: CHALLENGES FOR KNOWLEDGE SOC’Y 597, 609 (2016)
(examining some intrapreneurial traits).

